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My research in Romania examines the presence of politics in the everyday lives of youth 
in the 1980s. While most research on youth’s political opinions focuses on First World 
democracies, my work examines how political education took place in the tightly controlled, 
non-democratic context of communist Romania. I tried to understand how Romanian youth 
experienced politics in their everyday lives in the 1980s, under a “totalitarian-sultanistic” system. 
I try to answer this question by looking at three levels: the lived and remembered experience of 
students and their teachers, the “indoctrination” materials such textbooks and policy documents 
they were exposed to, and the social research from the 1980s aimed at assessing the effectiveness 
of their “indoctrination”.  
My findings show that ideological indoctrination of youth in 1980s Romania existed 
more as intent (Party policies) than as outcome, thus rendering the “totalitarian” frame as 
outdated for the analysis of everyday life. The education system and youth organizations that 
were supposed to do the “indoctrination work” did it an inept and ambivalent fashion, and 
whatever they accomplished in schools was further deconstructed in autonomous spaces of 
expression within family and friendship circles. Furthermore, research commissioned by youth 
organizations and collected in the 1980s clearly shows evidence of their failing and awareness of 
it among members of the regime.  
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1.0  POLITICS OF A GENERATION 
FLASH BACK / FLESH BACK 
by Saviana Stanescu 
 
1990 – I am revolutionary 
1989 – I am alive 
1988 – I am insane 
1987 – I am stuck 
1986 – I am a student 
1985 – I am graduating 
1984 – I am a poet 
1983 – I am in high school 
1982 – I am stuck 
1981 – I am a ‘young communist’ 
1980 – I am 13 
1979 – I am a Pioneer 
1978 – I am stuck 
1977 – I am the best 
1976 – I am the worst 
1975 – I am declaiming poems with Ceausescu 
1974 – I am reading poems with Ceausescu 
1973 – I am taught poems with Ceausescu 
1972 – I am happy 
1971 – I am laughing 
1970 – I am playing 
1969 – I am talking 
1968 – I am walking 
1967 – I am born 
FLESH FORWARD 
 
For many members of the successful New York playwright and poet’s Saviana Stanescu 
generation, it seems that as more time separated them from the past, the more salient the past 
became in how they made sense of their place in this world. They were the generation born in the 
years after Ceausescu’s rise to power (1965) that completed high school before Ceausescu’s fall 
in 1989. They were the last generation to be educated with the goal of serving the socialist 
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system and the first one to be thrust into adulthood, democracy, and market capitalism at the 
same time. Stanescu’s reflections on her youth years are symptomatic for this generation as 
reflected in an increasing number of cultural productions. During the past decade, an 
unprecedented number of films were produced (often called the Romanian film “New Wave”), 
including documentaries like Cold Waves, Children of the Decree and also autobiographies, oral 
histories, plays, blogs, forums and social research emerged (described in detail in CHAPTER 
TWO), all drawing from everyday life experiences of the 1980s.  
Aside from noting the uniqueness of this generation I belong to as well, I wondered about 
the political component of the experiences that bring them together as a generation and about the 
broader political context that structured these experiences. I sought to cast some light on the 
political upbringing of these young Romanians about whom little is known by way of research 
and who were only thought of as products of the “totalitarian communist regime”. Although I 
find the totalitarian regime categorization useful for describing political regimes in broad, geo-
political terms, it offers little insight into the more micro level of everyday life experience. 
Furthermore, such broad categories speak more about the political regimes’ intentions, 
propaganda and policies then about their non-organized, non-elite political subjects.  
Perhaps a good way of understanding the aim of my work is to look at the most studied 
and controversial totalitarian regime in history, Nazi Germany, and the three distinct phases that 
marked the scholarship trying to understand this regime outlined by Eric Johnson.1 The first 
phase was characterized by a top-down approach, influenced by Hannah Arendt2’s Orwellian-
inspired work on totalitarianism, that emphasized the immense power of the Nazi regime and its 
                                                 
1 Eric A Johnson, Nazi Terror: the Gestapo, Jews, and ordinary Germans (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 
10–21. 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1966). 
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secret service arm, the Gestapo over the German population. The second phase (1960-1980), 
based more on archival and social research, challenged the previous paradigm and ushered in a 
more nuanced view showing divisions, contradictions, resistance, and a lot more diversity within 
both the regime and the population.3 The third and most recent phase took the focus on everyday 
life and ordinary citizens to a new level, showing they not only engaged in resistance activities 
but through their willing complicity, support, and voluntary aid sustained the Gestapo and Nazi 
regime activity. Johnson’s research in the archives from Cologne uncovered similar 
“complicities,” but at the same time he warned about the dangers of simplistic interpretations of 
such findings, such as downplaying the role of repression and the Gestapo and trivializing the 
role of the opposition. Most Germans, he argues, “[…] were motivated not by a willful intent to 
harm others, but by a mixture of cowardice, apathy, and a slavish obedience to authority.”4 
Research on the Ceausescu regime in Romania went through a similar first top-down 
phase and over the past ten years started moving in the direction of more nuanced and research 
grounded direction.5 By introducing the everyday life accounts in my research I took on a similar 
task of uncovering the ways in which the experience of ordinary citizens complicates the 
totalitarian frame through resistance or complicity, without losing sight of the repressive context 
in which it occurred.  
                                                 
3 See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New 
York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1996); Christopher R Browning, OrdinaryMen: Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). 
4 Johnson, NaziTerror, 21. 
5 See Ruxandra Ivan, Daniel Barbu, and Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România, 
“Transformarea Socialista”: Politici ale Regimului Comunist între Ideologie si Administratie (Iasi: Polirom, 2009); 
Zoltán Rostás and Andrei Pippidi, Chipurile Orasului: Istorii de Viata în Bucuresti: Secolul XX (Iasi: Polirom, 
2002); Zoltán Rostás and Sorin Stoica, Istorie la Firul Ierbii: Documente Sociale Orale (Bucuresti: Tritonic, 2003). 
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In one of the most complex and thorough regime classifications by Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan6 Romania is categorized as a “Totalitarian-cum-Sultanistic” regime, according to four 
comparative dimensions: pluralism, ideology, leadership and mobilization. It was a totalitarian 
regime because it has “eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social 
pluralism, had a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, intensive and extensive 
mobilization, and a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great 
unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and nonelites alike”7 and “sultanistic”8 because it 
was ruled in a dynastic, highly personalized fashion by the Ceausescu family.  
                                                
In terms of leadership and repressive policies Romania was similar to East Germany: 
they were both ruled by old and conservative communists, Nicolae Ceausescu, respectively, and 
Erich Honecker. Both Ceausescu and Honecker were very averse to attempts to reform the 
economy or the political system, and visibly opposed Gorbachev’s policy of openness and call 
for reform. In order to preserve their power they both set up the infamous secret services, 
“Securitate” and “Stasi”, whose main mission was to keep the population under extensive 
surveillance and fear.9 The limited but significant political and economic pluralism placed 
Poland in the “authoritarian” category, while Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria shared the 
“post-totalitarian” categorization, due to their “limited responsible social and economic and 
institutional pluralism, no political pluralism, official guiding ideology but weakened 
 
6 Juan Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 
Post-communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
7 Ibid., 39. 
8 “In sultanism the private and the public are fused, there is a strong tendency toward familial power and 
dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a state career and personal service to the ruler, there is a lack of 
rationalized impersonal ideology, economic success depends on a personal relationship to the ruler, and most of all, 
the ruler acts only according to his own unchecked discretion, with no larger impersonal goals” Ibid., 52.  
9 Anthony Oberschall. “Opportunities and Framing in The Eastern European Revolts of 1989” in Doug 
McAdam, John D McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Sructures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
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commitment to it, routine state-sponsored mobilization, emphasis on personal security in 
leadership and internal democracy in the party”.10 
Romania’s relationship with the Soviet Union was a tense one; since the early days of his 
twenty-five years in power Ceausescu took further his predecessor’s (Gheorghiu Dej) nationalist 
and populist drive for independence from Moscow. Romania gradually became the most 
independent country in the Eastern block - nicknamed the “communist maverick” in the west11 
and gained some precious sympathy and support among Romanians and Romanian 
intelligentsia12 – who otherwise saw the communist party as an alien, illegitimate implant 
brought to Romania “on Russian tanks”13. Among the important gains of this rebellious game 
were the freedom to craft economic and development policies independently of the Soviet Union 
(whose initial plan was to have its allies’ economies develop in according to the Soviet needs), 
not having Soviet troops stationed in the country and great sympathy and support (including 
financial) from the West. The Western support waned in the 1980s: on the one hand Gorbachev’s 
push for political and economic reform in the Warsaw Pact eclipsed Romania’s “maverick” 
status, and on the other hand more and more reports of Ceausescu’s tyrannical leadership style 
were finding a sympathetic ear in Western Europe and the United States.14 
                                                 
10 Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 44–45. 
11 See Almond 1988, 1992, Shafir, 1996 for detailed discussions of Ceausescu’s relationship with the West 
12 This sympathy peaked in 1968 when Ceausescu condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia  
13 For an extensive discussion of the Romanian Communist Party’s history see Michael Shafir, Romania: 
Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (London: Pinter, 1985); Dennis 
Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-1965 (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1999); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Understanding National Stalinism: a Comparative Approach to the History of 
Romanian Communism (Washington D.C.: East European Program European Institute The Wilson Center, 1990).  
14 Mark Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu (London: Chapmans, 1992). 
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While Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria15 embraced more or less 
Gorbachev’s direction, the Ceausescu regime in Romania took the opposite path, increasing its 
repression of dissent, tightening censorship, attempting to increase its control over the population 
while taking the glorification of the leader to extremes.16 Its extensive secret service apparatus 
recruiting vast networks of informants kept the population under surveillance and brutally 
repressed any form of dissent.17 Although there are several documented cases of protest, revolt, 
and dissidents, overall Romania had the least organized opposition, made up of mostly 
“fragmented, isolated individuals.”18  
Linz and Stepan’s focus on political pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilization 
leaves us with little information about ordinary citizens, and is limited to the state and organized 
dissent as the main focus of analysis. Similar to researchers of Nazi Germany, scholars of 
Eastern Europe and the former Union noted the shortcomings of the totalitarian frame. One of 
the first scholars to discuss its limits was Sheila Fitzpatrick19 who argued for the need of taking 
alternative paths, “unfamiliar angles,” such as the examination of everyday life, for a more 
complete understanding of societies such as the former Soviet Union. James Scott’s 
                                                 
15 Bulgaria adopted more economic and less political reforms. Similarly to Ceausescu, Bulgarian leader 
Todor Zhivkov was also quite an authoritarian figure but his weak opposition is credited to a “conquer and divide” 
treatment of the intelligentsia, as opposed to Ceausescu’s more repressive policies. See Gale Stokes, The Walls came 
Tumbling down: the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 51.  
16 Almond, The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu. 
17 See Marius Oprea and Dennis Deletant, Banalitatea Raului: o Istorie a Securitatii în Documente 1949-
1989 (Iasi: Polirom, 2002). 
18 Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 353–354. 
19 Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Afterword: Revisionism Revisited,” Russian Review 45, no. 4 (1986): 409–413., 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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geographically broader work on less visible forms of resistance of subordinated groups also 
influenced my approach20. 
In this spirit, I wanted to understand the ways in which the lives of ordinary youths were 
affected by the Ceausescu regime. I wondered how did they come of age in such a political 
environment? How exactly did these policies unfold in the everyday lives of youth? Did they 
succeed in creating a subservient, adoring generation?  
Several scholars21 have discussed the legacies of communism in broad top-down geo-
political terms, pointing to the “paternalistic” legacy of the communist regimes. Others, like 
Laurentiu Luca22 set out to describe in great detail how the regime attempted to transform 
Romanian youth through propaganda in schools in the 1970-1980s. Drawing exclusively on 
propaganda publications, textbooks and secondary sources, Luca concludes that “the experiment 
has been largely ‘successful’ (without a clear definition or assessment of success) and its results 
are still seen in today's Romania,”23 and more specifically:  
It is no surprise that the generations schooled during those years and who rose through 
the ideological ranks of the mass organizations still cling to the "black and white, good 
and bad" simplistic interpretation of life and history and to the collectivist view of the 
world. Their disregard for any value elite and their harboring of a paternalistic view of 
the state which should take care of all their needs and provide them with income and 
benefits disqualify large segments of the population from (re)adapting to a market based 
economy and to a free society.24  
 
                                                 
20 James C Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990). 
21 Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: a Political History of Romanian Communism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).Kenneth Jowitt, New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
22 Laurentiu Luca, “Propaganda in the schools of Communist Romania” (MA Thesis, University of 
Toronto, 2005).  
23 Ibid., ii. 
24 Ibid., 67. 
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The scholars writing the final report of the “Presidential Committee for the Analysis of 
the Communist Dictatorship in Romania”25 (2006) included communist “propaganda” and 
“indoctrination” among the crimes of the communist regime in Romania. Based on this report, 
President Traian Basescu officially condemned communism in the Romanian parliament on 
December 18, 2006.  
While it is important to document the propaganda efforts, all these accounts seem to 
conflate propaganda with the reception of propaganda, which is problematic. As Kathleen Blee’s 
work about organized racist groups suggests, propaganda and the experiences of those exposed 
to it are not necessarily the same thing:  
It can be dangerously misleading to presume that we can understand the motives of racist 
activists by looking at the ideologies of their group. Nor can we understand racist groups 
by simply examining their propaganda. Rather, we must consider how members receive 
the cultural, political, and ideological messages projected by racist groups. Although 
racist groups display great similarity in their ideological messages and stylized pageantry, 
the members to whom these are directed are heterogeneous and their perception of these 
messages is uneven.26  
 
I chose to research the last decade of communism in Romania, driven by the same sense 
of “glaring absence of scholarship in late communism” noted by Paulina Bren27. Romania’s case 
is very similar to her description of the Czechoslovak case, where the bulk of scholarly research 
focuses mostly on the early decades of communism and the very few scholars who tackle the last 
two decades of communism look at it mostly in terms of “dissidence” and civil society.  
                                                 
25 Raportul Comisiei Prezidenţiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, 
http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf. 
26 Kathleen Blee, Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 5. 
27 Paulina Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV: the Culture of Communism After the 1968 Prague Spring 
(Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 2010), 3. 
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My goal here was to bridge state intervention, propaganda, and influence with individual 
accounts of how politics translated in the lives of ordinary youth, that is, to connect communist 
era records, research data and documents with the memories of my respondents. While the first 
are readily available and unchanged, the latter require a discussion of the concept of social 
memory. Here I am drawing on Maurice Halbwachs’28 argument that all memory is collective, 
because all individual memories form in a social context (milieu), they are prompted/recalled in 
a certain social context, or are forgotten in other social contexts (such as separation from a 
reference group), and from classical sociologists Cooley29 and Mead30 emphasizing that 
individual identity formation is essentially a product of social interaction (“self-looking 
glass”).31 More recent works (Huyssen32 and Nora33) historically contextualize the discussion of 
memory, talking about a contemporary societal “obsession” with memory, manifested in the 
proliferation of museums, archives, and monuments. They attributed this “memory industry” to a 
crisis caused by the emergence of several critical “lenses” through which the traditional, linear, 
history is re-examined, contested, and re-written. What these new lenses have in common is the 
questioning of power (including state power) by post-modernists, multiculturalists, feminists, 
and hegemony theorists. This resulted in the emergence of alternative histories/memories of 
groups previously ignored or repressed, questioned historical linearity and notions of “truth” and 
                                                 
2). 
ead and Arthur Edward Murphy, The Philosophy of the Present, (Chicago; London: 
Open co
32 Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (New York: Routledge, 
1995). 
33 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996). 
28 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 199
29 Charles Horton Cooley, Social Process, (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1918). 
30 George Herbert M
urt Pub. Co., 1932). 
31 Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order. (New York: Schocken Books, 1964). 
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highlig
out their families, 
environ
 look at archival 
materia
hted the strategic uses of memory and history, especially in the realm of national 
politics34.  
My resorting to individual memories from the 1980s decade is not necessarily a 
“revisionist” alternative to the history of the Cold War, but rather an effort to bring in the 
everyday life perception of the youth living in those times, the voices that were not easily 
available to scholars of Romania under communism, and were not a research priority after 1989. 
In addition to cognitive dissonance and other memory processes, recounting the 1980s after more 
than twenty years raises the question of new factors that may be shaping these accounts, such as 
the experience of living in a post-communist, democratic society, the present socio-economic, 
status or current day political divides. In order to control for such factors, I chose to bring in 
accounts of participants with different roles in the process of political education: students, 
teachers, and researchers. Instead of a summary questionnaire I decided to use extensive life 
histories (childhood to present day), something that would allow me to better trace their 
trajectories and experiences. Also, I collected a wealth of information ab
ment, peers, and schools. The highly standardized national education system and 
curricula of kindergartens and schools also made comparisons very feasible.  
My own experience of two years of high school in 1980s communist Romania (my 
student informants were two to eight years older than I) coupled with a “fresh”
ls and publications constituted more of an asset than a liability in my research, and 
allowed me to establish rapport easily and to be more specific in my questions.  
 I was interested in what was remembered and how it was remembered, as well as 
connecting the state and non-state political socialization experiences to which this generation 
                                                 
34 Barry Schwartz, “Introduction: The Expanding Past,” Qualitative Sociology. 19, no. 3 (1996): 275–282. 
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was exposed. In order to construct as complete a picture as possible, I decided to define politics 
and political experiences in a very broad sense, from the very obvious political education courses 
and textbooks in schools to memories of childhood, parents, friends, and leisure time. This broad 
definiti
 made it easier to find locally-
schoole
ives of my subject 
generat
                                                
on was influenced by the way the Ceausescu regime itself sought to infuse its politics into 
all aspects of social life, as witnessed and ethnographically documented by Katherine Verdery35 
and Gail Kligman36.  
I decided to narrow down my focus geographically to the capital city of Romania, 
Bucharest, for several reasons. One of them was the relative scarcity of urban research on 
Eastern Europe as opposed to rural ethnographies, as noted by Chris Hann37. Another favorable 
factor was its population: its size (approx. 2 mil.) made recruitment of informants easier (which 
proved to be very useful in the case of the teachers who were very difficult to track) and the fact 
that it attracted rather than lost population after 1989 which
d informants. Furthermore, since all written sources I needed to collect were located in 
archives and libraries in the city, it allowed me to easily alternate archival/library research with 
interviews and follow-ups when my informants were available. 
In order to collect accounts of the presence of politics in the everyday l
ion I conducted life-history interviews with four women and six men born between 1965 
and 1975 who completed their education in Bucharest. We talked loosely about their childhood, 
school experiences, material conditions, parents, friends and leisure activities. 
 
35 Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s 
Romania (Berkeley/Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1995). 
36 Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998). 
37 Chris Hann, Postsocialism Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia (London; New York: Routledge, 
2002). 
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To reconstitute the state political education efforts I analyzed the curriculum and 
textbooks used to teach politically-related subjects, as well as interviewed six former teachers 
who taught these subjects. In addition, I collected various guides and periodical articles related to 
education and teaching in the 1980s.  
 very useful way to control for the inevitable pitfalls and biases that the use of oral 
retrospective accounts carries were the 1980s survey-based research reports found in the archives 
of the Center for Youth Research. These allowed me to compare interview data with findings 
based on large sample surveys.  
 
 
 
  
A
 12 
 1.1 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
I conducted fieldwork in Bucharest, Romania over one year and three months (September 2004 – 
December 2005) and for eight weeks during the summer of 2006. I collected several types of 
data I needed in order to provide an account of how the last generation of youth that completed 
high school under communism formed their political views: life history interviews with former 
high school students, interviews with social science teachers, interviews with social scientists, 
interviews with former party activists in charge of education, a review of publications for 
teachers, textbooks, publications about youth in the 1980s, and a great number of research 
articles on youth under communism from the archives of the former Center for Research of 
Youth Problems. The sequence of my research carefully planned in my initial proposal was 
adapted to the local conditions, with the goal of advancing in whatever direction was possible. I 
started by initiating contact with sociologists and a broader network of acquaintances in order to 
recruit former students and teachers for interviews, while collecting data that was readily 
available in archives and libraries.  
A serendipitous encounter with college friend Adrian Neacsu led me to an unexpected 
and impressive data source: The Center for Youth Research. Here, Sorin Mitulescu graciously 
made their archive available, having two large boxes of research reports about youth spanning 
from 1968 to 1989 rescued from a basement where they had been reportedly abandoned for 
years. The Center published four yearly reports covering the findings of research projects carried 
on by the center, articles about methodological issues or new theoretical developments, 
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summaries of policy directives of the party, as well as collections of papers presented at the 
conferences organized by the center. The range of topics covered in the center’s publications was 
very wide, and most research articles’ more consistent research core was wrapped up in the 
official communist and nationalist rhetoric. Beyond use of such rhetoric, researchers touched on 
issues that otherwise were taboo in the public sphere, such as youth deviance or religious beliefs. 
The circulation of these publications was limited to a specialized audience made up of scholars, 
away from the larger public. Most research articles I selected for my research covered issues that 
touched on the civic/moral/political education of youth as well as cultural consumption. I also 
included a few articles on other topics (such as deviance and physical development) in order to 
better understand and contextualize the activity of the Center.  
Textbooks  
In order to understand the formal education component of the political socialization of 
my informants I had to look at political education in schools. Education in Romania was 
completely controlled by the state and all schools followed a single curriculum, so the most 
useful sources were the textbooks. I analyzed the four textbooks used for teaching “social 
sciences” in Romanian high schools during the eighties. These were Economics (9th grade), 
Social and Political Education (10th grade), Political Economy (11th grade) and Philosophy (12th 
grade). In my analysis I looked at both content and the form of delivery. 
Interviews 
To help make better sense of the data I collected from the Youth research Center I 
interviewed four researchers who worked at the Center before 1989. These interviews ranged 
from one to three hours and were conducted in cafes or offices between November 2004 and 
June 2006. They helped me learn a lot more about the validity of data from their reports, how the 
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center worked, how the research topics were chosen, how research was carried out, what type of 
constraints or pressures they were facing, and what impact their research findings had among the 
upper levels in the Party.  
Between March and June 2005 I also conducted six in-depth, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with teachers who taught these subjects in the 1980s. Getting hold of these teachers 
was quite a difficult task, because many of them changed careers after 1989 or retired, and did 
not keep in touch with their former schools or colleagues. First I got in touch with two retired 
college professors who taught social sciences, hoping that they would be able to put me in touch 
with high school teachers. Although unsuccessful in tracking down teachers, they gave me useful 
information about publications I should look at, books, periodicals and the way they experienced 
the system and teaching under communism. Initially, they seemed reluctant to talk to me about 
their experiences; throughout our conversations they were very keen to point out that they are not 
“being interviewed,” they are not my “subjects” but they are professors and who help me, a 
student, with my research. They gave me advice about research methods and design, and one of 
them even offered to write some dissertation chapters for me. Fortunately, another academic 
contact introduced me to a University professor who used to teach in high schools before 1989. 
She was extremely nice, and since she was advising masters and doctoral students herself she 
was much more open to my questions and research in general. I interviewed her, and she warmly 
introduced me to five of her former colleagues for interviews. Her introduction helped a great 
deal and I was able to establish a very good rapport with them. The interviews were much shorter 
compared to the student interviews, mainly because of the busy schedules of the teachers. They 
ranged from one hour to one hour and a half, and they were conducted mostly inside their current 
high schools. One of them was conducted on a park bench outside the high school and another 
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one was split among the teacher’s car, the insurance office where she needed to file some claims, 
and finally, the high school where she was teaching.  
After I interviewed the other teachers I realized that they all were much more connected 
than I initially realized. They were all women, close in age (born between 1954 add 1958), knew 
each other from college and formed a group of very active, enthusiastic teachers. Aside from 
their friendship ties the gender composition of the group also reflects the feminization of 
education in Romania under communism. After 1989 almost all of them got involved in a wide 
range of civic education activities within or outside their schools, and formed connections with 
organizations in Romania and abroad. I worried about these similarities, but after carefully 
transcribing the interviews I realized that they taught in a very wide range of schools and had 
considerably different experiences. The fact that they seemed to be very gifted teachers posed an 
interesting issue: on one hand I had the accounts of self-described, well-prepared, and popular 
teachers, and on the other hand the other, “less good”, teachers were impossible to track down. 
During the interviews (which were more structured than the student interviews) I asked them 
about their own college experiences, about choosing a teaching career, getting a job, teaching in 
the 1980s and specifically about the “social science” subjects they taught. I was interested in 
their teaching methods, how they felt about the curricula, textbooks, perception of students, their 
relations with students, other teachers and administrators, and their political views during and 
after the 1980s.  
Between June and December 2005 I also conducted in-depth, loosely structured life 
history interviews with 10 former high school students in Bucharest, members of my subject 
generation. Using snowball sampling (recruiting respondents through already interviewed 
respondents) and chain sampling (different starting points that ensure a diverse sample) I 
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recruited 4 women and 6 men. They varied in terms of place of residence at time of schooling, 
the prestige of the school they attended, and their family background. They did not vary very 
much in terms of education level, all but one having graduated from college, and the non-
graduating one being a college drop-out. They were interviewed by using a life-story approach 
(Creswell, 1998). I started by asking about where they grew up, their parents, their schools, 
peers, leisure time, within the overarching question about the presence of politics in their lives 
and how it manifested. Chronologically, we ended the detailed life-story in the first few years 
after 1989 and their present view of politics. One of the advantages of using a loosely structured 
interview was the discovery of the importance of grandparents in their political education. 
Having put together my research design physically and mentally in the American academic 
mindset, I overlooked the major role that the extended family played in raising children in 
Romania in the 1980s.  
As Kathleen Blee38 pointed out, the use of oral history in the feminist and “bottom-up” 
tradition of emphasizing empathy, reciprocity and authenticity poses particular difficulties in 
contexts where the informants are not necessarily a subordinated or voiceless group. In her work 
about women’s participation in organized racist groups, she called out the “romantic 
assumptions” of the oral history method, reminding us that the contextual nature of the 
informants’ accounts, often “laced with deceptive information, disingenuous denials of 
culpability, and dubious assertions about their political motivation.”39 During my interviews and 
analysis, I tried to keep in mind her cautionary note and carefully scrutinize informant accounts 
by comparing student and teacher interviews, comparing oral history accounts with publications 
                                                 
38 Kathleen M Blee, “Evidence, Empathy, and Ethics: Lessons from Oral Histories of the Klan,” The 
Journal of American History 80, no. 2 (1993): 596–606. 
39 Ibid., 597. 
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and quantitative research data from the Center for Research for Youth. My triangulation of 
sources did not yield any flagrant or significant discrepancies. Teacher, student and researcher 
interviews were confidential and the names used here are pseudonyms. The interview with Ion 
Iliescu is quoted with true name.  
1.2 RESEARCHER IDENTITY  
This dissertation was an academic endeavor as much as a travel back to my past, my country, my 
memories and the memories of a generation slightly ahead of me. Being Romanian made my 
research much easier in terms of language and culture. Having been born in 1973, I am two years 
younger than the youngest of my informants, so we had a great deal of experiences in common. 
Being educated in Romania through college added another layer of common experiences. All 
these were beneficial when I planned and carried out my research, but could become a potential 
pitfall in several ways. One danger was of letting my own account, my own experiences become 
a standard for comparison, or becoming blinded by my own preconceptions. Another possible 
problem, that the use of life-history and loosely structured interview methods helped avoid, was 
concentrating on the common experiences and excluding other potentially interesting ones. 
Focusing on the informants’ own story, allowing them to put the timeline together, gave me a 
much more complex and rich perspective than having an interview structured and limited by my 
(subjective) familiarity with the period. This also helped me avoid leading questions or 
“correcting” them, or involuntarily setting the parameters for their story. For example, this 
allowed one of the teachers interviewed to use an incorrect name for one of the subjects she 
taught for years – this slip and the way she handled it reflected one more time the disgust she 
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expressed regarding having to teach a course about the policies of the Romanian Communist 
Party.  
My own experiences came in handy when interviews reached a gap, sometimes caused by 
my informants’ assumption that because we were close in age I might “know all about it” and 
there’s nothing new she or he could add. At these points I recounted how things were done in my 
school, or in my family, and my own story helped the informants relate and recount their own 
experience by discovering points of convergence or pointing out differences. 
A particular personal difficulty related to being so close to the era I researched arose 
when I had to analyze the “social science” high school textbooks and some of the official 
propaganda publications. I had to study two of the textbooks in high school, and I remembered 
them with revulsion, a feeling that was eased by seeing again how poorly they were written and 
by reminding myself that this time I was not going to be tested and I did not have to memorize 
them.  
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In CHAPTER TWO I am exploring the area of formal education controlled by the state. I am 
describing the Romanian education system, its history, structure and specifics in the 1980s, with 
a special focus on the teaching of civics and “social sciences” in high schools. Since communist 
youth organizations were deeply tied to and functioned within public schools I also included here 
a section devoted to these organizations. This chapter was based on analysis of textbooks, 
publications and archival research as well as interviews with former high school teachers of these 
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subjects. Student interviews used in chapter one were triangulated40 with the teachers’ accounts, 
textbooks, and official publications.  
In CHAPTER THREE I am moving the focus to the home environment of my informants 
and how the socio-political environment of communist Romania filtered down inside the family, 
schools and peer circles. This chapter is based on life-history interviews with members of my 
target generation. Here, I am exploring the role parents and peers played in the development of 
their early understanding of politics, as well as how this understanding intersected with the 
influence of schools and teachers.  
 
In CHAPTER FOUR I am looking at my target generation as seen through the lens of 
Romanian sociological research in the 1980s. Although communist-era sociological research was 
severely restricted and especially scarce in the 1980s41, I was able to find interesting and 
trustworthy research data about youth, collected between 1968 and 1989 at the Center for Youth 
Research in Bucharest. After a short discussion of the politics of sociological research during the 
last two decades of the Ceausescu regime I focus on the research data about youth in the 1980s. 
Here I found national data confirming some of my small scale interview findings (for example 
the role of parents and the generalized learned duplicity in teaching the communist party 
doctrine), as well as some surprisingly critical survey data about the activity of the Communist 
Party Youth Organization. This chapter was based on research in the archives of the Center for 
Youth Research, interviews with former researchers employed by the Center, and official 
publications.  
                                                 
40 “The use of multiple methods […] as an attempt to secure an in-depth understanding”, Norman K Denzin 
and Yvonna S Lincoln, The Landscape of Qualitative research: Theories and Issues (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 1998), 4. 
41 Maria Larionescu, Istoria Sociologiei Românesti (Bucuresti: Ed. Univ., 2007). 
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CHAPTER FIVE offers a summary of my findings and a discussion of the common 
thread the theme of duplicity among former students, parents, high school teachers and 
university professors. I am discussing duplicity in the context of other scholars’ work on the 
same phenomena, such as Czeslaw Milosz’s42 concept of Ketman and Gail Kligman’s43 work on 
reproductive policies in Romania. I also offer some theoretical reflections on how my findings 
highlight shortcomings in the totalitarian frame. 
                                                 
42 Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Knopf, 1953). 
43 Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity. 
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2.0  POLITICS, SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS  
This chapter outlines the state-controlled dimension of youths’ political education in the 1980s. It 
contains a historical overview, the description of the communist regime in Romania and its 
educational policy, the analysis of interviews with former social science teachers about their 
experiences in the 1980s, and an examination of high school social science textbooks.  
2.1 THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT AND EDUCATION UNDER 
COMMUNISM 
The post World War II Romanian Communist Party’s (RCP) ascent to power was accompanied 
by a specific interest with the role of education. As Vasile44 notes, a special committee within 
the party closely watched and even interfered with the activity of the Ministry of Education, led 
between 1945 and 1947 by Stefan Voitec, member of the Social Democrat Party, a political ally 
that was absorbed by the RCP in 1947. The Committee was paving the road to the complete 
takeover of education by the RCP by recruiting teachers into the party, mobilizing students, 
monitoring alternative youth organizations such as the local YMCA organizations or Jewish 
schools, and by restricting the circulations of books and publications that were not approved by 
                                                 
44 Cristian Vasile, Literatura si Artele în România Comunista: 1948 - 1953 (Bucuresti: Humanitas, 2010). 
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the Party. 45 In addition to such activities, the Commission also commissioned the writing of a 
new, pro-Soviet history textbook by Mihai Roller that was introduced in 1947, and started a 
campaign against illiteracy which was estimated to be 29 percent in the population over seven 
years old.46 
The abdication of Romania’s King in 1947 marked the complete takeover or government 
by the Romanian Communist Party, and was quickly followed by the adoption of a new 
constitution in April 1948. The new constitution called for the nationalization of education, and: 
[…] the communist education of youth, a strict control of primary, secondary and college 
education, the abandonment of academic independence, and an expansion of education at 
all levels that would fulfill the needs of industrial development.47  
 
The education reform resulted in the elimination of the “abstract and metaphysical” 
disciplines in secondary education, and a reduction or elimination of courses on classics, 
Western languages, religion and sociology, accompanied by a rise in the number required 
ideological, Marxist-Leninist courses.  
The nationalized education was to be atheistic and to promote Marxist-Leninist 
principles, and its purpose was to serve the needs of the planned economy48. It also introduced 
four years of mandatory schooling, and a system of seven years of elementary school (and after 
1960 eight) and four years of high school or vocational school. The law had special provisions 
intended to “shake up” the existing class system. It would eradicate illiteracy and foster 
                                                 
45 Bogdan Murgescu, România si Europa: Acumularea Decalajelor Economice: 1500--2010 (Iaşi: Polirom, 
2010), 386. 
46 Vasile, Literatura si Artele în România Comunista, 261–263. 
47 Ibid., 268. 
48 Randolph L Braham, Education in Romania: a Decade of Change, ([Washington: U.S. Office of 
Education, Institute of International Studies; [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), 10. 
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“democratization” by setting up special tracks and “Workers’ Universities” where workers and 
peasants could get a degree in two years.49  
In 1955, as Romania chose the path of development through industrialization, the 
education curriculum was adjusted to provide more industrial training, as well as increased 
teaching of social sciences and ideological education at all levels50.  
Some argue that the Soviet-inspired changes led to a deterioration of the quality of 
Romanian education, a significant regress compared to the system before 1948, which used to 
require a minimum of seven years of public education.51 Others point to growth of enrollment in 
post-secondary education, improved training of the teaching staff, better equipment and facilities, 
and significant growth in higher education (a growth of the student body from 71,989 in 1960 to 
141,589 in 1967)52.  
Things changed again in 1965 when Nicolae Ceausescu was elected as the General 
Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. He took further and expanded his predecessor’s 
(Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej) gradual distancing from the Soviet Union and fashioned himself as 
the “maverick” of the Soviet bloc, opening up to the West economically and diplomatically.53 
This political environment coupled with criticism of the failure of the educational system to 
                                                 
49 Cristian Vasile, “Educaţie si Ideologie in România 1948–1953,” Revista Istorică XV, no. 5–6 (2004): 
121–140., Mariana Momanu, Educaţie si Ideologie: o Analiză Pedagogică a Sistemului Totalitar Comunist (Iaşi: 
Ed. Univ.“Alexandru Ioan Cuza,” 2005). 
50 Braham, Education in Romania, 11.  
51 Dan Constantin Radulescu, “Învăţământul Românesc 1948–1989 – Între Derivă si Recuperare 
Instituţional - Funcţională,” Calitatea Vieţii XVII, no. 3–4 (2006): 307–318, also Momanu Educaţie si Ideologie: o 
Analiză Pedagogică a Sistemului Totalitar Comunist, Vasile Educaţie si Ideologie in România 1948–1953.  
52 Braham, Education in Romania, 11. 
53 Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development the Case of Romania, 1944-
1965. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Kenneth Jowitt, Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: a 
Debate on Development in a European Nation (Berkeley: University of California; Institute of international studies, 
1978); Katherine Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu’s 
Romania (Berkeley/Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1995). 
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satisfy the needs of economic growth, produced new education legislation54 in 1968, which 
called for distancing from the Soviet model and “renewed the pre-1948 traditions and aspirations 
for a national and European education”55. The main goals of the new legislation were to: 
Impart a general culture and the knowledge required for the successful performance of a 
socially useful job, to advance the dialectical-materialist conception of society and 
nature, to promote the intellectual, moral, esthetic and physical development of its 
citizens and to cultivate citizens’ love for the nation and the State and the ideals of peace 
and social progress.56  
 
The main responsibility for carrying out these objectives was assigned to the Ministry of 
Education, in cooperation with the Union of Communist Youth, the Union of Communist 
Students and the Pioneers’ Organization. The new legislation also declared education free at all 
levels, including funding for boarding, meals and scholarships and overall more funding was 
allocated to support the overstretched educational system. Most of the previously banned 
disciplines were reintroduced, including the social sciences.57  
Several years after Ceausescu's rise to power, and at the same time as building its 
reputation as the “maverick” of the Soviet bloc through the condemnation of the 1968 Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia58, a new take on ideology started to take shape in Romania. One of 
the first signs was the 1967 creation of a “Commission on Ideology,” and after a visit to North 
Korea in July 1971, a more crystallized version came out in the form of two speeches (later 
referred to as the “July theses”) by Nicolae Ceausescu where he presented his new priorities: 
more focus on ideological education (which in his view was lagging behind other communist 
                                                 
54 Legea privind învăţământul din RSR, 1968, Bucureşti 
55 Constantin 2006, ibid. 
56 Braham, Education in Romania, 17. 
57 Ibid., 23. 
58 Daniel N Nelson, Romania after Tyranny (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
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countries), less tolerance towards foreign influence, especially Western influence59, and more 
emphasis on Romanian nationalism. The early Soviet influence was followed by a brief period of 
“openness” and later replaced with a discourse that blended Marxism and Leninism with 
nationalist values.60 In this newly revised “ideological-symbolic mode of control” argues 
Verdery61, “national ideology gained pride of place.” For the next decades, the mission of the 
Communist Party and of the education system as its tool was the formation of the socialist “New 
Man” in the spirit of Romanian nationalism and Ceausescu's interpretation of communism.  
These changes were reflected in the new 1978 “Education Law” which tightened state 
control of both schools and universities even more62. Throughout the 1970s, Murgescu63 notes  
the replacement of the more competent “technocrats” leading the Ministry of Education with less 
knowledgeable loyal party cadre whose priorities were the implementing of Ceausescu’s 
ideological requirement and the introduction of more and more “production”64 activities in the 
curriculum. Consequently, the number of humanities-track high schools was drastically reduced 
in favor of the “industrial” track high schools. The number of students educated in the 
humanities high schools dropped from 390,455 in 1968 to 55,988 in 198965.  
Overall, and aside from the quality decline of the early decades some historians have 
noted, the communist reform of the education system and its emphasis on enrolling as many 
students as possible was a success. Illiteracy was almost eradicated, and from 1945 to 1989 
                                                 
59 Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism, 101. 
60 Robert King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party (Stanford Calif.: Hoover Institution Press 
Stanford University, 1980)., Verdery 1991 ibid. 
61 Verdery, ibid: 101 
62 Constantin ibid:6 
63 Murgescu, România si Europa, 388. 
64 “Production activities” generally meant student participation in industrial or agricultural work, most of it 
during the school year.  
65 N. N Constantinescu, Istoria Economica a României (Bucuresti: Editura Economica, 2000). In 
Murgescu, România si Europa, 389. 
 26 
Romania's student population grew from 13.9 percent of the total population to 24.1 percent. The 
average number of years of schooling per person in the total population grew from 3.5 in 1950 to 
10.5 in 1990. The number of high schools tripled over the same time interval, and the number of 
high school graduates grew from 13,905 in 1948 to 143,436 in 198966. As Murgescu notes, the 
80 percent high school attendance of the 1980s showed that high school education had become 
less of a privilege and more of a norm.67  
 
By 1980 Ceausescu’s cult of personality (which included his wife) had grown to 
dominate almost all social life: politics, the media, education, culture and the workplace68. 
Romanian students had Ceausescu’s portrait hanging in every classroom, printed on the first 
page (and not only) of every textbook, and had to praise the great man and leader in their classes 
and at school events. The backfdrop of this culmination of ideological indoctrination efforts was 
an international economic recession worsened in Romania by Ceausescu's decision to pay off all 
of Romania's foreign loans (effort started in 1982) and at the same time to pursue his 
megalomaniac construction projects such as the “People’s Palace.” The payment of the loans was 
completed by 1989 through massive exports and severe cuts in consumption and spending. 
During this time Romanians suffered from a lot of basic food and goods shortages, rationing, pay 
cuts, blackouts and lack of heating in their apartments, schools and workplace69 while their 
television sets blasted shorter and shorter daily programs70, filled with propaganda about living 
Romania's Golden Age under the wise leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu. The education budget as 
                                                 
66 Constantinescu, Istoria Economica a României. In Murgescu, România si Europa, 387. 
67 Murgescu, România si Europa, 387. 
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69 Mary Fischer, Nicolae Ceauşescu: a Study in Political Leadership (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 
1989). 
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a percentage of the state budget dropped from about 6.3 percent in the 1960s, and 7.1 in the 
1970s to 5.8 percent in the 1980s71. Some schools were closed and the number of teachers was 
cut down72. This is the context in which my research informants, the last generations of 
communist high school graduates completed their education.  
2.2 TEACHER INTERVIEWS 
Tracking down the teachers who taught social sciences73 in Bucharest in the 1980s was a 
difficult task. According to the ones I interviewed, many changed careers in the post-1989 
turmoil in Romanian education, when a lot of them were vilified and associated with the old 
regime, leaving only the more resilient ones in the system. All six teachers I interviewed were 
women, attended college in the late 1970s, were close in age (born between 1954 and 1958) and 
were affected by the post 1971 changes in the education system. Similarly to the changes in the 
high school system, the humanities departments in the universities were reduced and 
consolidated, and their number of students went from 39 percent in the total student body in 
1969 to 14.8 percent in 1979 and 9.5 percent in 198974.  
In 1978 the previously independent university departments of Sociology, Psychology and 
Philosophy were consolidated with the History departments, and continued to function as sub-
                                                 
71 Murgescu, România si Europa, 391. 
72 Constantin ibid:12 
73 High school social science subjects were Economics, Social and Political Education, Political Economy 
of the Romanian Communist Party and Philosophy. History was not considered a social science and was taught 
separately.  
74 Constantinescu, Istoria Economica a României. In Murgescu, România si Europa, 389. 
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sections with their staff and number of courses reduced75. All the teachers I interviewed started 
in one of these departments and graduated from the consolidated program in the History 
department. They all ended up teaching social sciences in high schools in Bucharest, with the 
average class size of 30 students, between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.  
I asked the teachers about the education they received in college in the late seventies, and 
considering that the social sciences were perceived as the most politicized disciplines, about the 
presence of politics and ideology in their lives. Surprisingly, all of them emphasized a “certain 
openness” within the university system, as one of the teachers put it, even after the crackdown on 
the Sociology, Psychology, and Philosophy departments. The one teacher who majored in 
Sociology mentioned great freedom in choosing research topics (hers was religion) and 
conducting fieldwork; there was “an overall great atmosphere” as she put it. In stark contrast 
with the post 1989 perception of lack of resources, she claimed that the resources available to 
students were of excellent quality:  
We had access to the library and to a lot of foreign literature in English or French, the 
library was fabulous, they had a special section with foreign books brought by professors 
or through university exchanges and we were able to read them in the library. The 
professors were quite good about recommending readings and we were up to date with 
the Sociology literature, and we were feeling very comfortable and free. (Andrea) 
 
The presence of communist ideology was felt in college, but the college professors 
seemed to treat it with detachment, sometimes even with criticism:  
I remember that in our Economics class we criticized socialism; we learned about the 
capitalist economy, which is today's market economy and when we moved to the socialist 
economy the professor was very open and he was its biggest critic.. We were sort of 
sneaking between constraints and felt quite free. (Andrea)  
 
                                                 
75 Due to the communist leadership’s belief that social research activity could pose a threat to the regime. 
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Although the official philosophy was Marxism, and Marxism was supposed to inform 
every aspect of life, the teachers who majored in philosophy reported receiving what they 
considered a well-rounded, solid education, “not as Marxist philosophers, but as philosophers in 
general” (Corina). Many of their philosophy teachers (for example, Alexandru Valentin76, 
Mircea Flonta77) had training or degrees in Western universities and were seen as doing an 
excellent job. Even the courses that bore the heaviest ideological load, such as Scientific 
Socialism, were thought to be taught in an objective and critical manner, which drew the 
students’ admiration:  
I took Scientific Socialism with Radu Florian78. He at the time was against the local 
exaggerations and even forbade us to pick them up. He was teaching us a sort of social 
philosophy, more like contemporary socialist doctrines, democratic, not totalitarian at all. 
We even had very open critical discussions about the difficulties that the socialist systems 
were facing. The only thing they asked us is not to take notes in lectures. For the exams 
he assigned several books. A form of dissimulation… (Corina)  
 
This type of dissimulation was picked up by the college students and future high school 
teachers, who learned to separate the Marxist philosophy from Ceausescu’s take on it, filter out 
the latter and only use it when the situation called for it:  
I think every time we dealt with written documents such as my professors’ publications 
or when we had to write our senior thesis we had to insert some quotes from him 
[Ceausescu], that was mandatory in a sense, people did it out of obligation, out of reflex, 
out of obedience… (Florentina) 
 
                                                 
76 Specialized in Marxist philosophy. 
77 Specialized in epistemology. 
78 Radu Florian is mentioned in a Radio Free Europe report as one of the traditional, and more academic 
philosophers who criticized the dogmatic Leninist interpretations of his party loyal colleagues. “Philosophy in 1974: 
An Embarrassing Picture”, n.d., http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/52-3-96.shtml. 
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Extremely similar accounts of duplicity and circumventing the curricula in the university 
were reported in interviews by DiGiacomo79, in his 2010 dissertation: 
Teachers also found clever loopholes in the program requirements that enabled them to 
preserve non-ideological or different elements of education. For example, on the topic of 
the teacher’s ability as an individual actor, Interviewee Simona stated that for instance, I 
do remember that when you had the Marxist- Leninist course, the professor was simply 
telling us that look, this year, we are discussing the origins of the Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy. And the origins are actually Kant and Hegel, and he spoke all year on Kant 
and Hegel, nothing about Marx and Engels, and this happened in the faculty in ’76, ’77. 
So for instance, in my faculty, we didn’t have this kind of ideological education because 
not one of the professors promoted anything like this. (144) 
 
All the teachers got their jobs through a system of “allocation” of college graduates based 
on their GPAs and place of residence. Andrea, Dana and Eliza were initially assigned to teach 
outside Bucharest, based on their pre-college residence80, but in a few years they eventually 
managed to transfer and get substitute or full-time positions in various high schools in Bucharest, 
some in poorer neighborhoods, others in prestigious high schools in more affluent areas.  
Andrea graduated from college in 1979, with a major in Sociology. She passed up a 
teaching job in her hometown of Craiova to be closer to Bucharest and hoping for a college 
position, and she took instead a job as a Pioneer instructor in a small town near Bucharest. In 
1983, after marrying a Bucharest resident she was able to transfer to a modest industrial high 
school at the periphery of the city where she taught Logic, Psychology, Philosophy and 
Economics. A year later she transferred to a better, more central high school, “N. Iorga”, and 
after 1989 she transferred twice more, until she found a position at one of the top high schools in 
the country, Sf. Sava.  
                                                 
79 Francis Anthony DiGiacomo, “Education Amidst Transition: the Case of Romania” (PhD diss., 
University of Maryland, College Park, 2010), http://hdl.handle.net/1903/10855. 
80 Romanians were assigned a unique ID (Buletin de Identitate) which among other information specified 
your place of residence. If people changed their residence they had to have the ID updated. Moving to the capital 
was severely restricted, thus limiting a college graduate’s prospects of getting a job in the capital. 
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Since Bianca was originally from Bucharest, she was able to start there, teaching History 
in an industrial, vocational high school in 1978. In 1985, due to a re-shuffling of teachers based 
on the neighborhood where they lived she got a job at a much better math-physics high school in 
a central area of the city, the Caragiale High School where she taught Social and Political 
Education and Political Economy. Corina, also a resident of Bucharest got a position first 
teaching History and Constitution in a secondary school and later Economics and Social and 
Political Education in a modest industrial high school.  
Dana started teaching Economics in 1977 in a prestigious Economics high school, in a 
small city south of Bucharest. After a few years of commuting she was able to transfer to 
Bucharest, to a math-physics high school where she continued teaching Economics and Social 
and Political Education.  
Eliza started her teaching in 1976 at a forestry high school north of Bucharest, in 
Campina. A few years later her husband got a position in Bucharest, they moved, and she 
became a substitute social science teacher for one year at an Industrial (Chemistry) high school. 
After another year, she got a position at the prestigious Zoia Kosmodemianskaia, the only 
humanities high school in Bucharest. She pointed out that she was able to get it when one of her 
husband's colleagues at the philosophy Institute was married to the principal of the school.  
Florentina started teaching in Bucharest in 1979, in an Industrial high school in one of the 
poorest neighborhoods of the city, “where there was a massive gypsy population, with no 
motivation to study,” and many of her students were illiterate. She started by teaching History in 
the secondary school and later Economics and Social and Political Education.  
Although they had varied careers that took them to schools of different quality, there was 
a consensus on a great deal about the job of teacher. The high school work environment they 
 32 
described was very different from their “relaxed” university experience, and they felt more 
pressure to conform. It was loaded with ideological pressures, manifested through numerous 
party meetings81, mandatory “ideological debates,” rallies on the national or communist 
holidays, training sessions about new Party policies and taking students to mandatory 
agricultural “volunteering” (picking corn, or grapes, sorting onions or potatoes or cleaning city 
parks). Over the 1980s the duration and frequency of these activities intensified, eating into their 
class-preparation time, or even some of the class time. Here is how Dana remembers these 
pressur
r group of kids I would leave. I was only going to be seen and was embarrassed in 
ont of the kids and other colleagues, but with the commute this was a huge waste of 
me.  
 poor kids. And of course they were never good enough and we were all 
laughin
                                                
es:  
There were some rough times in the 80s, times when there were a lot of party meetings 
which I had to attend because we had to sign all kinds of papers. There were times when 
we had to do a lot of volunteer work, like harvesting corn. I didn't actually pick corn, I 
would go with the kids and the bus to the cornfield and when the bus returned to pick up 
anothe
fr
ti
 
Compared with the non-social science teachers, the ideological pressures extended far 
deeper into their classrooms. The curricula for all of the four social science subjects contained 
significant portions devoted to discussions of Marxist philosophy or economics, as well as long 
sections devoted to Ceausescu’s speeches or extolling his extraordinary leadership qualities. All 
teachers resented preparing and delivering such lectures: “When it was time to bullshit (mananc 
rahat) and give speeches and introductions I did that myself instead of the students, because I did 
not want to torture those
g…” (Bianca).  
 
81 All philosophy graduates had to be party members in order to get a teaching position. Also joining the 
party came with a number of benefits: better chances to be promoted, transfers to better high schools.  
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Some of these pressures were sometimes eased by the very ones who were in charge of 
enforcing them. Two teachers recalled with gratitude their former high school Principals, people 
with very important positions in the Romanian Communist Party. These Principals used their 
power to excuse them from attending some of the mandatory ideological activities in exchange 
for run
n Marxist true believers (people who 
have ac
driven 
 
t as her choice, not a product of her 
backgro
educati
ilosophy, not 
because my mom told me to or because the party leader told me to, it was my choice. 
 
ning extra tutoring sessions with students participating in national (social science) 
“Olympic” competitions.  
I also wanted to know how their political views were influenced by the education they 
themselves received. All but one teacher saw themselves as “non-Marxists,” and revealed that 
Marxist philosophy didn't really resonate with them. All of them made a sharp distinction 
between Marxism as in Karl Marx’s work, which they respected and considered an interesting 
theory, and the local, domestic Romanian Communist Party’s take on Marxism and its policies 
which they despised all along. They distinguished betwee
tually read Marx) and the opportunistic “Marxists” who were ignorant most of time and 
by the prospect of privileges and material benefits. 
If someone believed in it and was truly a Marxist, that person is ideologically innocent. 
The problem was that we weren't tested on Marxist ideas but that we had to take Marxism 
with the local ideological behavior and everything else. (Bianca) 
The only teacher with Marxist views emphasized i
und (she was coming from a peasant family with strong anti-communist sentiments), her 
on, her wanting privileges or any other constraints:  
In my fourth year of college I became a member of the Communist Party because I 
wanted to. Many years in a row I willingly chose to teach Marxist ph
Again, I joined of my own will, not because I wanted privileges, prestige or a position. I 
joined out of conviction. Of course as time went by and I read more I realized that things 
were… how should I put it… shaky in regards with my conviction. (Eliza) 
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Later on in the interview Eliza explained what caused her doubts about Marxism: “if you 
apply a philosophy that fails to produce good results in terms of living standards, the reason why 
you made a revolution, there must be something wrong somewhere.” She talked about her 
Marxist views as an unusual, isolated case among her peers. In a strange way, the “true believer” 
Marxis
whose 
] I made my Marxist view clear in the school. In my classroom I would say what I 
ought. For example sometimes I taught Marxist philosophy. The students can always 
ture, 
literatu
and in t
was doing in the 
lassroom? Of course, back then I wasn't really touching on political aspects, contesting 
e regime or praising capitalism. But that didn't prevent me from discussing from the 
student or inspector complain about what I did in the classroom. (Eliza) 
t social science teacher in a socialist country sounded more like a dissident than someone 
views were aligned with the official political doctrine: 
[…
th
tell if you really believe in something or if you are just doing it because you have to. I 
was never embarrassed to say that was my choice. (Eliza) 
 
She, however, described herself not as the enthusiastic and dull propaganda tool the 
regime was hoping to craft, but as a highly educated and sophisticated Marxist. Through her 
husband's job at the Philosophy Institute she was able to read contemporary Marxist litera
re critical towards Marxism and even dissident literature that was not generally available, 
he classroom she felt free to discuss Marxism in a critical fashion with her students.  
Before 1989 I never really felt limited. Who could really check what I 
c
th
very first year theories that were critical towards Marxism, and I never had anyone, any 
 
This almost carefree attitude regarding ideological pressures or constraints in the 
classroom was shared by the other teachers as well. They described several strategies in dealing 
with them. One teacher (Bianca) for example, avoided teaching altogether the subject of Political 
Economy because she would have to lecture about how much the living standard had improved 
in a time of severe economic crisis and shortages, and she did not want to discredit herself by 
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doing that. Another strategy she adopted in teaching “Political and Social Education” was to 
focus disproportionately on theory and teach what she called “masked logic” lessons. She would 
eventua
with re
[…] we were teaching the way we were teaching, there were lectures devoted to the party 
 
 the entire school. In the philosophy course she 
preferre
issues (
] there was a way around that, you could talk about Hegel's system for example and 
o it as part of the historical roots of Marxism, but we would talk more about Hegel. At 
point of view.  
e her own professors in college she developed a complicit relationship 
with he
unpleas
lly have to talk about the Romanian Communist Party’s policies. She remembered this 
morse and regarded it as the price she paid so that she could teach philosophy:  
policies… anyway they were awful, if you look back it looks like a horrible joke but we 
did it because that was a way of saving philosophy. Again we were emphasizing the form 
not the content… (Bianca) 
This convoluted way of teaching about Romanian Communism was reflected in her 
students’ papers which she called “completely ridiculous” and shared with her colleagues to 
amuse themselves until someone warned her that this could be interpreted as her not delivering a 
proper ideological education and cause trouble for
d to rely heavily on a historical perspective in order to avoid discussing contemporary 
RCP ideology or Ceausescu’s speeches):  
[…
d
the very end we would append a little section where we cover the proper Marxist critique 
 
At the times when she really didn't feel like delivering the more ideologically loaded 
lectures she had the students simply copy in their notebooks fragments from the textbook or 
some Party documents and directives published in the newspapers, instead of lecturing, which 
was the main teaching method. They were aware that she avoided lecturing on certain subjects, 
and preferred it. Just lik
r students in regards to these topics, where both she and the students were avoiding an 
ant experience: 
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They also knew about it from home, about things you discuss and things you don't 
iscuss and they also tacitly agreed to some of these procedures. Pretty much in exchange 
r not having to stand up and answer questions about party policies the students agreed 
 
e
y thinking that the 
teacher
iacomo’s dissertation83 also contains an example of this strategy, this time from a 
Roman
subject
ommunist Romanian values and skills. Therefore, the teachers in high 
hool and higher education, when they chose to, contributed to what Interviewee Simona 
 
                                                
d
fo
to just read them from the book. (Eliza) 
 
A similar account of these strat gies of avoidance to teach the highly ideological parts of 
the curricula are remembered to exist as early as the 1950s by Leon Volovici in his biographical 
volume in dialog with Sandu Frunza.82 Volovici recounts his history teacher stopping lecturing 
and asking students to “read the rest from the book.” He confesses to initiall
 was bored or tired, only to realize later in the course that the sections they were asked to 
read from the book were the ones that consisted mostly of Party propaganda.  
DiG
ian language teacher, suggesting that the practice was common among teachers of various 
s:  
In another example provided by Interviewee Simona regarding subversive activities: I 
taught Romanian language, and all the textbooks started with a poem to the leader, but it 
was a method, you want to do this in the classroom or not. And all the times, for instance, 
[I assigned this task for homework]. And I said, okay, this year, the first text is a very 
nice [poem] [I said this] because you had to say that it’s a very nice [poem]. Through 
such means, it seems teachers were able to maintain a sense of western culture or, at 
least, of non-c
sc
considered a “double education,” meaning that while the students learned one perspective 
at home, they could learn an alternative perspective in the school, depending on the 
teacher. (144) 
The teachers’ relationship with their students was always very good, but the rapport was 
considerably shaped by the relative affluence of the high school where they taught. Each teacher 
 
82 Leon Volovici and Sandu Frunza, De la Iasi la Ierusalim si înapoi: pornind de la un dialog cu Sandu 
Frunza (Bucuresti: Ideea Europeana, 2007). 
83 DiGiacomo, “Education amidst transition: the case of Romania.” 
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had a home-room and weekly meetings with her home-room students and four of them were 
Union of Communist Youth coordinators in their schools. Teachers familiarized themselves with 
the stu
d most important, never getting any complaints from parents, some of whom were 
importa
                                                
dents during class, from the grade books (which contained all students’ grades, home 
addresses and parents’ occupation/workplace), homeroom meetings and school trips.  
In the case of more affluent area high schools where most students aspired to go to 
college, the priority for teachers was to help the students who chose to go to universities where 
social science exams were part of the admission process84, and prepare them for national 
competitions. In this case they were on one hand trying to ease things for the students going to 
more technical colleges and on the other hand devoting themselves more to the students who 
needed to take the social science exams. With the latter, they made sure they thoroughly covered 
the material, no matter how ideological, because the exams required word by word 
memorization. Their efforts were appreciated and rewarded for both of these approaches. One of 
the teachers for example reported that the good performance of the students in college entry and 
competitions was rewarded with a monthly prize consisting of a chicken from the high school 
Principal (a well connected Party member)85. These strategies seemed to be widely known and 
valued among teachers, administrators and parents: teachers reported being popular among the 
students, an
nt party and administration members and could have raised objections about their 
strategies. 
 
84 College admission in Romania was based on an entrance exam. Students chose their college and major in 
advance and the exam subjects were different for each major. The Economics/ Business schools required one social 
science exam. It's also worth noting that during economic decline of the 1980s admission in the business school 
became highly competitive.  
85 This was the only incident of positive reinforcement from the administration that I came across during 
discussions with teachers. 
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The teachers working with a working class student population mentioned organizing 
extra-curricular activities (mostly trips), and a few of them mentioned making efforts to better 
the lives of their students. For instance, one of them used the Union of Communist Youth 
organiz
forming
using th
] the UTC structures were used more for their social role than a political one. When it 
teachers that were no good at teaching went for the 
admini
teacher
that cou
by someone above them in the hierarchy. Therefore, they 
ere themselves willing to be duplicitous. (Bianca) 
extra curricular activities) and knew that all the reports and everything was made up and 
papers were in order. (Corina) 
ation as a way of getting involved and empowering the “troublemakers” in her school and 
 a collective that sought to help students with broken families. In her own words, and 
e same “bullshit” as Bianca, Andrea explained:  
[…
was time to make bullshit speeches and introductions I did it, because I didn’t want to 
torture those poor kids. And of course they were never good enough and we were 
laughing… well the point is that I was never able to run a process of indoctrination. 
(Andrea) 
 
The supervision of the teachers was not limited to the high school Principals. At least 
once a year, their classrooms were visited by inspectors from the Ministry of Education. Once 
again, the common denominator in the description of these inspections was duplicity. The 
inspectors, along with the Party apparatus in the Ministry were seen with disdain by the teachers. 
Just as in other occupations, they argued, the 
strative jobs. The inspections were scheduled ahead of time and announced to both 
s and students, and were superficial and mostly concerned with not stirring up anything 
ld bring trouble from their superiors: 
[…] they couldn't control us 100%, and even they were in the same situation on a 
different level, being checked 
w
There were some party activists who came and looked into the paperwork (lesson plans, 
had no connection with reality and never checked anything. They were happy that the 
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In spite of the fact that none of them had any important problems during the inspections, 
all the teachers shared a great deal of anxiety about them. In the generalized duplicity, there were 
occasions when the inspectors would choose to exercise their power and pick on some issue and 
make a big deal out of it. For example, one inspector objected that one of my interviewees did 
not “raise their students’ consciousness enough” because while she was lecturing they were not 
browsin
escalate
inspect ir effect was not to motivate teachers to be better, but to make them 
feel powerless:  
ts highest point, and its over-
embelli
                                                
g the Party policy pamphlets on their desks. Most of these inspection mishaps did not 
 beyond the school level, but were enough to keep the teachers on their toes and made the 
ors quite feared. The
The big issue was the arbitrariness of the situation in which we were: anybody could 
evaluate you in any way, anytime. They could put you in any situation… This extended, 
generalized arbitrariness, the fact that you could end up at the top or get 
fired…(Florentina) 
 
The common denominator of the social science teachers’ classroom work during the last 
decade of communism in Romania was duplicity. This duplicity resulted from their attempt to 
reconcile the expectations and standards imposed by the country’s leadership “from above” and 
the often conflicting reality on the ground.  
 Several factors contributed to the duplicity. The first and most important was external 
and political: the unprecedented extent of ideological pressure, the aggrandizing focus on 
Ceausescu that affected the social sciences more than any other disciplines86. During the 1980s 
decade Nicolae Ceausescu’s cult of personality reached i
shment of reality was flagrantly incongruous with the life of the average Romanian. The 
economic crisis Romanians were dealing with (in many ways perceived at the time as the direct 
 
86 Murgescu, România si Europa. 
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result of Ceausescu’s policies) made it very difficult for teachers to convincingly argue about the 
extraordinary progress brought by the Communist leadership.  
The requirements intended to strengthen ideological education, such as meetings, debates 
or “vol
detrime
schools
Dana p
e were supposed to ask students to purchase the pamphlets with the party speeches 
eived as 
the “ex
 
Finally, teachers were part of a duplicitous bureaucratic system in which participants 
were far more concerned with preserving their positions and privileges than serving an 
ideological “mission.” In this duplicitous system teachers received no credible supervision or 
positive reinforcement, but on the contrary, they felt like random targets for sanctions.  
untary,” “patriotic work” often took teachers and students away from the classroom to the 
nt of education. Often the lack of resources after the cutbacks in the education budget left 
 without the ability to purchase the course materials students were supposed to study. As 
ut it, 
W
from bookstores, the schools were no longer providing them. Many of my students could 
not afford them, and I felt uncomfortable pressing their parents to buy them. We had to 
cope, and we had a convention: what happens between the walls in the classroom stays 
there, and this gives us a lot of freedom to think and to say what you think. Things like 
it's impossible to get X crop per acre. Many times I didn't even need to say it because 
they knew already. 
 
Another important factor was the covert defiance against teaching what was perc
aggerations” in the official ideology, defiance that the teachers picked-up in college from 
their own professors. They reported being uncomfortable propagating the flagrant economic 
exaggerations from the textbooks and party pamphlets, and also worrying that by doing so, they 
would compromise the close relationships they reported having with their own students.
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2.3 SOCIAL SCIENCE TEXTBOOKS  
In this section I am discussing the social science-civic education high school textbooks used in 
the 1980s87. Although most of other disciplines were infused with explicit or implicit party 
propaganda (most significantly history and literature) I narrowed down my focus to social 
sciences in order to be able to triangulate with the teacher and student accounts88. It is also worth 
noting that in a broader discussion of ideology and education systems, the Romanian communist 
textbooks were no exception. As Steven Brint notes, historically, all education systems were 
driven by various ideologies, and were guided by the interest of nation-states of “developing a 
trained workforce and well-disciplined citizenry.89  
Very little has been written about socialist textbooks, largely because the post-1989 
changes captured most scholars’ attention, and besides, among the records, documents and 
archives of the communist years, socialist textbooks every generation had to memorize did not 
exactly contain exciting material or revelations. A unique account of socialist textbooks so far is 
historian John Rodden’s “Textbook Reds” (2006) covering the East German textbooks. Rodden’s 
interest in the socialist textbooks is very close to my own. He looks at elementary school and 
high school textbooks as the product of pedagogical efforts to educate East German youth by 
telling them what to think about their country, their party, or their class enemy. Although it is 
very difficult to assess the effect of these efforts, Rodden draws on several interviews with 
former students and teachers and argues that they created a “textbook mentality” which equated 
                                                 
87 Comparisons to other subject textbooks would have been very interesting, but they have not been studied 
yet.  
88 No other communist era textbooks were studied. 
 
89 Steven Brint, Schools and Societies, 2nd ed. (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 7. 
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citizens’ critiques of the party and DDR government with disloyalty and such bourgeois sins as 
individualism, negativism, and cosmopolitanism imprinted itself deeply in generations of DDR 
pupils.” (2006: xxviii) 
Several of Rodden’s observations about East German civics/social science textbooks 
could perfectly describe the Romanian textbooks as well. The most interesting of these 
observations is their unidimensional, party-only focus:  
 […] unlike other subjects they did not have to contend with literary or geographical or 
historical “facts”: it was almost pure ideology. Its textbooks cited virtually no authorities 
except sacred party documents and leaders. (2006:89) 
 
As one would expect, this led to a very dry, lackluster content, which are the first 
adjectives that come to mind when describing the Romanian textbooks. Topics such as “socialist 
freedom” or “socialist romance” mentioned in the German textbooks analysis are completely 
missing from their Romanian counterparts. Quite the opposite, the Romanian textbooks 
emphasize more coercive concepts such as discipline, sacrifice and gratitude towards the Party. 
They also contain fewer examples, illustrations and practical tasks.  
Like all Romanian textbooks from the 1980s, the social science textbooks reflect the peak 
of Ceausescu's personality cult opening with a first page full-page portrait of a young, healthy-
looking Nicolae Ceausescu, who in reality was well over 60. The severe economic downturn is 
reflected in the poor physical quality of the textbooks, in the thin, yellow, almost see-through 
recycled paper they were printed on, which makes it possible to almost read the text printed on 
the reverse. They were provided free of cost to students and passed from one cohort to another, 
but the better-off and concerned parents would buy new copies for their children. Like all other 
textbooks, they were the unique official textbooks, part of the standardized national curriculum. 
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They were revised every five-seven years to reflect the latest Romanian Communist Party 
Congress speeches.  
The purpose of the “Economics” (1978, 1985) textbook was to introduce 9th grade 
students to the basics of the socialist economy. Of all the social science textbooks it was the least 
ideological, most readable, non-repetitive and logical. Overall the style was very sober, and no 
illustrations or examples provided.  
The textbook begins with a section emphasizing how important it is for the country that 
the students learn Economics, accompanied by a quote from Ceausescu about the “work 
heroism” ethic that young Romanian students are expected to develop. The next chapters 
introduced basic economic concepts such as the production of goods, labor, workforce, and 
means of production, followed by a brief history since 1944 of the socialist context in which 
Romania's economy functions. Here the students were told about the planned economy, socialist 
property, social equality (which didn't mean that meant that all citizens are being paid equally, 
but that they are all owners of the socialist property). The citizens’ salaries were based on the 
“quality, quantity and social importance of work” (1985:9). 
The socialist economy was postulated to be in a permanent growth process “the national 
economy continuously develops,” and was also “one unitary and independent entity” (1985:15). 
The next chapters describe the socialist economic unit and its administrative structure, as well as 
concepts such as workers’ self-management, socialist production, organization of work and work 
discipline. Here, another set of basic economic concepts are introduced: productivity, production 
costs, price, profit, salaries, circulation of goods, import/export and gross domestic production. 
The final chapters discuss the current economic situation, living standards and Romania’s future 
development. Again, the Romanian economy is described as being on an ascending trend, 
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independent from the world economy, following only the prescriptions of central planners and 
the Party.  
Perhaps the most glaring contradiction with the actual experience of the 1980s students is 
the discussion of Romanians’ living standards. The improvement of living standards, argues the 
textbook, is “the ultimate goal of the socialist economy.” Whatever progress the Romanian 
economy made since 1945, the authors completely fail to illustrate in terms of living standards. 
Instead, they shift the discussion to the last party Congress and empty phrases such as “profound 
revolutionary transformations in Romanian economy and society.” Only two examples of 
economic growth are given: the current industrial production is said to be 120 times higher than 
in 1945, and there is a graph showing salaries increasing from 1950 to 1985 (inflation was not 
factored in) by a factor of 13. Although the “living standard” is described as an indicator taking 
into account factors such as “income, consumer goods and services, working conditions, living 
conditions, transportation, leisure time, social services, medical services, cultural activities, 
education, access to science art culture and politics”, the authors gave no examples of 
improvements other than for income and state spending on “cultural activities.” The last part of 
the chapter is solely devoted to detailed coverage of the next five-year plan and the 
improvements it is going to bring in “housing, consumer goods and culture.” Romania’s next 
goal was to “transition from a developing country to a medium-developed one.”  
In the 10th grade, Romanian students were taught the subject of “Social and Political 
Education” (1978, 1985, 1988). In this textbook the ideological dimension completely takes 
over, making it an even more mind-numbing reading. Buried among endless and repetitive 
quotes from Nicolae Ceausescu, the students found occasional references to Marx, Engels and 
Lenin. The textbook manages to introduce several Marxist concepts about the evolution of 
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human society, types of social organization, socialist revolution and class struggle, but all these 
are dwarfed by long sections covering “comrade Nicolae Ceausescu’s contribution to the 
development of revolutionary theory.” The first two decades of communist rule in Romania are 
briefly mentioned, whereas the years after Ceausescu's rise to power are covered in a lot of 
detail, emphasizing all of his accomplishments, leadership and speeches. Unlike the Economics 
textbook which was a little more logical, this textbook is full of stereotypical party speech 
sentences, loaded with adjectives and very vague in their meaning. Here is an example of such a 
sentence:  
Our party promotes with unrelenting consistency its policy of developing and 
consolidating socialist property, and its two forms - state owned and cooperatist (28).  
 
Once again, just like in the previous textbook, a lot of the text is devoted to covering 
glowing future plans of development. A section on social classes describes Romania as a two 
class society: the working class (51,6 percent of working population) and the cooperatist90 
peasantry (28.3 percent), along with several other “social categories” such as intellectuals, 
administration and services personnel, small cooperative workers, freelancers and independent 
(non-cooperatist) peasants. These social classes, the authors argued, were not antagonistic, but 
functioned in the spirit of the “worker-peasant alliance” the political basis of our society” (37). 
Future economic development and policies such as the “systematization of the villages”91 will 
transform Romania into a classless, homogenous society. The Romanian Communist Party is 
presented as “a group of people united by their common politics, ideology and social interests, 
[…] the most active and most organized part of a social class” (41) with a membership of 3.7 
                                                 
90 Member of an agricultural cooperative. 
91 An internationally criticized program initiated by Nicolae Ceausescu aiming for a forced urbanization, by 
razing villages and moving their population to the cities. (39) 
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million, of which 55 percent were workers, 15.5 peasants and 20 percent intellectuals and other 
categories. The party members and the president represent “the sovereign will of the nation,” 
however nothing is mentioned about the selection of party members and leaders or about how the 
nation communicates its will to them. The next section, devoted to democracy, discusses the 
flawed capitalist democracies which “proclaim formal rights, whereas our society provides 
essential human rights: the right to work, to education and healthcare, equal work for equal labor 
and nondiscrimination based on sex or nationality” (48). Party elections and “workers’ self-
governance” are given as examples a functioning socialist democracy.  
One of the most important goals of the Party policy was to form the “New Person”: a 
citizen with revolutionary spirit, motivated by socialist revolutionary patriotism, devoted to 
socialist ethics and equality, with a materialist scientific education and views, and an eye out for 
combating mystical-religious manifestation. The Party’s hope for attaining this ideal citizen was 
focused on the youth, “the vital center of our society” (9), which had a chapter of its own in the 
textbook, the ones who were seen as the most malleable segment of the population, removed 
from the old capitalist system and naturally progressive. Therefore, the authors present the youth 
as being especially targeted through “political ideological” and “cultural educative activities” 
throughout their education, and having a “very special place” in the Communist Party through 
the Union of Communist Youth. The last chapter discusses Romania's foreign-policy where 
some of Ceausescu's favorite causes are mentioned, such as stopping nuclear proliferation, 
slowing down the arms race, and conflict mediation. The significance of the East-West political 
divide is remarkably absent from this section (a brief mention of NATO and the Warsaw Pact is 
the only hint). Instead, Ceausescu's international peace activism is given prominence. Romania 
comes across as an independent state, as Ceausescu liked it, but also as a politically isolated 
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state, with no friends92 or enemies. This representation of Romania in international relations is 
highly consistent with Ceausescu’s autarchic leadership style and policies of isolationism in 
foreign affairs noted by Nelson, such as non-integration in the Warsaw Pact, military self-
reliance as well as a less voluntary isolation from the Reagan administration which decided to 
pay more attention to human rights violations in the 1980s93.  
The 11th grade social science subject seems to have taken things to an entirely new level: 
compared with the ninth and 10th grade subjects textbooks which were about 70 to 100 pages 
long, the Political Economy of the Romanian Communist Party textbook stretches to 236 dense 
pages. It is divided into three sections: Introductory Concepts, The Socialist Economy, and The 
Capitalist Economy. The introductory section addresses in more depth concepts previously 
introduced by the Economics textbook (labor, modes of production) as well as an attempt to 
define the discipline (“the totality of principles and norms that guide the economic life of a state, 
internally and internationally, as well as the means and methods used to perfectly accomplish the 
course of economic life” p. 21) 
As in the case of the previous textbooks, economic concepts are covered briefly to make 
room for the sections covering the Party or Ceausescu’s take on the specific concept discussed. 
Here, the authors show off their exceptional ability to write apparently articulate but very vague 
paragraphs such as this one:  
In our Party’s political economy, the scientific dimension blends organically with its 
creative original character. Through its realism, precise estimation of internal and 
international factors and conditions that factor into its design, the political economy of 
the party constitutes a living example of the development of general truths, universally 
valid for the socialist construction (22). 
                                                 
92 It is also very interesting to note the absence of Ceausescu's most famous foreign policy move: the 
critique of the Soviet Prague invasion of 1968, which gained him a lot of admiration in Romania and internationally. 
93 Nelson, Romania afterTyranny. 
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 The next section on “The Capitalist Economy” covers concepts such as production, 
commodities, value, capitalist exploitation, accumulation of capital, the working class and the 
crisis of capitalism. All concepts are introduced without any context, as purely “theoretical” until 
the end of the “Capitalism” chapter, where a discussion of the situation of the working class in 
capitalism developed, Western countries come up as examples. To illustrate how bad the 
working-class situation was, the authors mention data from a 1987 United Nations report on 
unemployment (average of 8.5 percent which equals 31.5 million total in the developed countries 
among which women, youth, elderly are overrepresented), income inequality (in the US 18.7 
percent control 76 percent of the wealth; same in Belgium, France, UK, Italy and Sweden), and 
poverty (14 million UK, 18 million France, 32 million. USA) (pp.54-56). The US car industry is 
used as an example of monopoly, whereas companies such as Exxon and Philips are examples of 
the imperialist export of capital. The rise of transnational, multinational companies is a 
confirmation of Leninist theory about the economic division of the world, the inevitable collapse 
of capitalism and the transition to socialism:  
Capitalism transformed into a world system of social oppression and colonization, of 
exploitation of the vast majority of the world population by a group of developed 
capitalist countries (71) 
 
The issue of imperialism constitutes another occasion to introduce a little bit of 
Ceausescu’s thinking, something unusually straightforward in this textbook: his analysis of the 
thesis that nineteenth and twentieth century Romania was an imperialist state. His argument was 
that capitalist Romania was economically too underdeveloped to be imperialist, and far from 
being an exploiting state it was an exploited one (p. 71).  
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The final section on “The Socialist Economy” offers the students a brief recap of 
Romania’s transition to socialism, where the earlier historical analysis credited to Ceausescu is 
attributed this time to Lucretiu Patrascanu (a leading member and “party intellectual” of the 
Romanian Communist Party, promoter of national-communism within the party, executed in 
1954 and rehabilitated by Ceausescu in 196894) and accompanied by a quote. Unlike Ceausescu, 
Patrascanu actually published several books and social-history essays about Romania in the 
1930s. Several indicators of Romania’s economic backwardness in the 1940s are used: an 
economy mostly based on agriculture, a modest industrial sector, a trade balance deficit, low 
income per capita plus the costs of World War II, large losses due to economic subordination to 
Germany (443 million in 1938 currency) and Northern Transylvania’s brief annexation to 
Hungary.  
The incursion into reality and data stops after a couple of pages, after which the highly 
abstract-theoretical enumeration of concepts continues with socialist property, agrarian 
revolution, the planning of economic activity, productivity, cost of production, workers self 
governance and financial self-management, socialist reproduction, circulation of goods.  
The chapter concludes with a special section about “the improvement of living standards: 
the supreme goal of party policy” (208). Here the authors mention Romania’s effort to deal as 
much as possible with members of the Eastern Bloc’s economic organization (Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance) and with developing countries, which represent 24 percent of 
Romania’s total foreign trade (the textbook does not specify which countries outside of the 
Council are the rest) . The task of illustrating the improvement of Romanian citizens’ standards 
of living is carried out by reiterating the national economic growth numbers mentioned earlier in 
                                                 
94 For more on Patrascanu see Adrian Cioroianu, Pe Umerii lui Marx: o Introducere in Istoria 
Comunismului Românesc (București: Curtea Veche, 2005). 
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the “Economics” textbook, as well as a weak attempt to give more individualized examples. 
These are limited to healthcare (an improvement from a ratio of 1485 population per physician in 
1945 to 475 on 1986), and a mention of improvement in housing and cultural activities.  
The style remains as convoluted and a-historical as in the previous textbooks. Overall, the 
textbook makes for an extremely dull, repetitive and confusing reading; its lack of examples or 
practical assignments, question, discussion points, or illustrations make it the worst of all the 
social science textbooks.  
The last of the textbooks, the 12th grade subject of “Philosophy” is a blend of history of 
philosophy, Marxist philosophy, and Ceausescu quotes. The textbook opens by clearly situating 
the development of philosophy in a social-historical context. Philosophy is a partisan discipline 
which “represents one way or another, the interests of a certain social group” (6). Philosophies 
can be progressive (such as the Marxist-Leninist philosophy) or conservative. The former, which 
represents the ideals of the working class is the philosophy of the Party, and is the people’s only 
way to accede to a superior society, and is therefore, objective. The textbook continues with a 
historical overview of philosophical schools from ancient Greece, middle ages to modern 
philosophy, everything being presented as an evolutionary process that led to the 19th century 
Marxist revolution in philosophy. Again, the Party’s 13th Congress95 documents and Ceausescu’s 
speeches creep-up in every section, emphasizing that:  
The learning of Marxist philosophy contributes to the formation of a new human type, 
with a superior capacity of understanding objective laws and acting upon them, freed 
from idealistic, conservative, and mystical conceptions (8).  
 
                                                 
95 The Romanian Communist Party started holding Congresses at irregular intervals since 1921. After 1948 
they were held every five years. The 13th Congress took place in 1984. King, A History of the Romanian Communist 
Party.  
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Contemporary philosophy is also mentioned (existentialism, phenomenology, 
spiritualism, neopositivism, structuralism, the Frankfurt school) along with Romanian 
philosophy, where Gr. Ureche, M. Costin, Scoala Ardeleana, Gh. Lazar, T. Diamat, V. Conta, T. 
Maiorescu, B.P. Hasdeu, A.D. Xenopol are sandwiched between Ceausescu and the same 
Ceausescu. The Romanian section insists on the “original” and “progressive Romanian traditions 
in philosophy.” A lot of authors, some of whom had written religious texts, are recovered in this 
nationalist key, and presented as champions of humanism, knowledge and freedom of 
expression. The early 20th century is presented as a battlefield between the materialistic and 
idealistic philosophies. The authors of the latter are not mentioned, only the ones that 
significantly “critiqued and exposed it”: P.P. Negulescu, P. Andrei, M. Florian, M. Ralea, D.D. 
Rosca.  
The focus shifts again to Ceausescu and the Party’s “contributions to the development of 
revolutionary theory.” Ceausescu is given credit for concepts such as the “novel sprit” the Party 
seeks to spread among its people and the “multi-laterally developed socialist society,” an ideal 
stage of independent development towards communism. The next few sections (Matter and 
Consciousness, Epistemology, Determinism, Social-human determinism, The Materialist-
Dialectics of Development, Social Progress, Social Conscience, Forms of Social Conscience; the 
Formation of the New Man) continue with heavy theorizing, classifications and definitions 
intermixed with the Marxist view of each topic.  
The Romanian social science textbooks used in the 1980s shared a great deal with the 
official Party rhetoric, or “double speak,” often called in Romania “the wooden tongue,”96 which 
                                                 
96 Lavinia Betea, Mentalități si Remanențe Comuniste (București: Nemira, 2005), suggests a Russian, pre-
communist origin of the term 
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“does not communicate anything new, and does not describe anything97 (Thom, 1989). Betea98 
suggests the “wooden tongue” speech originated in the Soviet Union and was propagated in 
Romania (and Eastern Europe) by the intellectuals affiliated with power. She cites poet and 
philosopher Lucian Blaga’s experience of mandatory ideological training: “I understood that 
professors had to suspend their own brain activity and try the impossible: to think with the brain 
of the classical Marxists.”99 All the characteristics of early Soviet communist rhetoric 
inventoried by Jackobson100 (1963) are found in the textbooks analyzed in this chapter: vague, 
full of abstractions and redundancies, identical from one author or topic to another, with heavy 
use of hyperbole, euphemism and superlative. The vocabulary is poor, the tone is passive, and 
the discourse lacks clarity and it is not adapted to the audience101. As Lavinia Betea discovered 
in her interviews with Ceausescu’s speechwriter D. Popescu, everyone was aware of these 
problems, but this was the way Ceausescu wanted his speeches and party documents. Here is 
what Popescu recounted:  
Nobody forced him to deliver speeches all the time… he was not bothered that all his 
speeches were alike […] once we had a discussion about these concerns of mine and he 
was surprised, “why are you bothered by this? It’s normal. We don’t have two policies, 
we have only one!” His speeches, even among the small circle of party leaders felt like a 
bath in ice water, like the North Pole. The strongest sensation was of depersonalization, 
people walked out of meetings with a feeling of mineralization. (1994: 74-75) 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 Thom, 1989 in Betea ibid. 
98 Lavinia Betea, ibid. 
99 Lucian Blaga, Luntrea lui Caron: Roman (București: Humanitas, 1990)., 1990:183 in Betea 2004:47 
100 Roman Jakobson, Essais de Linguistique Generale: les Fondations du Langage. (Paris: Minuit, 1963).in 
Betea 2004.  
101 Françoise Thom, Newspeak: the Language of Soviet Communism (London: Claridge, 1989). in Betea 
ibid.  
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3.0  THE EVERYDAY LIFE EXPERIENCE OF ROMANIAN YOUTH: PARENTS, 
FAMILY, FRIENDS 
This chapter is devoted to the everyday life experience of youth in the 1980s. First, it situates my 
work in the context of theoretical and methodological shifts in the scholarship on Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, and the relevance of the everyday life perspective for 
understanding communism in the region. It also sketches the evolution of Romanian literature 
and research on the communist era and the theoretical and political factors that shaped them.  
Based on my interviews with former students I offer a general description of all phases of 
the educational system as directly experience by students, followed by a more in-depth analysis 
of how former high school students form Bucharest traced their political education over time. I 
divided their accounts by sources of influence: parents, peers, schools and communist youth 
organizations (Pioneers and the Union of Communist Youth).  
3.1 LENS TRANSITION: A SLOW SHIFT FROM MACRO TO MICRO ANALYSIS 
ON SOCIALIST EASTERN EUROPE 
During the Cold War and for most of the first decade following 1989, the scholarship on Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union was marked by a distinct focus on elite level politics and its 
opposition/resistance, “particularly owing to the persistence of the ‘victim-oppressor’ syndrome” 
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according to Kott102. As more and more reports about the victims of the socialist revolutions 
surfaced from the Soviet Bloc in the 1950s, the concept of “totalitarian systems” seeking total 
control of their subjects became the lens through which issues of oppression, fear, and the 
absence of individual freedom were exposed. This approach was rooted in the “totalitarian 
paradigm” originating in the works of Karl Popper103 and Hanna Arendt104 and exerted 
considerable intellectual influence on Western sovietologists105. Although there were exceptions, 
such as Fitzpatrick’s work106 on the Soviet Union or Burawoy’s107 work on Hungary, this 
paradigm dominated the scholarship on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  
During the decade that followed the revolutions of 1989, as the socialist experience 
moved into the realm of the past, alternative approaches emerged in both local and Western 
scholarship from history, anthropology and sociology. This shift in methodological approach is 
most often associated with Alf Lüdtke’s108 German school of Alltagsgeschichte (history of 
everyday life) and drew on Eric Hobsbawm’s and E. P. Thompson’s “history from below” 
focusing on ordinary people left out by the previous grand narratives109.  
                                                 
102 Sandrine Kott, “Everyday Communism: New Social History of the German Democratic Republic,” 
Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (May 1, 2004): 233–247. 
103 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism Karl Popper. (London; New York: Routledge, 1994). 
104 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. in Péter Apor, “The Joy of Everyday Life: Microhistory and the 
History of Everyday Life in the Socialist Dictatorships,” East Central Europe 34, no. 1/2 (June 1, 2007): 185–218. 
105 Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958); Carl 
Friedrich, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2d ed., rev. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); 
Robert Tucker and American Council of Learned Societies Devoted to Humanistic Studies., Stalinism: Essays in 
Historical Interpretation, 1st ed. (New York NY: Norton, 1977); Vladimir Tismaneanu, Byzantine Rites, Stalinist 
Follies: the Twilight of Dynastic Socialism in Romania (Philadelphia PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1986); 
ibid. 
106 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts 
Under Lunacharsky October 1917-1921 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1970)., Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism. 
107 Michael Burawoy, The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to Capitalism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
108 Alf Lüdtke, The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
109 Apor, “The Joy of Everyday Life.” 
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The new “wave” of scholarship draws from the wide range and diversity of ordinary 
people’s lives and practices under socialism, such as women’s experiences of (in)equality, 
fashion, labor, sexuality110, socialist spaces (dachas, street photography, Pioneers’ Palaces, 
communal apartments, décor111, youth in working class towns112), social class and popular 
culture113, cinema114, citizenship and power115, social work116, culture117 modernity, and 
material culture118. 
                                                
Several critiques have been leveled against the everyday life perspective on the socialist 
experience. The most common one is the failure to take into account the historical context of 
these everyday life experiences. For example Koczanowicz119 and Kubik120 are concerned with 
the “normalizing”, nostalgic or even apologetic potential of such accounts. Apor on the other 
hand warns about the trap of thinking from the point of view of the fall of communism in 1989 
and the dangers of ignoring the pre-communist context of “poverty, deprivation, uncertainty, 
 
110 Rebecca Kay, Gender, Equality and Difference During and After State Socialism (Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)., Jill Massino, “Something Old, Something New: Marital Roles and Relations in 
State Socialist Romania,” Journal of Women’s History 22, no. 1 (March 6, 2010): 34–60. 
111 David Crowley, Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc (Oxford; New York: Berg, 
2002). 
László Kürti, Youth and the State in Hungary: Capitalism, Communism, and Class (London; Sterling Va.: 
Pluto Press, 2002).112  
113 Svetlana Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1994). 
114 Joshua Feinstein, The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in the East German Cinema, 
1949-1989 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
115 Jan Palmowski, Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 
1945-1990 (Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
116 Lynne Haney, Inventing the Needy: Gender and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002). 
117 Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV. 
118 Susan Reid, Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-war Eastern Europe (Oxford; 
New York: Berg, 2000). 
119 Leszek Koczanowicz, “Memory of Politics and Politics of Memory. Reflections on the Construction of 
the Past in Post-Totalitarian Poland,” Studies in East European Thought 49, no. 4 (1997): 259–270. 
120 Jan Kubik, “Historical Memory and the End of Communism,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 
(May 9, 2007): 127–133. 
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absence of social welfare systems”, and the existence of local anti-capitalist sentiments.121 
Another important critique is that this approach is turning a blind eye to processes of the 
production of power, and presenting power instead as “external, from a clearly defined center” 
attempting to control subjects that come across as “a separate sphere”:  
It was as if socialism had been a project only of a group of strange people who were 
cultivating lunatic utopian ideas and as if those ideas had been artificial ideological 
constructions, or even that during socialism nobody had ever believed in anything.122 
 
Some proponents of the everyday life approach, however, emphasize the importance of 
addressing this interconnectedness, of looking at “the inter-relations between the overlapping and 
mutually informing elements of state and society”123. Furthermore, they argue, it is important to 
understand not only how the state was able to influence individuals but also how policies were 
“mediated, contested, reinforced, and in some cases ignored” in everyday life124.  
3.2 EVERYDAY COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA 
The interest in everyday life under communism, quite noticeable today, took about a decade to 
sprout in the Romanian field, much later compared to the Soviet Union or East Germany125. 
Local Anthropology and Sociology were repressed, and although research was still conducted in 
some institutions (as I describe in chapter 3), analyses and publication were very limited. Several 
                                                 
121 Apor, ibid: 207 
122 Apor, ibid. 
123 Mary Fulbrook p. 289 in Patrick Major, The Workers’ and Peasants’ State: Communism and Society in 
East Germany Under Ulbricht 1945-71 (Manchester UK; New York ;New York: Manchester University Press; 
Distributed exlusively in the USA by Palgrave, 2002). 
124 Massino ibid:36 
125 See Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism; Lüdtke, The History of Everyday Life. 
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western anthropologists (such as Katherine Verdery126, Gail Kligman127, David Kideckel128 and 
Steven Sampson129) were able to conduct fieldwork in Romania and their work constitutes an 
exception from the focus on politics and elites. Their work, however, was limited to small rural 
communities.  
In the early years of the first decade of post-socialism the present seemed the most 
pressing issue and Romanians, just like the other post-soviet societies, seemed to be eager to 
discuss the future. Many local scholars joined their western counterparts in debating political and 
economic transition, as well as the spread of nationalism in Eastern Europe. As far as the past 
was concerned, it was the early decades of communism and its victims that occupied a privileged 
place in both scholarly circles and public debate, not the recent period. This trend could be due to 
the general perception that communism was a Soviet-backed130, external imposition, coupled 
with a romantic view of the interwar period131. These factors, in the context of the post-1989 
policy issues of property restitution, led to a strong interest in the forceful ways in which 
communism was imposed, and the Romanian resistance to communism, which was severely 
suppressed and never before discussed in public. 
                                                 
126 Katherine Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic 
Change (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California press, 1983). 
127 Gail Kligman, Căluş: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981).Gail Kligman, “The Rites of Women: Oral Poetry, Ideology, and the Socialization of Peasant Women 
in Contemporary Romania,” Journal of American Folklore 97, no. 384 (1984): 167–188. 
128 David Kideckel, “The Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in a Romanian Commune, 1945-62,” 
American Ethnologist 9, no. 2 (1982): 320–340. 
129 Steven Sampson, National Integration Through Socialist Planning (Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1984). 
130 See Cioroianu, Pe Umerii Lui Marx. 
131 See Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic 
Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
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Several histories of the communist Party were published132. One of the most iconic 
public figures in the discourse about the early communist past was TV producer Lucia Hossu-
Longin. She produced a 35 episode long documentary titled “Memorialul Durerii” (The 
Memorial of Suffering) where she featured interviews with the anti-communist resistance of the 
1950s and 60s and portraits of their tormentors, members of the secret police. It was aired 
between 1991 and 1994, a time of bitter political division between the so called “neo-
communist” regime of Ion Iliescu and the much less influential opposition that included several 
pre-1945 veteran politicians133 who survived the communist prisons.  
                                                
The focus on the victims inevitably portrayed the first two decades of communism as a 
dark and horrific experience. The interviews with the anti-communist resistance and torturers 
were accompanied by footage of dark prison halls, cells, torture instruments with Hossu-
Longin’s low and grave commentary in the background. The documentary generated strong 
support from dissident poet Ana Blandiana, who along with writer Romulus Rusan went on to 
found “The Civic Academy Foundation” (Fundatia Academia Civica) and in 1993 “The 
International Center for Research on Communism” (Centrul Internaţional de Studii asupra 
Comunismului)134. The Center collects historical material and oral histories about the resistance. 
It transformed the former Sighet prison (where many political prisoners were detained) into “The 
Sighet Memorial”, a place to educate the younger generations about the crimes of communism. 
 
132 Tismaneanu, Byzantine Rites, Stalinist Follies; Deletant, Communist Terror in Romania; Dennis 
Deletant and Centrul de Studii Românești., Romania under Communist Rule, Rev. 2nd ed. (Iași Romania; Portland 
OR: Center for Romanian Studies in cooperation with the Civic Academy Foundation, 1999)., Tismaneanu, 
Stalinism for All Seasons. 
133 Corneliu Coposu, Radu Campeanu, Ion Ratiu, Constantin Dumitrescu. 
134 http://www.memorialsighet.ro/ 
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The museum received some criticism from one former political prisoner for lack of authenticity 
in its freshly varnished look.135 
The use of oral history to document the suffering during the communist repression was 
pioneered in Romania by linguist and anthropologist Smaranda Vultur136. Along with a team of 
students she collected oral histories of communities from the western province of Banat, Jews or 
Germans deported to the Baragan plains (Romania’s dust bowl).  
The passing of time and the rise of questions about responsibility for the abuses and 
debates about how history should be taught to the post-89 generations led to a proliferation of 
state and private/non-profit institutions and organizations created specifically to document the 
communist past. Most of these institutions retained the primary focus on the political victims of 
communist abuses. The earliest one is the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism 
(Institutul National pentru Studiul Totalitarismului), created under the patronage of the 
Romanian Academy in 1993137. It deals with documenting the communist repression, political 
history and foreign relations. The Oral History Institute138 (Institutul de Istorie Orală) was 
created in 1997 within the History and Philosophy department of the Babes Bolyai University in 
Cluj and although it ran projects about the anti-communist resistance as well, it expanded its 
focus to include research on ethnic and religious minorities. 
 The Romanian Institute for Recent History139 (Institutul Roman de Istorie Recenta) was 
established in 2000 as a non-profit organization through a program of the Dutch foreign affairs 
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ministry, with the mission of opening up the academic debate about communism through public 
debates, collection of oral histories and publications. They supported the publication of several 
volumes focused on political repression, such as histories of the secret service, the Brasov 
workers’ revolt of 1987, forced demolitions and foreign policy but also more “everyday life” 
topics such as gender identity under communism and urban oral histories of Bucharest. The same 
year the non-profit organization AsperA was founded by Romanian émigré Lidia Bradley, with 
the mission of supporting education but also running the “Memoria” periodical and the website 
http://www.memoria.ro/, “a digital library of interviews, memoirs, oral histories, books and 
images from Romania’s recent history.” 140  
Soon enough, the state stepped into the Romanian memory industry, as Pierre Nora141 
would call it. The state involvement in the communist memory work in Romania was plagued by 
contemporary political divisions and tensions, and bitter fights over funding, staff and 
“academic” turf. 
The first state-funded institute under direct government control under the Nastase 
government (and “coordinated by the Ministry of Culture) was The National Institute for the 
Memory of the Romanian Exile142 (Institutul Naţional pentru Memoria Exilului Românesc) and 
was established in 2003. Its mission was to collect historical material about the Romanians living 
in exile during communism, to support publications about the exile and function as liaisons 
between the government and the Romanian diaspora.  
In 2005 the Tariceanu government created the Institute for the Investigation of the 
Crimes of Communism (Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România) and 
                                                 
140 http://www.aspera.ro/index.html 
141 Nora, Realms of Memory. 
142 www.exilul-romanesc.ro – website defunct, accessed with Google Cached page on October 25, 2011. 
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appointed Romanian historian Marius Oprea (prolific author of publications about the secret 
service and communist repression in general) as its head. Consistently with Oprea’s expertise, 
the institute focused on victims and perpetrators and started a campaign of locating burial sites of 
citizens executed during the communist repressions, exhumations and identifications.  
Political tensions in 2006 between president Basescu and the Tariceanu government, led 
the president to start his own Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist 
Dictatorship in Romania (Comisia Prezidenţială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din 
România) headed by University of Maryland political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu. The 
mission of the commission was to examine the communist period, write-up a report, and advise 
the president on the appropriateness of publicly condemning communism. The broader backdrop 
of this drive to investigate the communist past was a long time refusal or avoidance of previous 
post-1989 governments (both the so called “neo-communist” social democrats as well as the one-
time in power conservative Democratic Convention) to take a stand about that past or to open 
investigations about past abuses. The presidential commission presented its 660 page report143 in 
December 2006 and, based on it, the president officially condemned communism144, declared it 
an “illegitimate and criminal regime,” “a totalitarian regime born through violence and 
terminated thorough violence.”145 The report covered the abuses perpetrated by the communist 
regime (imprisonments, persecutions and demolitions of villages, churches and cultural heritage 
sites) as well other faults such as the indoctrination of the population146 or the destruction of 
national culture and the imposition of party approved culture. The report was criticized by 
                                                 
143 The entire report is available on the presidency website http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=htm&id=83. 
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http://www.presidency.ro/?_RID=det&tb=date&id=8288&_PRID=ag. 
146 Tismaneanu’s own parents are listed as perpetrators of the indoctrination. 
 62 
several intellectuals on various grounds, such as the (in)appropriateness of spending tax revenue 
on it, the choice of the committee members, the short timeframe (6 months), its indiscriminate 
blaming or its anti-left political bias. These critiques were later published in a collective 
volume147.  
In November 2009 president Basescu decided to consolidate The National Institute for 
the Memory of the Romanian Exile and the Institute for the Investigation of the Crimes of 
Communism (created by his political rival prime minister Tariceanu) into the Institute for the 
Investigations of the Crimes of Communism and the Memory of the Romanian Exile148 
(Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului si Memoria Exilului Romanesc). Vladimir 
Tismaneanu was appointed the head of the new institute. Marius Oprea, the former head of the 
Investigation of the Crimes of Communism protested the consolidation and unsatisfied with the 
deputy head position offered in the consolidated institution created in 2010 a new Center for the 
Investigation of the Crimes of Communism149 (Centrul de Investigare a Crimelor 
Comunismului) where he continues his archeological search for those executed in the first two 
decades of communism. The center is funded through private donations and in part by the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation.  
                                                
The political history of communist repression and its victims still dominates the way the 
communist past is re-memorized in Romania, but beginning with the 2000s different accounts 
started to emerge. Most of these come from a younger generation, born in the 1960s and 70s, a 
generation that today, as adults, is starting to remember their childhood and realize its 
uniqueness. A lot of this remembering took place in conversations and in online forums and 
 
147 Critiques of the report can be found in Ciprian Șiulea, Iluzia Anticomunismului: Lecturi Critice Ale 
Raportului Tismăneanu, Ediția 1. (Chișinău: Cartier, 2008). 
148 http://www.crimelecomunismului.ro 
149 http://www.condamnareacomunismului.ro/ 
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blogs, and later in dedicated websites150. Here, members of those generations shared memories 
of growing up under communism, such as children’s games, nursery rhymes, stories of 
fetishizing western consumer products, old communist newspapers, photos, communist film 
fragments, communist era snacks and brands, very much in the spirit of the popular yet 
controversial German film “Goodbye Lenin.” Advertisers quickly caught the trend and 
concocted several “nostalgia” ads, such as the one for the resuscitated communist-era Rum 
Chocolate151 featuring a cameo of Ceausescu scaring off high school students or the Bucegi152 
beer ad reminiscing about the two hours-a-day Romanian television broadcast and the habit of 
watching the Bulgarian television channels153.  
                                                
The Romanian “New Wave of Cinema” writers and directors are part of the same age 
group and some of their films are representative of this new current. Catalin Mitulescu’s “The 
Way I Spent the End of The World” (2006) portrays communist everyday life and its permeation 
by politics through the eyes of a school girl whose world is completely changed when she 
accidentally breaks a bust of Ceausescu. The award winning “4 Months, 3 Weeks and 2 Days”154 
(2007) closely follows the experience of a young woman going through the process of arranging 
an illegal abortion155 for her best friend, while “Tales from the Golden Age”156 is a humorous 
exploration of several urban legends of the 1980s, most of them ridiculing the communist 
bureaucracy and red tape.  
 
150 http://www.latrecut.ro/, http://www.comunismulinromania.ro  
151 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o5BsN9BKoFI&feature=related (circa 2003) 
152 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKpKHdZn8W4 (circa 2004) 
153 Watching it was popular despite the obvious language barriers: Romanian is a romance language and 
Bulgarian Slavic. Many Romanians started learning Bulgarian to be able understand the dubbing of their western TV 
programs. In the 1980s Bulgarian dictionaries were rumored to be sold out in Romania.  
154 2007, directed by Cristian Mungiu. 
155 In the post-1967 Romania abortion and contraception was banned as a way of increasing birth rates. See 
Gail Kligman’s “Politics of duplicity”. 
156 2009, directed by Hanno Höfer 
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In a series of three volumes titled “Explorations of Romanian Communism” 157 literary 
critics and members of the same generation158 Ion Manolescu, Paul Cernat, Angelo Mitchievici 
and Ioan Stanomir analyze (sometime sarcastically) literary productions, plays, and political or 
cultural figures of the communist era. The four also wrote an autobiographical volume159 about 
their childhood and youth experiences from the communist era. Their intent, as explained on the 
book’s back cover, is remembering and “recapturing” those times: 
We would like our texts to be read not with judging eyes but by someone able to 
understand their relativity. We were silent about some things from our past and opened 
up about others. Those who are our age will recognize, undoubtedly, the familiar 
everyday atmosphere, but for those who don’t have memories of those times it’s all 
fiction already. Through the stories collected here we wanted to open and close a gate to 
a magical, atrocious or tender past, knowing very well that it would never be possible to 
completely recapture it. (my translation)  
 
In the same book series, the publisher (Polirom) released in 2008 a volume of memoirs of 
women writers160 touching on such issues as sexuality, schools, abortions, motherhood, or 
shopping under communism. The interest in oral history also produced a collection of everyday 
oral histories from Bucharest161 collected by the Romanian Peasant Museum researchers, and a 
volume of secondary school and high school student essays about communism based on 
interviews with their family members162. Communist dissenters such as Mircea Carp163, Radu 
                                                 
157 Paul Cernat, Explorări Iin Comunismul Românesc: 3 Vol. (Iaşi: Polirom, 2004). 
158 They were born between 1968 and 1973. 
159 Cernat et. al. O Lume Dispărută: Patru Istorii Personale Urmate De Un Dialog Cu H.-R. Patapievici 
(București: Polirom, 2004). 
160 Radu Gheo, Tovarășe De Drum: Experiența Feminină in Comunism (Iași: Polirom, 2008). 
161 Anghelescu, Serban et. al. Mărturii Orale: Anii ’80 si Bucureştenii. (Bucureşti: Paideia, 2003). 
162 Luciana Jinga and Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România., Elev in Comunism = 
Student During the Communist Regime (București: Curtea Veche, 2009). 
163 Mircea Carp, “Vocea Americii” În România: 1969-1978 (Iași: Polirom, 1997). 
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Filipescu164, Herta Műller165 published autobiographical volumes, along with witnesses of the 
privileged lives of party members such as coffee shop manager Gheorgeh Florescu166. Powerful 
photographs167 surfaced, very different from the official photos everyone remembers, reminding 
Romanians of the depressing face of the 1980s, of poverty, waiting in lines of hundreds, 
overcrowded busses, demolitions of old historical neighborhoods, empty shop windows or lucky 
shoppers showing off a dozen rolls of rough toilet paper.  
3.3 THE ROMANIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AS SEEN FROM THE 
STUDENTS’ PERSPECTIVE 
This section is based on my interviews with former students. First, I offer a general description 
of all phases of the educational system such as Preschool, Grade school and High school, as they 
were directly experienced by students, followed by a more in-depth analysis of how former high 
school students form Bucharest traced their political education over time. I divided their accounts 
by sources of influence: parents, peers, schools and communist youth organizations (Pioneers 
and the Union of Communist Youth).  
                                                 
164 Herma Kennel, Jogging Cu Securitatea: Rezistența Tânărului Radu Filipescu (București: Editura 
Universal Dalsi, 1998). 
165 Herta Müller, Regele Se-nclină si Ucide (Iași: Polirom, 2005). 
166 Gheorghe Florescu, Confesiunile Unui Cafegiu (București: Humanitas, 2008). 
167 Andrei Pandele, Martorul-Surpriză: Fotografii Necenzurate din Comunism (Bucureşti: Compania, 
2008). 
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3.3.1 Preschool 
 Nurseries and kindergartens were optional, and the attendance rate for the time my respondents 
were of that age was about 45.7 percent168. Ideological education was present at this level 
through the youngest communist organization, named “Falcons of the Fatherland” (Soimii 
Patriei). All four year old kindergarten children were enrolled, and wore uniforms made up of 
orange shirts with a button on red tie trimmed with the national flag colors, blue skirts/pants, and 
blue hats. Kindergarten teachers were required to teach children about president Nicolae 
Ceausescu (presented as the father of the country) and the Communist Party. In addition, 
children were read news stories about the president and taught songs and poems about the 
president, party, and patriotism. 
3.3.2 Grade school 
During grades 1-4 Romanian students studied with one teacher and were taught reading and 
writing, math, drawing, physical education, and music. In most of these subjects (except for math 
and physical education) the ideological component is present through photos of the president in 
the classroom and on the first page of each textbook, in poems, stories, or direct learning about 
the president and the communist party. In second grade, ideological education becomes more 
structured, through the enrollment of the students in the “Pioneers” youth organization (grades 2 
to 8). Most169 students were invited to join in an oath ceremony that took place at a location of 
                                                 
168 Education in the SSR (1973:17) in Martin Croghan, Ideological Training in Communist Education: a 
Case Study of Romania (Washington: University Press of America, 1980). 
169 Usually 2-3 students with very low grades were invited in a second round of enrollment which took 
place a year later. Not being invited to be a pioneer was equivalent to being labeled a bad student.  
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historical-national significance, such as The Communist Party Museum in Bucharest, The Army 
Museum, or the Doftana Museum, a former prison where Nicolae Ceausescu and other party 
founders had been imprisoned before 1945. The pioneers wore uniforms as well: blue 
skirts/pants, white shirts, red scarves with the national flag trim, belts, and white berets with the 
Pioneer insignia pins.  
The pioneers held meetings that entailed military-style protocol and elected leaders 
named after military ranks, such as row leader (commandant de grupa), class leaders 
(commandant de detasament) and school leaders (commandant de unitate). All elections were 
closely supervised by teachers, and up to the school leader level they were quite democratic: 
students nominated their candidates and voted for them during the same session, without 
campaigns. The school leader positions were less democratic, the position was strategically 
assigned to students with important Party connections or who were perceived by teachers as 
more obedient, mature, and responsible. All pioneers participated in activities in their classroom 
(organized by their home-room teacher) as well as school activities organized by one teacher 
assigned to be a Pioneer school-supervisor (instructor de unitate). These activities involved 
leisure activities such as school-trips and camping, as well as more ideological ones, such as 
readings from the Party newspaper, visits to factories or pageants with plenty of poems and 
songs praising the president, the party, and the fatherland. The pioneers were also required to 
participate in rallies supporting the president and the Party and do collective “volunteer” work – 
called “patriotic work”, which in most cases involved cleaning parks or other green areas, 
collecting recyclables, and gathering medicinal herbs. Participation in these activities was 
required. Although no direct grading was involved, missing these activities led to notifications 
sent to parents and possibly penalties in the “behavior” grade, which could get the student 
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expelled. Ideology was also present in a lot of the subjects taught (such as literature or history) 
and parents were often involved in helping their children do their ideological homework on 
topics such as “The Party is the party of all workers”, “Romania loves peace”, “The importance 
of the five year plan.”170 
Starting with 5th grade students had different teachers for each subject – Math, Language 
and Literature, Foreign Languages (mostly German, English, French, Russian), History, Biology, 
Geography, Chemistry, Drawing, Physical Education. At this stage, Croghan noted in his 
research about education in the 1970s, ideological education continued with a more intense 
emphasis on nationalism, especially present in subjects such as History and Romanian 
Literature.171 
3.3.3 High school 
In Romania, just like in the Soviet Union, tracking started at age 14 (the equivalent of 9th grade) 
through competitive examinations which, as Brint argues “[…] favored children whose parents 
had higher levels of formal education.172” In the case of Romania I would amend Brint’s 
observation by also adding children whose parents did not necessarily have high levels of 
education but had the available income and social aspirations to hire tutors for their children.  
As students got closer to 8th grade high school admission exams became the focus of 
students, parents, and teachers. The high school exams were very competitive and were regarded 
as extremely important in determining one’s future. Students had to choose a high school they 
                                                 
170 Croghan ibid:108. 
.171 Croghan ibid:121 
172 Steven Brint, Schools and Societies, 2nd ed. (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006)., p. 101. 
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would like to attend (the most desirable ones were the “math-physics” ones and the specialized 
ones such as computer-science, pedagogy, art, music or Economics). After signing up, students 
took an entrance exam (Math and Romanian Language). Based on the exam grades they 
occupied the available slots at the desired high school; lower-scoring students were redistributed 
to less desirable high schools. The exams constituted a great source of stress for students, 
families, and teachers. Hiring private tutors for their children was the norm for better-off parents 
and even less affluent parents, who often forfeited other necessities for what they saw as the 
guarantee of better jobs for their children. All the students I interviewed had at least one private 
tutor in 8th grade in Math and some of them also had tutors for Romanian Language173. At this 
point in a student’s life both parents and teachers eased up on the expectation to get high marks 
on every subject in favor of the two exam subjects. Since ideological classes at this level were 
not important for getting into high school, sometimes home-room teachers arranged to replace 
them with tutoring from the math or Romanian teacher, and most teachers in the school 
acknowledged the hurdle ahead for their students and eased their assignments. Prestigious high 
schools also held tutoring sessions for aspiring 8th graders on Sundays.  
Tutoring continued in high school for students aspiring to go to the university, as well as 
to prepare for another exam scheduled half-way through high school. This mid-course exam was 
similar to the admission exam and was scheduled at the end of 10th grade and it determined their 
eligibility to continue attending their present high school or to transfer to another (better or 
worse) high school. Since both the high school and University exams in the 1980s tested the 
students only on two subjects (independent of their GPA) the trend of focusing more on the exam 
disciplines started in 8th grade continued through high school. Only Economics high schools 
                                                 
173 Croghan (ibid) reports widespread practice of private tutoring in both secondary school and high school 
as early as the 1970s.  
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(which a small number of students attended) required a Political Economy exam, thus making it 
an important subject for their aspiring students. For all other high schools (the majority), 
however, exams tested students on different subjects, thus decreasing the importance of 
instruction in ideology. In the case of college admissions, ideology courses played an important 
role only for a limited number of students, those aspiring to attend the Economics Academy. 
These were a minority in an educational system that prioritized industrial training and allocated 
most of the college seats to the Polytechnic Institute.  
On average a student attended thirty hours of classes per week174, as well as a few hours 
of participation in meetings of the UCY and occasional “patriotic work”. Sundays were free, but 
school met on Saturday, regarded as a work day in socialist Romania. Patriotic work in high 
schools often involved school trips accompanied by teachers to nearby agricultural cooperatives 
where students were required to pick or sort corn, potatoes or onions, or trips to factories where 
they were supposed to participate in the production process.  
During their first year of high school, students were to join en-masse The Union of 
Communist Youth (UCY). The UCY was founded in 1949 as a Romanian version of the Soviet 
youth communist organization, the Komsomol.175 By the 1980s the UCY included all high 
school and college students and some youth between the ages of 15 and 26. Its secretary was 
Ceausescu’s son Nicu Ceausescu from 1983 to 1987.176 The mission of the UCY was to 
introduce youth to the party culture. It continued their ideological education in high school and 
beyond. In high schools the UCY activity was exclusively run by teachers. The teachers had their 
                                                 
174 Croghan ibid:128. 
175 Federal Research Division, Romania: a Country Study (Kessinger Publishing, 2004). 
176 As Tismeanu noted, the second half of the Ceausescu regime had a strong dynastic component. Nicu 
Ceausescu was widely known in Romania as Ceausescu’s successor. His image among Romanians was one of a 
privileged, arrogant heavy drinker known more for his wild partying and escapades than for his political 
involvement. See Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons. 
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own party organization run by a teacher who was party Secretary. Usually the teacher who was 
the assistant of the high school party secretary was appointed as the secretary of the UCY 
organization. This person was responsible for coordinating the school UCY organization which 
included virtually all students and their representatives for each grade. At the homeroom level 
the responsibility for organizing the UCY activities was given to the homeroom teacher. Some of 
these activities included weekly or biweekly meetings for ideological education. These would 
typically have lectures or involve reading a newspaper article about the activities of the president 
or the party. They occasionally included criticism for “incorrect ideological behavior.” Other 
activities were participation in demonstrations, patriotic and literary or artistic competitions, or 
more leisure oriented activities such as trips, camps, visits to the theater or the movies or 
dances.177  
3.4 REMBERING POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE 1980S 
Between January and December 2005 I conducted ten life history interviews with high school 
graduates (4 women and 6 men) from Bucharest who completed high school between 1980 and 
1989. In the interviews we focused on their memories of childhood, education, family and 
friends with specific focus on the presence of politics and ideology in their lives. The interviews 
ranged from a total of 1.5 to 3 hours, sometimes in two sessions. My respondents were born 
between 1966 and 1972. I recruited them through snow-ball sampling with three different 
starting points. Their current occupations were production manager in an advertising company 
                                                 
177 Croghan ibid: 132. 
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(1), journalist (3), public relations and multimedia specialist (1), advertising copywriter (3), non-
profit manager (1), and high school teacher (1). Four of them attended elite high schools 
(Balcescu, Lazar), five attended medium-prestige high schools (Caragiale, Mate-fizica 3, 
Neculce, Sincai) and one of them attended an “industrial” low prestige high school, but only for 
the first two years after which he transferred to a higher prestige high school. All of them 
continued their education in college, majoring in business, literature and languages, architecture, 
electronics (2), the polytechnic institute (2, one of whom dropped out), history and journalism. 
Only one respondent had parents who were originally from Bucharest, which explains the fact 
that all of them grew up in new working class neighborhoods, in apartments built during 
socialism that were usually provided by state companies where a parent worked. This could 
reflect their parents’ social mobility but it can also be explained as the result of intense 
urbanization of the country during the communist years, and the fact that new communist-era 
apartment building neighborhoods were the only option available for new families. Their early 
childhood accounts are remarkably similar: playing with many other kids around their apartment 
buildings and new construction sites, attending the neighborhood school, visiting grandparents in 
the countryside on vacation. Six of them came from families where both parents were college 
educated (2 fathers had PhDs), two had only fathers with college degrees and two came from 
parents with a high school education. Among the grandparents I found a middle or upper class 
background178 before Communism among five maternal grandparents and three paternal 
grandparents. Two of the middle-upper class maternal grandparents were political (non-
communist) party member before 1948, the rest were not involved in politics or they did not 
                                                 
178 This was important to know because in their efforts to achieve social equality the early communist 
governments expropriated and persecuted not only the members of the upper class but also middle-class or even 
wealthier peasant families.  
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mention it to their grandchildren. The rest of the grandparents were peasants, except for one 
working class grandparent who worked for the railroads. Among parents, men were more likely 
to be party members: eight out of ten fathers were members of the RCP, compared with only four 
mothers. Considering the social class of their grandparents before 1945, five of the ten pairs of 
parents married across class lines.  
3.4.1 The influence of parents  
As I showed in the previous section, the generation of my informants was bombarded, beginning 
with kindergarten until maturity, with communist ideological messages and the personality cult 
propaganda of Nicolae Ceausescu. The intensity and reception of these messages, however, 
changed considerably over time. The most susceptible to the ideological indoctrination were the 
very young kindergarten and primary school students. This is the age when my informants 
reported going home from kindergarten reciting patriotic and pro-Ceausescu poems or even 
thinking of him and his wife as special parents watching from above. This is how Gabriel 
remembers thinking about Ceausescu:  
I thought he was the smartest man on earth… when I was little. I knew he was president, 
and back then I thought the president was the smartest man in the country. On the other 
hand I realized later that my mom and dad had a different opinion, around first or second-
grade. My parents weren't talking openly with me about this, but I caught a whiff that 
things weren't exactly that way, that this Ceausescu guy wasn't exactly okay. 
 
As they grew older and more aware, they overheard criticism of the regime and president 
from their parents and extended family, and ultimately it was explained to them that things were 
not exactly the way they were taught in school, and they were trusted to keep absolute secrecy 
about the things they discussed at home. This was the experience of all my informants. In 
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Adrian’s family, politics or criticisms were almost never present, but because of his father’s 
important position179 he received the warning as well:  
I had to be careful when I talked on the phone, my parents warned me. Because of my 
dad's job our phone was tapped. 
  
  The most common discontent expressed in the critical political discussion within the 
family was about the severe consumer goods shortage and economic crisis, which were 
perceived as the direct result of Ceausescu’s policies and the corruption among Communist party 
members who lived lavishly compared with the average socialist citizen. Ceausescu’s personality 
cult and the heavy penetration of ideology in every aspect of life were also resented.  
My informants had more and more open discussions about politics as they grew past the 
age of 7-8, heard political jokes in the family and even listened to Radio Free Europe with their 
parents. Even the party member parents (except for Adrian’s father) expressed critical views 
about the Ceausescu regime. Camelia’s father, a working class communist sympathizer’s son 
who graduated from the party college was listening to Radio Free Europe with her and discussed 
the pre-communist history of Romania. “I think he really believed in communism helping the 
working class”, Camelia explained, but he became disillusioned, especially after he lost his 
position as mayor due to machinations in the local party organization. Her mother, a party 
member teacher, also complained about the food shortages and the many hours of ideological 
classes she was required to attend as a teacher as well as to advise her home-room students. 
Ana’s mother is another example of a “poster case” for communist social reform. A young girl 
with only four years of primary school, she worked for a rich banker’s family, as a companion 
for his daughter. After the communists came to power she got a factory job and later she was 
                                                 
179 Factory manager. 
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sent to attend one of the “Workers’ Universities” that offered the equivalent of a college degree 
and became a party member. Ana remembered her mother as genuinely believing in communism 
and being very grateful for the chance it gave her to continue her education. “She was aware of 
all the abuses but she was rationalizing and thinking that somehow, overall it was still good.” 
I asked her how she felt when she heard about her mother’s life story, and if she felt 
sympathy for her. She replied: 
I thought she was very exotic and I was eager to find out details, especially about the time 
when she worked for the very rich banker's daughter. And I thought those were things 
from very different times that will never repeat again. I also thought it was very stupid 
that she had to study so much and stay up all night [in the Workers’ University]. 
 
Ana was much closer to her father, who was very well-read and who came from a 
wealthy family. Because of his wealthy background he was unable to join the party and advance 
his university professor career. Ana and her father listened to Radio Free Europe together and 
discussed history and politics. But she also heard stories about how much property was 
confiscated from her grandfather and greatly admired her father’s “more sophisticated, cultured 
and interesting” side of the family over her mother’s peasant grandparents. She was critical 
towards her mother and tried to show her that she was wrong in her political views:  
I was identifying with the rich and that made my mother very angry. She thought that the 
rich were bad and greedy and the poor were good. After the banker’s family she worked 
in a textile factory in the night shift and sometime sang. Someone's spotted her great 
voice and put her in an office so that she won't ruin her voice. See? I was telling her, it 
was pure luck that you got out of there.  
 V: did you ever feel empathy for her? 
The opposite! I was criticizing her. I was trying to take apart her ideas. I was trying to 
make her admit that she was subjective about communism. 
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When political discussions did not take place with the parents, families of peers or 
grandparents stepped in. Alexadru’s parents for example, never discussed politics around him, 
but he learned about Radio Free Europe and Western culture from his best friend’s family, who 
were more “intellectual, open-minded, and more artsy” than his own. Grandparents who before 
1945 were middle-class or politically involved and subsequently expropriated or marginalized by 
the communist regimes were more vocal and political than parents in criticizing the Ceausescu 
regime. My informants considered them influential in how they began to think of the official 
propaganda. Adrian (whose parents avoided discussing politics) remembered listening to Radio 
Free Europe with his maternal grandfather who was a former National Peasant Party member 
who after 1945 was arrested and tortured by the Romanian Secret Services. Camelia’s maternal 
grandfather served (she said he “was a sort of confidante’) for a Romanian prince before 1945, 
and she grew up with stories of the royal court, with princes, princesses, and politics. When I 
asked if the stories affected how she perceived the world she grew up in she responded:  
I wasn't comparing a lot, I took things the way they were. But I was thinking that they 
were very beautiful times, I was thinking of it with melancholy. Especially because I read 
a lot of literature and I fell in love with the epoch. But most of these things for me were 
stories, they were not palpable reality. At that age I didn't really see an end to the present 
situation. I was thinking that this is how my life is, and will be.  
 
Radu’s grandmother had her family’s bakery confiscated and suffered marginalization 
because of their “bourgeois” background. She also entertained him with stories about interwar 
Romania. Radu browsed interwar newspapers from his grandfather’s collection. His grandfather, 
he told me, was from a noble family, had been politically active and after 1945 was accused of 
being a legionnaire180, his wealth was confiscated, and he lost his university professor position.  
                                                 
180 Member of Romania’s interwar fascist movement “The Legion of Archangel Michael”, also known as 
the “Iron Guard”. 
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In all the cases parents, grandparents, or friends exposed my interviewees to messages 
contradicting what the communist power was trying to convey: that their lives were so much 
better than the lives of people living in capitalism, past and present. The shortage economy of the 
1980s, the romantic images of interwar Romania, the identification with the former upper-class 
side of the family (a very ironic outcome of the communist pressure for social equality that made 
such marriages possible), all went against the goals of the official propaganda.  
From my interviews I found that fathers and (both) grandparents were more likely than 
mothers to discuss political issues with their children. Mothers were more likely to be on the 
cautious side or express indirect complaints, such as the long hours of ideological meetings that 
added to their work hours, or the time spent waiting in lines to procure the basic food needed for 
their families. Although party membership brought some career advantages, mothers were also 
more resistant to party recruitment. Only four mothers were party members (compared to 8 
fathers), and three of the rest of the mothers refused to join the party claiming that they were too 
busy raising a family.  
3.4.2 The influence of teachers and youth political organizations (the Pioneers and the 
Union of Communist Youth)  
General education and political/ideological education were deeply intertwined in Romania in the 
1980s. All youth organizations were run by grade school and high school teachers, and most of 
their activities originated in schools or were coordinated through schools.  
Most of my interviewees considered themselves to be average – to very good students. 
All reported having private tutors for exams. Looking back at their education they considered it 
“good”, some of them even commenting that post-1989 public education has gone into decline. 
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From its very beginning, and also in the 1980s, Romanian education was based on obedience and 
discipline and the teachers were treated with a great deal of respect. Students addressed them as 
“Comrade teacher”, boys had to uncover their head when greeting them and all students had to 
rise and greet a teacher entering or leaving the classroom. Even sitting at one’s desk was 
regulated (especially in grades 1-4): students had to hold their hands together behind their backs 
when not reading or writing at their desk. In order to talk they had to raise their hand and receive 
the teacher’s permission. They had to stand up whenever they were addressing the teacher. 
Uniforms and dress code were strictly enforced and deviations could lead to the student being 
sent home. Teachers had authority not only in the classroom but also outside. They could 
admonish or sanction any inappropriate student behavior they noticed anywhere, even outside 
the school. In addition, students were required to wear textile badges sewn on their uniforms 
with the school name and a number assigned to each one, so that they could be identified any 
time they wore the uniform. Most of teaching consisted of the teacher lecturing and writing on 
the blackboard and students taking notes, writing down every word the teacher said. A few 
classes involved other activities in laboratories, such as biology, chemistry and physics. The 
grades were based on written exams, quizzes, oral examinations and papers.  
My interviewees’ perception was that their teachers had a lot of power over them, and a 
few of them abused it. Sometimes this took the form of physical abuse, such as in Gabriel’s 
account about his homeroom teacher (grades 1-4):  
She would hit us with a ruler. We were all scared of her. She made us believe that when 
we go home she might be walking behind us and watching us. She actually sometimes 
did it. So every once in a while we would turn back to see if she was there. She told us to 
go straight home, and talk nicely and be quiet on the way home. I think her intentions 
were good, she was trying to teach us good manners.  
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Ana had a home-room teacher in high school who used some unusual psychological 
abuse to punish her students over a pageant gone wrong:  
One day she was very mad and she came to the class with a tape recorder and played a 
tape with her saying very mean things about each of us, pointing out our “flaws”. We 
were really traumatized by that, I still remember the mean things she said about me.  
 
Radu remembered one politically well-connected teacher who used student behavior 
outside the school as reason to fail them in Chemistry course: 
[…] we had a chemistry teacher who was an inspector, very well connected and well 
indoctrinated, and nobody dared to say a word to her. This character really marked our 
existence in high school, she was very mean and aggressive. She failed a lot of students 
no matter how hard they tried, just because she could. […] we had another mean math 
teacher who was also some kind of inspector. He hooked up with the chemistry teacher, 
one student saw them in the park and whistled. She saw him, and later failed him. He had 
to leave and transfer to another high school.  
 
 Although they could not directly question the teachers’ decisions, students did sometime 
respond to what they perceived as abuse. Radu recounted a new rule that required them to wear a 
special hat that resulted in a lot of students not being allowed to enter the school without the hat. 
He and a large group of students from his high school went to protest in front of the Ministry of 
Education and that got their principal fired. Maria and her classmates took revenge on a boring 
teacher: 
[…] there was a teacher of “Industrial Materials” who had a notebookfrom which he used 
to dictate to us every class. Whenever he started class he asked us: which where the last 
three words? … to resume his dictation. Once he dropped his notebook on the way out, 
and of course we took it and destroyed it. That day he wasn't able to teach the class.  
 
This was the only instance when one of my respondents recalled the effectiveness of collective 
action. Of course, there were also great teachers they remembered with great fondness. One 
teacher Radu remembered was a teacher of Russian who was “very cultured” and approached 
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teaching with “unusual” and enjoyable methods such as talking about nature or art in Russian. 
Camelia “had a crush” on her young History teacher, who captivated the class with his lectures 
and inspired her life-long passion for history. A history teacher was also Gabriel’s favorite in 
high school. He remembered her interesting lectures and, most importantly, that she let the 
students express their opinions, and encouraged them to think for themselves. He also credited 
some of his college professors for teaching him to think and express an opinion of his own, but 
emphasized that these were exceptions in his experience of the educational system:  
It was the opposite of what all the other teachers were doing. We weren't taught to think, 
and discouraged from expressing our opinions.[…] Romanian education was and still is 
dominated by teachers who think they can “stuff things into your head”. Lots of 
memorization… 
  
Ana had two of what she called “celebrity teachers.” One was a famous geography 
teacher and author of textbooks (Octavian Mandruta). He not only was a great teacher but was 
“adored” by students. He played soccer with them and shared his passion for cinema by narrating 
his favorite films to the students (such as Solaris181 by Tarkowskii). The other was math teacher 
Valentin Matrosenko, also famous among students.  
Ideology was physically present in the classrooms through the portrait of president 
Ceausescu. A familiar story that I heard during my interviews and numerous other occasions was 
the encounter of this symbol of power with various objects the students were playing with during 
recess. Here is Gabriel’s experience:  
                                                 
181 Andrei Arsen’evich Tarkovskii et al., Solaris ([S.I.]: Criterion Collection, 2002).  
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There was a portrait of Ceausescu in the classroom, the one with one ear182, and we were 
staring at it. Beyond the portrait there was a presence we felt in the air. I don't think we 
can talk about seven, eight years olds suffering from paranoia, but we were taught at 
home: “be careful about what you say in school, be good, the comrade is up there, 
watching you”… It was imprinted in your subconscious, to be careful when someone said 
something against him, we were taught not to agree and just walk away. We didn't talk 
about this psychological tension, but we all felt it. Once during a break someone hit the 
portrait with an eraser and left a mark on it. We were all silent and paralyzed. It felt as if 
someone broke someone else's skull and he was covered in blood.  
 
The rigid and dull ideological education started very early, and most times it was 
delivered without any basic considerations such as the style of delivery or its intended audience. 
Gabriel remembered the 11th Congress of the RCP in the fall of his first grade just because their 
teacher came into the classroom and started writing on the blackboard a long quote from a 
Ceausescu’s speech for students who didn't know to read or write yet. This formalism continued 
throughout their education. Radu remembered with amusement the “Training for the defense of 
the fatherland” (Pregatire pentru Apararea Patriei) class in ninth grade. In preparation to defend 
their country students had to make a scrapbook with newspaper clippings from Party speeches: 
The teachers would check them; even the principal would double-check once in a while. 
We glued them with water based glue, and the pages would wrinkle and turn into a 
cabbage-like notebook.  
 
As part of the same class other students were taken to a shooting range outside Bucharest 
and learned to shoot two rounds with a rifle. As Diana remembers, some girls refused to do it, 
afraid of hurting their shoulder, and the boys filled in for them. The heavy metal fans from her 
                                                 
182 In the 1980s all the three-quarter profile photo portraits of Ceausescu that were displayed in the front of 
every classroom, workplace, textbook, or magazine were replaced everywhere with a more frontal one, showing 
both of his ears. The explanation that circulated among Romanians was that the replacement was carried out in order 
to avoid having people call him “one eared,” which in Romanian means “gone crazy.” This is a story that came up in 
two of my students’ interviews and in many, many informal conversations, and I remember it as well.  
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high school “had a field day” showing off their khaki outfits. Except for the tight jeans the dress 
of the heavy metal subculture was made up of shirts, boots and bags procured from the military.  
 None of the teachers of social sciences, the most ideological courses, came up without 
my prompting in the student accounts of their education. When I specifically asked them about 
those classes and teachers they remembered taking them, but not the teachers’ names. Their 
memories of those classes were very vague, and centered on how boring they were. Here is 
Ana’s account: 
Yes, I remember this stuff.. I remember reading the newspapers, cutting out articles…. it 
was so unfriendly and abstract you couldn't possibly understand it. I also remember 
underlining a lot of things. I don't remember any message, anything that made sense or 
could be remembered … (laughing).  
 
Dragos remembered a “double” ideological message from his social science teacher:  
 
I remember our teacher once had us memorize some fragments from his [Ceausescu’s] 
discourses… but also slipped in once in a while something against him.  
  
 Alexandru told me “I slept through those classes”. Only Adrian, who was preparing for the 
admission exam in the Economics Academy, had to study the Political Economy textbook. He 
referred to it as “doping” or “making you dumb” (dopaj) and remembered that it covered 
extensively the Party’s 13th Congress and that he had to memorize it:  
There were teachers who would dictate or recite everything from memory. And we 
figured out that the exam was going to be the same.  
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3.4.2.1 The Pioneer experience 
My informants’ memories of the pioneer183 experiences were remarkably similar, and more 
favorable than the experience of the UCY. All of them remembered the induction ceremony 
(which took place in some location of historical/political significance), wearing the red neck 
scarf, the class ceremonies and the pioneer election for sections and class leaders. Interestingly, 
these elections, which were largely free from teachers’ interference up to the class “leader” level, 
gave them their first democratic experience. Adrian, whose father rose from a poor peasant 
family to military academy graduate, Moscow PhD and factory manager, fared modestly in the 
pioneer organization, with only a row commander position. “I did not like to stand out” he told 
me, and remembered missing a lot of the less desirable Pioneer activities such as sweeping the 
streets because he knew that the school would not pressure him because of his father. Ana, a very 
extroverted student and talented writer and poet, reached the “school leader” position in the 
pioneer hierarchy, and she was chosen by her teachers, not through elections. She explained her 
trajectory in the organization as a reflection of her above-average level of maturity which was 
valued by the teachers more than being a top student. The teachers used her as a liaison with the 
students, not for ideological indoctrination but to keep them in line in difficult situations such as 
this one: 
For example we had a very young and popular teacher who requested permission to 
emigrate to the US. This put her in a very bad situation at the workplace184, and 
coincidently, a few students in her class started misbehaving. The principal called me into 
her office and explained that she already is in a lot of trouble and any additional trouble 
                                                 
183 The Pioneer enrollment started in 2nd grade and ended in 8th grade. In 9th grade students were enrolled in 
the Union of Communist Youth. These organizations were the only officially approved youth organizations. They 
had connections across the Soviet bloc, but they were not connected with international scouting.  
184 The request to emigrate from Romania in the 1980s took years to process, and in the meantime the 
authorities did everything in their power to make the lives of the applicant difficult. They usually lost their jobs and 
their family members became suspect as well and lost the right to receive promotions or advance in their careers. 
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from students will make her case worse. I went and explained to my classmates and they 
understood. She left later for the US and everything ended well.  
3.4.2.2 The Union of Communist Youth experience 
According to all my respondents, at the age of 14, as they moved from grade school to high 
school they experienced less active involvement in political organizations (UCY). Membership 
in the UCY just like the Pioneers was obligatory, but it was more formal and there were fewer 
meetings and activities. Students attending elite high schools reported that in their case, the 
ideological pressure was less present than in the rest of the high schools. They felt that UCY 
activities were kept at a minimum “because everyone was very good and talented or came from 
an important party or administration background. Everyone was privileged in a way.” (Maria).  
Only one of my informants, whose parents did not have college degrees and were not 
party members, had a leadership position in the UCY during high school. Gabriel failed the high 
school admission exam and was sent to a lower status high school. Here he was appointed to the 
high school UCY organization and became propaganda secretary in ninth grade. He saw 
participation in the UCY favorably not because of ideological conviction but as an ego boost and 
a way to advance his “career”:  
I was promoted in high school and I was very proud of it. I noticed that politics was a 
good way of advancing toward becoming someone, only through politics you actually 
can succeed. My family also taught me that, actually everyone around me. […] The 
opportunist inside me was thinking that I have a future now. I was even thinking of a 
political career. I was very young, a naïve 15 years old.  
 
Gabriel was not impressed with how the organization looked from inside. He 
remembered his disappointment after taking courses at the political school of the UCY: “The 
class was totally formalized, I didn't learn anything, they weren’t serious about it not even at that 
high level, all I got was a diploma.” After he was able to move in 11th grade to a more 
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prestigious high school he stopped being involved in the UCY activities and focused more on 
mingling with his new peers:  
I was a newcomer and I wasn't the best in my class, so I didn’t care much about that 
[UCY position] anymore. I started thinking there was more dignity in not being active in 
the UCY, and I was ashamed of thinking before of becoming a party activist. I probably 
grew a little bit, I matured. 
 
He also invoked the worsening of the shortages and deprivations from the late 1980s as a 
disincentive for UCY involvement. The rest of my informants emphasized a generalized lack of 
interest in the UCY, and a high degree of casualness. Radu, for example, recounted “being 
inducted” into the UCY but never picking up his membership card. Later on, when he joined the 
military service he had trouble proving his membership and had to re-join.  
 
Romanian students in the 1980s grew up surrounded by the official ideological messages 
delivered mostly through the educational system. Although they were exposed to them as early 
as kindergarten, these messages were deconstructed and discredited in the family environment. 
As early as second grade, students were exposed to their parents’ to criticism of the Party, and 
especially about the economic shortages that affected the family most directly: the limited food 
items on the kitchen table, the shortage of domestic goods and the increasingly long hours family 
members spent in lines to obtain them. Coupled with increasingly long Party meetings at the 
workplace, these made a topic of criticism that was shared within all families.  
Along with the trust in sharing such criticism came the education in fear and duplicity: 
parents taught their children to not discuss any of the criticism with anyone, to be circumspect 
when asked questions that might pry into such matters, and to avoid political discussions outside 
the family altogether.  
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Within the family, students were exposed to alternative sources of information, mostly 
foreign radio stations such as Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America. Another important 
source of political alternative information were the grandparents. Their pre-communist 
experiences and increased willingness to talk about politics constituted an important influence, 
and many times helped create a sense of nostalgia for an idealized interwar Romania, where 
some of their ancestors perhaps had a better economic situation. Even the working-class 
background students found those times fascinating, and at the sane time remembered being 
unimpressed with their poor parents’ social mobility.  
The delivery of ideological messages through the education system was remembered as 
deeply flawed. The participation in youth organizations was favorably remembered as their first 
(and last) experience with democracy in the case of the Pioneers, while the Union of Communist 
youth was considered an insignificant, uninteresting part of the high school experience. The 
social science teachers and courses were remembered as some of the least interesting, because of 
the dreary, repetitive and abstract party documents and Ceausescu speeches were thrust into the 
classrooms indiscriminately, even to not yet literate students. Teachers were in the difficult 
position of being supposed to “teach” something that was very difficult to understand and 
explain and resorted to memorization and scrapbooking; and some of the teachers were 
themselves engaging in the practice of duplicity and delivery of “double messages”. 
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4.0  YOUTH AS RESEARCH SUBJECT IN 1980 ROMANIA  
My research in Romania uncovered that youth was not only the focus of the Communist Party's 
policies or the target of the Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist) 
recruitment efforts, but also the research subject of the Center for Research on Youth (Centrul de 
Cercetari pentru Problemele Tineretului). This chapter is devoted to describing the broader 
context of Romanian Sociology, its history, organizational structure, researchers, and methods. I 
also discuss some of their research findings that are relevant for understanding Romanian youth 
in the 1980s and the type of data that the center made available to the Communist Party and its 
overall political and academic impact. The research carried out by the Center made very clear 
that in some important ways the regime’s program of indoctrination was less than a complete 
success, in some ways much less. Young people took patriotism more seriously than socialist 
ideology and for very many, religion seems to have still been important. 
4.1 ROMANIAN SOCIOLOGY UNDER COMMUNISM 
In Romania, unlike much of Eastern Europe, Sociology had an early academic start, quite closely 
connected with the development of Sociology in France and Germany. Larionescu traced the use 
of the term “sociology” in Romania to politician and intellectual I. C. Batianu as early as 1853, 
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only fourteen years after Auguste Comte coined it.185 The first Sociology course was offered in 
1896 in Bucharest and Iassy (concurrent with the courses offered by Durkheim, for example). It 
was followed closely by other universities in the country, and by 1925 it became a course offered 
in both graduate and undergraduate studies186. As Larionescu notes, Sociology in Romania was 
driven by a several important scholars, many of them involved in politics, nation building and 
debates over the place of the (Romanian) nation in the world.  
One of the most prominent of these intellectuals was professor Dimitrie Gusti187, the 
1918 initiator of what was going to be remembered as Romanian Sociology’s “golden age.” 
Using his political clout (he held the position of Minister of Education between 1932 and1933 an 
in 1935 he became the chairman of the Romanian Academy of Sciences), he set up and secured 
public funding for the Romanian Social Institute, a multi-disciplinary group of researchers and 
students committed to what they believed should be the purpose of sociology: “modernizing” the 
country and “strengthening” the nation (Stahl, 1980). His team was made-up of (publicly) funded 
2,500 researchers, and spent extensive time collecting data and writing 626 village monographs 
(Ungureanu, 1980). Gusti political involvement allowed him to secure the funds not only for 
research, but also for structural improvements in the communities they studied (roads, schools, 
sanitation). Between 1932 and 1935 he was the minister of Education.  
Stalinism brought an end to Romanian Sociology's “golden years.” Like everywhere else 
in the Soviet bloc, Sociology was considered a “bourgeois” science and in 1948 was excluded 
from the curriculum at all levels, and Gusti’s Romanian Social Institute was closed. During the 
                                                 
185 Larionescu, Istoria Sociologiei românesti. 
186 Costea in Keen, ibid: 73 
187 Graduate of the Universities of Paris, Berlin, and Leipzig (doctorate in 1904). 
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ban, although Sociology was inexistent institutionally, the collection of empirical data in 
Romania continued, since the new communist administration needed it188.  
The end of the ban in Romania occurred in 1965, in an environment of increased freedom 
and liberalization promoted by the communist leadership and coincided with a political and 
cultural trend of rejecting Soviet domination and reassertion of “national values”.189 In his 
address at the 19th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party President Ceausescu 
acknowledged the usefulness of Sociology in the socialist society. However, the person 
informally credited for the lifting of the ban was Miron Constantinescu, at the time a prominent 
member of the Communist Party, minister of education and, most importantly, a former student 
of Dimitrie Gusti190.  
Soon after Ceausescu’s speech, Sociology was reinstated as a subject of study in 
universities across the country and within the Romanian Academy, where three research 
institutions were created: “The Center for Sociological Research”, the “Anthropology Center,” 
and the “Department for Social Research” of the Philosophy Institute. Several applied research 
centers were set up outside academia as well in 1965: the Institute for the Examination and 
Recovery of the Labor Force (Health Department), the Institute for Ethnography and Folklore 
(Ministry of Culture), the Office for Studies and Research within the Committee for Radio and 
Television, the Laboratory for Urban Sociology, and the Center for Research on Youth (Ministry 
of Youth). 191.  
                                                 
188 Larionescu, Istoria sociologiei românesti. 
189 Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism. 
190 interview with Ion Iliescu (former Minister of Youth in 1968), see also Ioan Mihailescu and Zoltan 
Rostas, Dialog Neterminat (Curtea Veche, 2007). 
191 Costea, ibid: 73, his translation. 
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This academic and institutional revival gave great hopes to sociologists, and intellectuals 
in general, but it was short-lived. The hopes for more advances in liberalization were completely 
crushed in 1971 when Ceausescu released his “July Theses” where he condemned the movement 
for autonomy and liberalization of 1965 and restored a strict political control over cultural 
production, education and cultural institutions.192 In 1977 Sociology started being marginalized 
again in academia, ending up as a subsection of the History department, along with Psychology. 
Looking back at those years, sociologist Ioan Mihailescu, chancellor of the University of 
Bucharest in the 1990s, blamed the new marginalization on the close interconnectedness of the 
discipline with politics:  
It was easy to reduce, to make Sociology disappear in 1977 because its role was 
practically insignificant. At the beginning of his career as the head of the party Ceausescu 
needed Sociology to gain legitimacy. He had no legitimacy and Sociology gave him that. 
When he took control of the situation Sociology became useless, even worse; if it 
claimed to be critical it could become dangerous for the system […].193  
 
Only a few courses in the Sociology of art and literature, as well as rural and industrial 
Sociology continued to be offered in the university departments of Philosophy, Literature and at 
the Polytechnic Institute, according to Badescu.194 In 1982 Romanian officials (and Elena 
Ceausescu, the president’s wife) become aware of a group of intellectuals taking “meditation” 
courses (inspired by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi’s spirituality) within the Institute for Pedagogy and 
Psychology Research, an institute under the patronage of the Ministry of Culture. The discovery 
of the group led to what was called the “Transcendental Meditation” scandal, with accusations of 
“conspiring against the communist regime”, a crackdown on the institute’s leadership and the 
                                                 
192 Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism. 
193 Mihailescu and Rostas, Dialog Neterminat, 19. 
194 Badescu and Baltasiu, “Romanian Sociolgy since 1989” in Mike Keen, Sociology in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Transformation at the Dawn of a New Millenium (Westport Conn.: Praeger, 2003). 
 91 
demotion of all the many intellectuals involved. Most of them lost their positions and were 
demoted to lower level, working class jobs.195 This scandal served as an excuse to scale back the 
research institutes as well: their personnel were cut, their research scope was limited, and 
censorship was tightened.196  
4.2 THE YOUTH RESEARCH CENTER (CENTRUL DE CERCETARI PENTRU 
PROBLEMELE TINERETULUI) AND ITS RESEARCH ABOUT THE UNION OF 
COMMUNIST YOUTH 
After the 1977 and 1982 backlash, sociological research in Romania was thought to be virtually 
gone. Katherine Verdery, in her brief discussion of the fate of Romanian Sociology, mentions 
that several research centers survived, but due to a shortage of new trained staff “their demise 
would be only a matter of time.”197 Among all the cutbacks and suppression, the Youth Research 
Center (Centrul de Cercetari pentru Problemele Tineretului), very likely because of its 
association with the Union of Communist Youth, managed to slip under the radar and continued 
to conduct empirical research. The center was created during the peak years of Miron 
Constantinescu’s political influence. In 1968 Ion Iliescu, then a prominent party member198, was 
appointed as Minister of Youth, and, among his first initiatives, was the creation of the Center199, 
which he affiliated institutionally with the Romanian Communist Youth organization. When I 
                                                 
195 Doina Jela, Afacerea Meditatia Transcendentala (Humanitas, 2004). 
196 Mihailescu and Rostas, ibid. 
197 Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism. p. 335. 
198 During the 1990s Ion Iliescu held three terms as president of Romania. One of the researchers I 
interviewed him described him as a “believer in science”, as someone who wanted to develop policies based on 
scientific evidence and scholarly research. 
199 The Center was officially created in November 1968, in Buletinul Oficial al R.S.R. nr. 51/1968. 
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got the chance to interview Iliescu and asked him about where the idea to create the center came 
from, he pointed to inspiration from other countries, both Western/American and East European: 
We were inspired by others as well, by the Poles, for example, to develop social research 
on youth. […] we looked into what research they were doing in other places and hired 
researchers to do it as well. 
 
In other countries 1968 was unfolding. One former Youth Research Center researcher 
that I interviewed pointed to the worldwide wave of social movements of 1968 as the inspiration:  
 
The Center, along with many other European centers, was established in 1968 as a result 
of the European social movements of that year.200  
 
The Western and Eastern European (Polish, Czech) movements of 1968 were well known 
in Romania, as this early period in Ceausescu’s rule was one of extraordinary openness towards 
the West. There is no record of significant local “contagion”, but there is one apparently 
“innocent” incident that one of my informants and Ioan Mihailescu mentioned: in December 
1968 students from the University of Bucharest marched from the dorms in Grozavesti, to the 
Moxa dorms, and then to the Economics Academy, singing Christmas carols.201 Events like this, 
Mihailescu believes, “introduced a sense of panic or at least a preoccupation with youth among 
the leadership in the socialist countries”,202 and, in the Romanian case, an early winter break 
(before Christmas instead of December 30).  
                                                 
200 He also mentioned the Prague Spring and the French student movements as a political inspiration 
201 The event is also mentioned in an article about the Romanian new wave band “Timpuri Noi”: “Cum a 
Scapat Formatia Timpuri Noi De Ancheta Fostei Securitati: Prin Pile - Muzica - HotNews.ro”, n.d., 
http://life.hotnews.ro/stiri-muzica-10455043-cum-scapat-formatia-timpuri-noi-ancheta-fostei-securitati-prin-
pile.htm?cfat=. 
202 Mihailescu and Rostas, Dialog Neterminat, 79. 
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Although not trained in sociology, Ion Iliescu told me that he was well acquainted with 
Gusti’s school of sociology: during his term as party secretary in the county of Timisoara he read 
the monographs about two villages of the region and was very impressed with their work. As 
minister of youth he appointed the late Ovidiu Badina203, a former student of Dimitrie Gusti, as 
head of the Youth Research Center, and then recruited sociologists Petre Datculescu, Fred 
Mahler, and a number of researchers from the first Sociology cohort to graduate after the 
communists came to power. Among them were Constantin Schifirnet, Ion Bazac, Mariana 
Buruiana, Ernest Dumitru and Catalin Mamali. Several local branches of the Youth Research 
Center were also established in some of Romania’s larger cities (Targu Mures, Timisoara, 
Constanta, Iasi). All these researchers continued to do research and write about youth until 1989, 
and some even later.  
The most pressing problems youth faced in Socialist Romania stemmed from the process 
of intensive industrialization; the issues were grouped into three broad categories by the 
researchers at the center: (1) the migration of youth from the countryside to the cities and 
especially issues of housing and a variety of social problems, (2) the effect of urbanization on 
young families (such as low birth rates), and (3) educational issues: how to make good 
communists out of adversaries of communism. 
The Center was commissioned (and funded) by the Union of Communist Youth to carry 
out research on specific topics. Although it was directly subordinate to the Union of Communist 
Youth, their relationship was quite loosely defined. Other than the specific research projects it 
commissioned, the UCY did not coordinate or supervise the Center’s activity. It was thus was 
                                                 
203 Badina was the head of the Center for Research on Youth from its inception until 1989. 
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able to conduct research for other institutions and organizations such as the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Justice and Police departments or the Ministry of Industry204.  
The projects researched by the center over twenty years included young people's attitudes 
towards work, youth’s moral and political values, their perceptions about the Communist Youth 
Organization, youth education and career preferences, young workers in specific industries, the 
effects of mass communication on youth, religious values and behaviors, youth cultural 
consumption, the role of science in young people’s lives, youth in other countries, rural youth, 
and other topics as well.205  
On the one hand the research agenda seemed to be constrained by whatever commissions 
they were given and they did not initiate their own research projects. On the other hand the 
researchers I interviewed reported that they had a great degree of freedom in deciding how to 
approach the assigned topics in terms of methodology, sampling and even reporting and 
publishing206. The unique positioning of the Center, compared to other research institutions that 
were heavily supervised and controlled, might explain why it made it through the 1970s and 80s 
without the cuts in personnel and censorship others had to face. Another very important factor in 
retaining a degree of independence seems to have been the managerial qualities of center director 
Ovidiu Badina. Under his leadership the Center survived the 1977 backlash against Sociology 
departments and research institutions, safely tucked under the umbrella of the Romanian 
Communist youth organization.207  
 
                                                 
204 This information was provided by the former researchers. The research reports in the archives of the 
Center do not specify who commissioned and funded the research discussed in their reports.  
205 For a more complete list of topics see Appendix A. 
206 The CCPT had its own publications that were distributed to a small number of subscribers, most of them 
sociologists - the estimated number is about 500. They were not available for the public in bookstores. 
207 Mihailescu and Rostas, Dialog Neterminat. 45. 
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4.3 RESEARCH DATA FROM THE COMMUNIST ERA – ISSUES OF 
RELIABILITY  
While I was conducting research in 2005, I encountered the remnants of the Center for Research 
on Youth under a new name: The National Agency for the Problems of Youth (Agentia 
Nationala pentru Problemele Tineretului – A.N.S.I.T). I was extremely lucky to find a group of 
friendly and very enthusiastic researchers who rescued two large boxes full of the publications of 
the defunct Center for Research on Youth from the basement of their old headquarters and 
graciously made them available. They included publications that are still available at the 
University Library as well as a few pamphlets that were never put in circulation (some marked 
“top secret”) .208  
 The first question that came to mind while I was looking at the Center for Research on 
Youth publications was: how valid were they, how much of the data was real and not falsified? 
The two decades (1970 – 1980s) that they were covering were marked in Romania by duplicity 
between public and private, between what one thought and what one said in public209 that 
spanned from the leadership of the party through television programs, to everyday conversations 
in the family or between neighbors and friends. Romanian television, radio, and the press were 
controlled by the Communist Party since the late 1940s. As time went by they became caught 
more and more in the whirlwind of reporting highly exaggerated crop yields, productivity levels, 
record numbers of hours worked by Romanian workers, and extraordinary standards of living to 
the point of losing any credibility among Romanians confronted every day with the grim realities 
of shortage and poverty. Could there be anything true in something published by an institution 
                                                 
208 Most of these were about deviance and were based on police statistics on juvenile delinquency.  
209 Milosz, The Captive Mind; Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism. 
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subordinated to the Communist youth organization or in any sociological research reports 
published under communism? 
These are not easy questions to answer. The data and research collected under socialism 
were not easily accessible to foreign researchers interested in the region before 1989; after 1989 
the data became very uninteresting, even for local sociologists, who were more interested in the 
transition than in the communist past. The very few non-East European scholars who raised this 
question of their worthiness were either dismissive about it210 or did their best to gather and put 
together the little bits of information that were available.211 There has been no attempt so far by 
any East European sociologist to write an updated history of the national social research of the 
region. On the contrary, although sociologists met many times before 1989 in conferences within 
the Soviet Bloc East European, sociologies remained insular at best, as Eva Kovacs put it so 
well:  
Slowly we formed an image of East European sociologists standing next to each other 
without looking at or even noticing one another, each separately contemplating the West 
on the far away horizon.212  
 
Two decades after 1989, the years of communism have recently become a subject of 
interest for filmmakers, scholars and nostalgic alike. However, this new wave of interest has not 
touched on sociological research yet. Although today's researchers at the former Center for 
Research on Youth generously gave me access to their old publications, except for one 
                                                 
210 Liah Greenfeld, “Soviet Sociology and Sociology in the Soviet Union,” Annual Review of Sociology 14 
(1988): 99–123. 
211 Raj Mohan, Handbook of Contemporary Developments in World Sociology (Westport Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1975); Jiri Kolaja, Glimpses of Sociology in Eastern Europe (New Delhi: Prints India, 1990); 
Dmitri Shalin, “Sociology for the Glasnost Era: Institutional and Substantive Changes in Recent Soviet Sociology,” 
Social Forces 68, no. 4 (1990): 1019–1039; Mucha, Janusz, Keen, Forrest, ed., Eastern Europe in Transformation: 
The Impact on Sociology (Greenwood Press, 1994). 
212 Kovács, Éva;, “What’s New in East-Central European Sociology?,” Regio - Minorities, Politics, Society 
- English Edition 1 (2002): 90. in Keen, ibid. 
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researcher who worked there before 1989, they did not express a great interest in them. Some 
worried that I was wasting my time, which I admit, sometimes was a great concern for me, too, 
especially considering the heavy layers of propaganda and party-speak in which most communist 
era publications bundled their content.  
In order to deal with this very vital issue of validity of data, I interviewed some of the 
former researchers at The Center for Research on Youth.213 Some of them were hired early on 
when the center was created, others a few years later. They all remembered the days at the 
Center for Research on Youth with great pleasure and their status as researchers there as quite 
privileged compared to the average person in Romania. Aside from things like freedom in 
carrying out their research, they also reported a very wide availability of foreign publications 
(mostly English and French which they all spoke)214, good salaries, holding a “work passport”215 
and with it the opportunity to travel abroad to conferences and obtain scholarships even outside 
the Warsaw pact countries.216 As a workplace, it was remembered by researchers as a very 
comfortable environment:  
Until 1990 Romanian sociologists were a very small group, we knew each other from 
college and there were a very small number of research institutes. [...] a small world, a 
hundred people at most, who knew each other and were all friends, they were all happy to 
collaborate. We had no place to publish or to discuss so we were discussing the way we 
talk here in a coffee shop. The Center for Research on Youth had its own publication that 
was read by our small group so we were left alone. 
                                                 
213Two requested confidentiality for some of the data. Since they are all well known public figures in 
Romania today I decided to anonymize all three.  
214 The bibliographies and reviews contained in the CCPT publications are quite impressive, with very 
recent articles and books. According to Mihailescu, one of the first things Miron Constantinescu told the first 
Sociology cohort was that “it is very important for you to learn foreign languages” in Mihailescu and Rostas, Dialog 
Neterminat. 41. 
215 “Pasaport de serviciu” – a special work passport that made it easier for its holder to travel for work 
related purposes, at a time when passports were very difficult to obtain and travel abroad was allowed to very few 
Romanians. 
216 Reportedly, the center functioned also as a research “Chamber of Commerce” of Romania -- the 
communist regime was happy to be represented in international research organizations and send researchers abroad 
to places like the German Federal Republic, France, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Poland, Italy, Finland or China. 
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All researchers denied having problems with any explicit external censorship. However, 
they did report an internalized form of censorship intended to keep them out of trouble:  
You were OK as long as you didn't stir the waters. What is characteristic for a Socialist 
administration? You’re employed to do something; nobody cares if you do it right or not. 
Only one thing matters: to keep your boss happy. To keep your boss happy means that 
you have to make sure his boss is happy, and so on… Then you could enjoy the little 
perks: a coffee217, travel abroad… why say “no”? Your biggest concern was to make sure 
that his boss will never come to ask you: what is your employee doing? [..] And this was 
the Center for Research on Youth strategy of reporting: everything is nice and pretty, we 
may have some problems but they're under control, we’re taking care of them, and you 
need to do a few little things... 
 
The internal censorship the researchers reported strongly resembled what Czeslaw Milos, 
in his discussion of practices of acting and dissimulation in the Eastern bloc, called “Professional 
Ketman218” and was described as follows:  
If I am a scientist I attend congresses at which I deliver reports strictly adhering to the 
Party line. But in the laboratory I pursue my research according to scientific methods and 
in that alone lays the aim of my life. 219 
 
Researchers also felt comfortable reporting the real numbers from the data they gathered, 
mostly because they were completely sure that nobody outside their small group was going to 
read their reports. Mihailescu220 even reports an anecdotal incident that I was unable to verify, 
but that reflects their mindset very well: a famous sociologist published quite a long report and 
inserted a note in one of the chapters giving his phone number and promising a case of beer to 
                                                 
217 Coffee, especially during the food and consumer good shortage of the 1980s, was almost impossible to 
find in stores, and therefore it was considered a treat. For example, half a pound of coffee could easily pay the bribe 
for a doctor’s visit.  
218 Milosz used the term “Ketman” to discuss practices of acting and dissimulation in the Eastern bloc. I 
discuss the concept in more detail in Chapter 5. 
219 Milosz, The Captive Mind, 69–70. 
220 Mihailescu and Rostas, Dialog Neterminat, 47. 
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the reader that got to the page and called him. Needless to say, the case of beer was never 
claimed. However, when discussing sociologists in general, Mihailescu221does not dismiss 
everything that was published: 
Among the many papers collecting dust at the Academy, there were some well done 
research reports by serious scholars for whom this was an outlet, a way to say things you 
couldn't say otherwise. We knew these were not going to be available to the public. Once 
in a while, quite rarely, Radio Free Europe would mention something interesting one of 
us wrote in a report. 222 
 
 
Discussing the Center for Research on Youth publications with its former researchers 
brought up a very interesting picture of the research team. Since holding a position there was 
prestigious and came with so many advantages, getting hired was a complicated process. 
According to the researchers I interviewed, the team was a mix of some talented sociologists (30 
percent), some mediocre but well-connected sociologists, and some that were outright 
incompetent and were hired through powerful party connections (I was told they accounted for 
about 20 percent). All of them however, were connected in one way or another with the 
Communist Party. One of the researchers confessed getting the job in exchange for writing a 
PhD dissertation for a party member.  
From the accounts of its researchers it appears that the data collected by the Center for 
Research on Youth didn't seem to make it to the higher levels of policymaking, or that if they 
did, it certainly wasn't noticed. This fact was also confirmed by party insider Ion Iliescu. When I 
asked him what was the impact of the research reports he shrugged and said: “They offered 
them; the smart ones223 used them as inspiration and in decision-making… ”  
                                                 
221 Ibid., 48. 
222 This suggests that someone who had access to the Center’s publications was in touch with Radio Free 
Europe. 
223 The literal translation would be “smart boy” (baiat destept). 
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4.4 THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON YOUTH RESEARCH DATA  
One of the first research projects of the Center Ion Iliescu remembered during the interview was 
inspired, he claimed, by a Swedish longitudinal study following the psychosomatic development 
of youth before and after the Swedish socialists came to power. The Swedish data showed a 
significant improvement in the physical development of Swedish youth, with large increases in 
height and body type (from short and stocky to tall and athletic)224. The Romanian study was 
supposed to find whether there were similar improvements since the communists came to power. 
The Center held a roundtable on in 1969 Romanian youth where they discussed existing health 
statistics and it also drafted a research agenda and several policy recommendations. These 
included the introduction of more gymnastics classes and sports activities as well as improving 
health education and healthcare and schools.225 The pamphlet containing the summary of the 
roundtable discussions was marked on the cover in bold letters: “For internal use only.” The 
Romanian Communist regime, like the Soviet Union226 and its allies, was very sensitive about 
social sciences and Sociology was labeled as “bourgeois science”. They believed that social 
problems that research might discover might tarnish the image of extraordinary progress they 
sought to project.  
                                                 
224 For similar studies see John Komlos, Nutrition and economic development in the eighteenth-century 
Habsburg monarchy: an anthropometric history (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989). 
225 Buletin informativ, CCPT, Iunie 1969. 
226 Sociological research in the Soviet Union was suppressed in 1924. In 1956, after Stalin’s death it was 
reintroduced as a discipline and flourished, except for two episodes in 1969 and 1983 when suspicion of “bourgeois” 
ideological influences led to purges and brief restrictions. Greenfeld, “Soviet Sociology and Sociology in the Soviet 
Union”; Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia; a Study in Mass Persuasion. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1958). 
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The next interesting research report I found, titled “Delinquency among youth in the 
Romanian Socialist Republic of 1968,”227 sounded attuned to the international political context 
of 1968 movements, and reinforced the former researchers’ observation that motives behind the 
creation of the Center were also fear of youth rebellion and the need for state control/supervision.  
The delinquency report was based on data provided by the Police Department and the 
Romanian Secret Service. It found that the number of minors investigated by the police for 
criminal behavior nationally increased 3.8 times between 1963 and 1968, whereas the 
corresponding increase in the total number of people investigated by the police during the same 
interval was only 1.4.228 The report also contained data about the course of the investigations, 
which indicates that these were taken very seriously by the authorities: 92.1 percent of cases 
went to trial229 and 7.9 percent were sent to rehabilitation institutions without trial.  
This research seems to have been discontinued after 1980 (I could not find any other 
reports on this subject). After that the Union of Communist Youth seems to have commissioned 
more reflexive research, concerned with its own organizational performance and membership. 
These later reports show consistent failings and shortcomings of the Union of Communist Youth 
activities when compared to schools or families. 
 In order to understand the significance of the data about youth political and ideological 
views contained in the Center reports, it is important to emphasize the political context in 
Romania at that time. In the 1980s, censorship tightened, and the reporting of anything related to 
the President or to the communist organizations was strictly controlled. The sensitivity of the 
regime was so high that the slightest potential for criticism or ridicule was nipped in the bud. All 
                                                 
227 Buletin informativ, CCPT, Iunie 1969. 
228 Ibid: 13. 
229 The report did not include the number of cases that resulted in convictions. 
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public appearances of Ceausescu, including on television, involved a massive effort reminding 
one of a movie set. Roads were paved for his motorcade; grocery stores were stocked with goods 
otherwise unavailable, unfinished buildings were given a finished façade, people and children 
were herded from work or school to line the roads and cheer him. Any public statistics that spoke 
about Romania, had to reflect the exemplary work that the president and the party were doing, 
the wonderful standard of living they brought to the people and how grateful people were. Any 
exception was considered a lack of patriotism or outright betrayal. Therefore, all the tasks were 
reported as 100 percent complete or above target (such as the agricultural crops or coal 
production) and negative developments were underreported or flatly denied (such the AIDS 
epidemic that affected especially children, found in the thousands in special orphanages after 
1989). In local elections the unopposed party candidates were always winning 100 percent, and 
record voter turnout and “unanimity” was the norm in all meetings when voting various 
decisions.  
The Center for Research on Youth reports are quite different from the regime propaganda 
and public reports and records that were cleaned-up by the censorship or started off as inflated 
numbers reported by co-operative managers scared of sanctions.  
The earliest report to touch on the influence of the Union of Communist Youth is titled 
“The Moral and Political Values of Socialist Youth” (The Center for Research on Youth, 1980). 
Here, researchers tried to measure the importance Romanian youth attributed to a number of 
social and individual values (Love of Country, Countering Behavior against the Socialist 
Regime, Respect for the Law, Attachment to the Social, Political and Economic [Socialist] 
System). The researchers asked respondents from a representative sample (n=3,894) to indicate 
the degree to which they agreed with general statements (such as “Love for One's Country” or 
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“Combating Chauvinism”), as well as an equivalent set of questions about their individual 
actions vis-à-vis the same values. They reported a discrepancy between the high level of 
adherence to the values in the general statements (85-86 percent) and a significantly lower 
adherence when it came to practical actions (63-66 percent). Here is the table230 with the 
dimensions of patriotism as defined by the Center for Research on Youth researchers: 
 
Table 1. Dimensions of socialist patriotism  
 
 
Dimensions of socialist patriotism
231
 
Exceptional 
importance (%) 
Great importance 
(%) 
Medium importance 
(%) 
Reduced 
importance 
(%) 
Love for one's country 92 5 1 1 
Being devoted to the socialist system 76 18 4 1 
Combating acts against the socialist system 90 6 1 1 
Combating chauvinism 80 13 4 1 
Protecting the wealth of our nation 76 17 3 1 
n=3,894 
 
The abstract “Love for one’s country” was rated as exceptionally important by 92 percent 
of the youth, while being devoted to the political (socialist) system was significantly lower (76 
percent), indicating support for the political system was conceptualized as separate, and less 
important than the value of “patriotism”. Their interpretation of these answers by researchers was 
a diplomatic statement, asserting that “when it comes to social and political values on the 
individual level, there is an incomplete harmonization between the theoretical and practical 
levels” (1980:87). The difference between “love of country” and the other items confirms 
                                                 
230 1980 “Moral and Political Values of the Socialist Youth”, CCPT p. 105. 
231 I tried to keep the translations as close as possible to the Romanian version, although they might sound a 
little awkward. 
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Katherine Verdery’s232 argument that the Marxist/communist discourse in Romania was 
subverted, assimilated into the pre-existing strong tradition of nationalism (and not the other way 
around), as the communist regime became more nationalist than Marxist. 
The relationships between the variable “love of country” (Dragostea de Patrie) and other 
variables showed youth even more divided, quite different from the homogenous patriotic and 
devoted youth image that Ceausescu’s regime was trying to project. Here for example, is a table 
from the same report about the relationship between “Love of Country” and “Being 
knowledgeable about Socialist Policies and Politics:” 
 
Table 2. The importance of loving ones’ country I 
The importance of being knowledgeable about socialist policies and politics % The importance of loving ones’ 
country Very important Somewhat important Not important 
Exceptionally important (92%)* 74 24 1 
Very important (5%) 37 57 3 
Somewhat important (1%) 33 55 11 
*92% of those surveyed reported that the importance of loving one’s country is exceptionally important 
n=3,894 
 
 
The variable “love for one’s country” does not fully overlap with one’s enthusiasm for 
learning about socialist policies and politics: only 74 percent among the 92 percent who declared 
that “the importance of loving the country” considered that it was exceptionally important to 
learn about the political system. The discrepancy is even more visible among those who 
considered that “love of one’s country” was “very important” (5 percent): only 37 percent 
considered that it was important to learn about the socialist political system. Such statistics 
                                                 
232 Verdery, National Ideology Under Socialism. 
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indicate that although many youths were successfully educated to love their country, they were 
rather apathetic when it came to learning about political education (that was delivered mostly 
through the educational system). 
The questions that addressed political education even more directly, by asking about the 
influence of the communist youth organizations (the ones that were in charge of teaching about 
socialism), showed that the “love for one’s country” variable shows less influence from the 
Union of Communist Youth (p. 111): 
 
Table 3. The importance of loving ones’ country II 
 
The moral influence of the Union of Communist Youth % The importance of loving ones’ 
country Great influence Medium influence Reduced influence Inexistent influence 
Exceptionally important (92%) 46 35 15 4 
Very important (5%) 22 29 29 19 
Somewhat important (1%) 11 22 39 28 
n=3,894 
 
The Union of Communist Youth had “medium” to “reduced” or “inexistent” influence on 
54% of the 92% of the highly patriotic youth. This comparatively quite low number was 
surprising from two points of view: the fact that respondents actually answered that way to an 
official questionnaire and secondly, that the results were published in an official publication. 
Along with what the researchers told me and the very restricted circulation of these reports, this 
makes a very strong case that the data were not interfered with. The fact that they were collected 
in an authoritarian, high-surveillance regime, where people were hesitant to disagree with those 
in power gives even more weight to the “less than enthusiastic” answers.  
 106 
Aside from the influence of the communist youth organizations, researchers also 
collected data about the influence of other factors, such as literature, radio, newspapers, and 
television. Their data showed that in comparison, the moral influence of the youth organizations 
was less than that of literature, and slightly above that of radio/television and newspapers.  
 
Table 4. The importance of loving ones’ country III 
 
The moral influence of literature, radio, television and the newspapers 
Great influence Moderate influence Reduced influence Inexistent influence 
The importance 
of loving ones’ 
country L R/TV N L R/TV N L R/TV N L R/TV N 
Exceptionally 
important (92%) 
53 43 41 33 42 38 11 12 16 2 2 3 
Very important 
(5%) 
47 30 26 36 47 38 13 19 28 4 4 7 
Somewhat 
important (1%) 
36 25 11 44 42 39 6 14 39 14 19 11 
n=3,894 
 
Although this research report did not include a discussion of the relationship between the 
variable “love for one’s country” and “the moral influence of schools”, I found the influence of 
schools discussed in relationship with one of the dimensions of patriotism, “the importance of 
protecting socialist property.” Here, the role of schools shows as considerably more important 
compared with the previous figures on the influence of the communist youth organizations 
(1980: 125):  
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 Table 5. The importance of protecting socialist property 
 
The positive moral influence of schools (%) The importance of protecting 
socialist property  Great influence Medium influence Reduced influence Inexistent influence 
Exceptional importance (76%) 68 27 3 1 
Great importance (18%) 55 34 9 1 
Medium importance (4%)  42 42 13 2 
Not important (1%) 34 46 16 3 
 n=3,894 
 
The finding about the stronger influence of the schools over other factors is consistent 
with the previous finding about “literature” being more influential, since literature was taught in 
schools.  
Surprisingly, for a time when religion was a taboo topic in public or denounced in tabloid 
style as a deviation, the Center for Research on Youth included in their research design variables 
such as “Religious beliefs.” They measured it here as “The importance of rejecting religious 
beliefs” (1980: 117).  
 
Table 6. The importance of being devoted to the socialist system 
 
The importance of rejecting religious beliefs ( %) The importance of being 
devoted to the socialist system Very important Somehow important Not important 
Exceptional importance (76%) 9 15 75 
Great importance (18%) 9 22 67 
Medium importance (4%)  11 34 54 
Not important (1%) 22 30 48 
n=3,894 
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 The results of the survey portray Romanian youth overall, and even more those most-
devoted to socialism, as quite uninterested in “rejecting religious beliefs.” The variable does not 
directly speak about the religiosity of youth, but it clearly shows that teaching them to “reject 
religious beliefs” failed. Similarly, a research report about youth in the county of Constanta233, 
revealed for example, that only 45% of the students questioned answered “never” to the question 
about holding “superstitious views,” and only 30% reported never attending church service 
(n=603). Another report from 1986234, shows that only 51% of youth answered “No” when 
questioned about believing in supernatural forces, and 69% did not believe in life after death 
(n=600, sampling method not known).  
Another report published235 in 1980236 (data collection took place in 1979, n=1,347) 
directly addressed the efficacy of the Union of Communist Youth among its members, reports a 
surveyed a sample of 3744 Union of Communist Youth members (31.5% in leadership roles). 
The table below shows how youth evaluated the activity of the Union: 
                                                 
233 Stefan, and Ciochina “Unele aspecte ale fenomenului religios in rindul tinerilor din Judetul Constanta” 
in Tineretul, Puternica Forta Sociala, 1/1981.  
234 Petre Datculescu “Modalitati de manifestare a atitudinilor mistico-obscurantiste si perfectionarea 
formelor de educatie materialist-stiintifica” in Tineret, Cercetare, Actiune Sociala 3/1986. 
235 When referring to the CCPT reports I use “published” more in the sense of “a few copies printed”, since 
these reports were not publicly available and their circulation was restricted to a very small number of researchers 
and party members (under 100).  
236 Elvira Cinca “Imaginea tineretului despre activitatea Uniunii Tineretului Comunist” in Tineretul 
Puternica Forta Sociala 2/80 CCPT. 
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 Table 7. Evaluation of the efficacy of the Union of Communist Youth activity 
 
Evaluation of the Union of Communist 
Youth 
Union of Communist Youth members % Union of Communist Youth leadership % 
Very good 14.5 7.5 
Good 61.4 76 
Poor 13 12 
Very poor 2 1.5 
Don’t know 9.1 3.0 
 
Only 14.5% of the Union of Communist Youth members evaluated the activity of their 
organization as “very good,” while the majority considered it “good” (61.4%), leaving a total of 
24.1% discontented (including “Don’t know” answers) or detached from their youth 
organization, and apparently not afraid to say so. The Union of Communist Youth leadership 
members were fifty percent less likely to give the “very good” evaluation, but also less likely to 
be dissatisfied or detached (total of 16.5). These numbers certainly don’t fit the standards of 
always reporting excellent results in the mass media.  
Another set of open-ended questions asked students what were some of their reservations 
about the activity of the Union of Communist Youth. Among these, the most frequent ones were 
“not addressing the problems that people face in the workplace and in school” (improve their 
training, housing, food) and “lack of concern with leisure time sports, travel.” The Union of 
Communist Youth leadership reported a lack of support from the larger institutional structures 
(schools, factories) and the lack of funding for such activities. The least satisfied with their 
organizations were college students who mainly complained about the Union of Communist 
Youth’s lack of involvement in organizing leisure activities, followed by working class youth 
 110 
concerned with work and housing problems. The author also noted a category of “disaffected 
youth” (9%) who did not answer some of the survey questions, and a certain degree of apathy 
regarding the Union of Communist Youth: only 19% of their subjects volunteered to make 
suggestions to improve the Union’s functioning. A similar report based on the same data 
concluded that “in order to become a real community of work and communist life, the Union of 
Communist Youth needs not only to educate youth about party policies but to expand its focus 
on issues related to work and leisure time.”237 
 Several researchers238 specialized in the Sociology of culture, and published a number of 
reports surveying the cultural preferences of Romanian youth. In their 1981239 report they 
included the Union of Communist Youth in the list of possible factors influences on youth’s 
cultural development (in Romanian “cultura generala”): 
 
Table 8. Factors contributing to one’s cultural education 
 
 
Influence % 
Factors  
contributing to one’s 
cultural development Great influence Medium influence Reduced influence Inexistent influence 
School 59 33 5 1 
Family 42 41 13 3 
Union of Communist Youth 17 33 33 14 
Self-taught 48 32 11 6 
 
                                                 
237 Vladimir Marin in “Aspecte ale participarii tinerilor la activitatea organizatiilor UTC”. 1981 Tineretul 
puternica sociala (1), p. 60. 
238 Constantin Schifirnet, Doina Buruiana, Dumitru Bazac. 
239 Comportament si optiuni culturale ale tineretului. 1981. CCPT. 
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They found the Union of Communist Youth remarkably absent as an influence on youth’s 
cultural development (17% - great importance), significantly lagging behind factors such as 
school (59%), one’s own efforts (self-taught – 48%) or family (42%). For an organization whose 
specific goal was the communist education of youth these evaluations were particularly poor.  
A 1985 report240 published by the Center analyzed the “effectiveness of propaganda 
among youth.” The researchers made a list of propaganda activities and asked a representative 
sample of youth to rate their effectiveness. Here are the results (1985:72): 
 
Table 9. The effectiveness of propaganda among youth 
 
Effectiveness %  
Propaganda activity Rank Very effective Somewhat effective Not effective 
Debates, discussions 
Political information 
Political-ideological classes 
 
I 
59.4 
51.6 
51.3 
31.2 
38.8 
36.4 
9.4 
9.6 
12.3 
Meetings with party leaders  II 42 43.2 14.8 
General assembly meetings 
Conferences, presentations 
Visual propaganda 
 
III 
34.8 
34.4 
33.2 
49.5 
49.3 
47.2 
15.7 
16.3 
19.6 
Other propaganda activities IV 16.7 61 32.3 
 
In the top ranking category (I) we find “Debates, discussions,” “Political education,” and 
“Political-ideological classes.” The last two of these activities took place in school classrooms, 
and were taught by teachers, not Union of Communist Youth leadership, except the “Debates, 
discussions” which also took place at Union meetings and were not conducted by teachers. 
                                                 
240 Buburuzan, Leon. “Opinii ale tinerilor despre eficienta mijloacelor de propaganda” in Tineret cercetare 
actiune sociala 2/1985. 
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However, in the responses to the open-ended questions about the Union, a frequent comment was 
the request for more debates and discussions, which corroborated the student interviews from 
Chapter Three and seems to suggest that debates and discussion were infrequent. Presentations 
by teachers rather than party members or events at which students could discuss things were the 
most effective. 
The more formal activities that the Union of Communist Youth was organizing (“General 
assembly meetings,”, “Conferences, presentations,” and “Visual propaganda”) were in the least 
effective category (III). The researchers interpreted this as proof of Union of Communist Youth’s 
lack of effectiveness and lack of responsiveness to youth needs. From looking at the responses to 
the open-ended questions it seems that young people considered these activities rather boring, 
repetitive and restricted, and felt constrained to participate. Here are some of the things they 
would have liked: “more sincere and more open debates, not just the old standard talk,” “more 
interesting activities, not just mandatory participation,” and “more open discussion without fear 
of consequences,” “more debates and less presentations,” or “more attractive, interesting, 
attractive visual propaganda.” (1985:81) The report ended with a convenient critical quote from 
Nicu Ceausescu, the son of President Nicole Ceausescu and at that time Minister of Youth 
Issues241, meant to show that the researchers were in line with one important Party member: 
Right now educating youth has fallen behind the standards set by the Party; we are not 
fully taking advantage of the multiple possibilities available.  
 
The last report of the decade dealing with the Union of Communist Youth came out in 
1988 and was titled “Issues faced today in the process of perfecting the working style and 
                                                 
241 Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 295. 
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guidance of the leadership of the Union of Communist Youth.”242 The researchers surveyed 
1218 members of the Union of Communist Youth leadership243, asking them about their own 
difficulties and deficiencies. They grouped the “deficiencies” in three categories: instructional, 
behavioral, and work related.  
Here are the deficiencies in instruction and behavior among the Union of Communist 
Youth leaders, ranked in descending order of their importance: 
Table 10. Deficiencies in the Union of Communist Youth leadership 
 
Deficiencies in instruction Behavioral deficiencies 
1. ignoring theoretical learning 1. fawning upon superiors 
2. know-it-all attitude 2. subjective 
3. arrogant, power-tripping 3. hasty 
4. lack of interest/deriding training 4. uncommitted 
5. superficial 5. disorganized 
6. unilateral thinking 6. untrusting 
 7. indolent 
 8. authoritarian 
 9. overestimating oneself 
 10. too bureaucratic 
 11. self-interested 
 
When it came to working in the organization, the highest ranking problem of all was 
constituted by “deficiencies in the overall education/culture/knowledge of the Union of 
Communist Youth leaders” which interfered with the “planning and carrying out of their 
activities as well as keeping a good work climate.” The subjects also complained about the 
                                                 
242 Buburuzan, Leon. “Probleme actuale pe care le ridica perfectionarea stilului de munca si de conducere a 
organelor si cadrelor Uniunii Tineretului Communist” in Tineret cercetare actiune sociala. 1/1988. 
243 Leader was defined as anyone holding a position higher than a “member”.  
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planning process itself (the fact that only 2 or 3 Union of Communist Youth secretaries were 
doing the planning), the lack of horizontal and vertical coordination, and the lack of follow-up on 
goals set. Their decision-making was characterized as often plagued by haziness, sectarianism, 
imposing one’s personal views, and setting unrealistic targets. The top-down hierarchical 
relationship between the various levels of leadership had its own problems. Subjects complained 
about too much control and too little guidance, stemming from superiors who were too 
authoritarian, or, at the other end of the spectrum, a superficial approach to both control and 
guidance.244 
For the people who witnessed first hand the years of communism in Romania, most of the 
findings of the Center for Research on Youth would not come as a big surprise; now that the 
story ended in 1989, they’re not even interesting. However, if we expand our examination lens 
beyond the individual level, things become a little more interesting: they are confirming to each 
individual subject that what they experienced, what they felt all along was shared and even 
voiced by many of their contemporaries. Expanding the focus even more, to the scholars of 
communism in Eastern Europe, things become very interesting. The Center for Research on 
Youth data offers insights into a statistical portrait of communism in Romania that foreign 
scholars of Cold War and ordinary Romanians could not even dream of accessing.  
The Union of Communist Youth is portrayed as inefficient, unpopular, run by power-
seeking, often incompetent, apathetic, and superficial leaders. The data show a reality that was 
the opposite of a state-run apparatus able to produce the heavily indoctrinated, “brainwashed,” 
loyal subjects that a lot of scholars245 of post-communism worried about. There may be a 
                                                 
244 Ibid: 56 
245 Jowitt, New World Disorder; Vladimir Tismaneanu, The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: 
the Poverty of Utopia (London; New York: Routledge, 1988). 
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“communist legacy,” but among this generation it seems to be not what the Communist Party 
intended. There were, rather a number of indirect, unintended consequences (such as a very well-
read generation due to the lack of television & entertainment).  
Furthermore, the data answers the question of whether the Romanian Communist Party 
officials were at all aware about how disaffected the Romanian youth were. The research that 
resulted in the core of the data discussed here was commissioned by the Union of Communist 
Youth and was reported to their leadership, many of them also Communist Party members. 
Although sociological research conducted under the communist regime in Romania was 
largely ignored in post-communist scholarship, my research suggests some of the data collected 
can be an interesting and useful source for understanding life under communism. The research 
carried out by the Center for Research on Youth suggests significant exceptions from the 
narrative of complete regime control over its subjects. Under the patronage of the Union of 
Communist Youth sociologists were able to conduct sociological research even during times of 
severe restrictions, such as the 1980s. Furthermore, they were able to report their findings, 
suggesting that the regime’s program of indoctrination was less than a complete success, in some 
ways much less, or that young people took patriotism more seriously than socialist ideology and 
for very many, religion seems to have still been important. 
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5.0  CONCLUSIONS 
As I was writing this chapter the world was inundated by images of the mourners of North 
Korean dictator, Kim Jong Il. The images of women, men of all ages, and children participating 
in a mass display of grief were shortly followed by reports that “insincere” mourners were being 
punished246. I could not help but wonder if the 1989 Romanian revolution didn’t happen, if the 
broader context of political opportunity247 didn’t exist, and Ceausescu had the time to appoint a 
successor and die naturally, would I, along with students and teachers I interviewed be among 
the pixel-sized faces making up such a grandiose display of grief?  
Western journalists noted the North Korean display of grief with horror and bemusement, 
referring to it as “mass hysteria”248 and grappled with the question of how such a thing was 
possible. For someone who lived through the 1970-1980s Romania, such images are not that 
surprising. After all, Kim Jong Il’s father, Kim Il-sung (to Romanians known more as Kim Ir 
Sen) along with Mao Tse-Tung were the inspiration for the massive and pervasive cult of 
personality249 of Nicolae Ceausescu.  
                                                 
246 “Daily NK - Harsh Punishments for Poor Mourning”, n.d., 
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8668. 
247 such as the “Gorbachev factor”, the reform in other countries in Eastern Europe, and “domino effect” of 
protest movements. 
248 “North Koreans Grief-stricken over Kim’s Death - CNN.com”, n.d., 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/19/health/north-korea-mass-grieving/index.html. 
249 John Borneman, Death of the Father: an Anthropology of the End of Political Authority (New York; 
Oxford: Berghahn, 2003), 127. 
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Beyond the amazement and the absurdity of such images, denunciations and post-factum 
repudiations, there has been little attempt to look beyond this public façade and understand the 
ordinary subjects of such regimes. My research was guided by this objective. I tried to 
understand how Romanian youth experienced politics in their everyday lives in the 1980s, under 
a totalitarian-sultanistic system. I tried to answer this question by looking at three levels: the 
lived and remembered experience of students and their teachers, the “indoctrination” materials 
such textbooks and policy documents they were exposed to, and the social research from the 
1980s aimed at assessing the effectiveness of their “indoctrination.” 
From talking to high school students of the 1980s I found that from an early age (around 
eight years) the communist ideological messages and the personality-cult propaganda of Nicolae 
was undone within the family with several counter-discourses. Parents and grandparents, 
increasingly tired of after-work mandatory ideological meetings and the daily hunt to provide the 
basic necessities for their families, were not shying away from expressing their frustrations in 
front of their children, just home from school, reciting over-flattering poems about Ceausescu. In 
families where one parent was a party member and holding a high position and was therefore 
abstaining from any criticism in front of the children, other members (spouses and grandparents) 
actively engaged in it.  
The criticism of ideology and the frustration with economic hardships was augmented by 
the youths’ direct interaction with privileged sons and daughters of the Party leadership who 
were engaging in conspicuous consumption of goods (mostly imports) not available to ordinary 
citizens. In the political context of a regime that claimed to satisfy all of its citizens’ needs, this 
created a strong perception of unfairness.  
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Their encounters with western products and culture, the listening to broadcasts of Radio 
Free Europe, along with grandparents’ romanticized accounts of economic prosperity in interwar 
Romania, further undermined official discourse about their lives being better than the lives of 
people living in capitalism, past and present. 
At the same time, families were the environment where fear was taught. Anything out of 
the official party line, any criticism of the regime by parents was accompanied by (successfully) 
teaching youth to keep such discussion inside the family, avoid any mention of it in public, and 
leave any conversation that might lead to those topics.  
The main institutions in charge of the delivery of ideological messages (the education 
system and youth organizations) were often doing it through a deeply flawed pedagogy. Most of 
the time, ideological education consisted in throwing dreary, repetitive, and abstract party 
documents and Ceausescu’s speeches into the classrooms indiscriminately, even to not-yet-
literate students. Teachers were in the difficult position of being supposed to “teach” something 
that was very difficult to understand and explain, so they resorted to memorization and 
scrapbooking. According to students, some of them even delivered “double messages”, 
especially when discussing the economic situation. Similarly, youth organizations demanded 
mandatory participation, were highly controlled by the same teachers and their activities (except 
for trips, sports, picnics), were highly scripted and formalized, thus precluding active, unforced 
participation on the behalf of the students.  
The high school social science teachers I interviewed, the ones who bore the brunt of the 
ideological work, also had interesting and surprising accounts of the 1980s. In spite of the 
political and ideological pressures affecting the education system and their university 
departments in particular, they all reported coming from a relatively free academic environment, 
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where they had access to a wide array of readings. Thanks to a few “open-minded” teachers, they 
were exposed to balanced, objective, and sometimes, even critical views of their fields 
(Philosophy, Sociology, History). As they started their teaching careers they were put in a much 
more restrictive environment, where they were required to teach subjects that were heavily 
ideological and filled with exhortations of the Ceausescu’s genius and leadership. Furthermore, 
as years passed by, they spent more and more hours of ideological trainings, meetings and other 
activities celebrating Ceausescu’s “Golden Age.” As my analysis of the textbooks shows, 
reconciling the flagrantly exaggerated claims of economic progress and prosperity with the 
economic reality of the 1980s was quite a difficult mission. Also, the extreme, dull, and 
repetitive personality cult of Ceausescu that was infused in all the texts, made teaching even 
harder, especially at the high school level, when students were already too familiar with how 
their parents felt about the regime.  
“Bullshitting” and “embarrassment” were terms former teachers used when discussing 
these parts of their own teaching. All of them unapologetically acknowledged doing it, but along 
with it came a list of strategies they used to make things more bearable for themselves and for 
the students. Some of them reported avoiding teaching certain subjects that were more 
ideological, such as Political Economy. Others reported focusing on theory and less on the 
current social situation, favoring a historical perspective as opposed to discussing the present, 
subverting the ideological purpose of the Union of Communist Youth for more practical and 
student focused activities or simply having students copy the more ideological sections of the 
textbook in their notebooks instead of lecturing. Although teachers expressed fear of state 
control in the form of school inspectors, they still claimed to employ these strategies with the 
complicity of students, parents and administrators, and with the conviction that what happened 
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in the classroom stayed in the classroom. They were convinced that they were safe as long as 
they kept the inspectors happy with the proper paperwork and staged their classes for their 
visits.  
The last element of my method and source triangulation, the examination of the research 
reports from the Center for Research on Youth, revealed yet another space that in many ways 
escaped the apparently draconian censorship and suppression of the Ceausescu regime. Under 
the patronage of the Union of Communist Youth researchers at the center carried on social 
research in times when empirical research seemed to have been halted in academia. They were 
able to collect, analyze, and report (although in a restricted fashion) sensitive data suggesting 
significant failures of the youth “ideological education” that Ceausescu imposed.  
Some of their reports from the 1980s highlight the stronger influence of families and 
schools over communist youth organizations in influencing youth’s moral beliefs. Others, 
specifically commissioned by the Union of Communist Youth to assess its efficacy show very 
critical evaluations from its members, and even more critical evaluations from its leadership. 
The ratings of its activity as well as the written answers to the open-ended questions of the 
surveys portrayed a superficial, undemocratic organization detached form the actual interests 
and concerns of its members, virtually absent in terms of cultural influence, and run by power-
seeking, often incompetent and apathetic leaders. 
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The common thread in all the accounts of the communist years is a double discourse 
noted by Czeslaw Milosz250, as well as scholars of Romania such as Gail Kligman251, Katherine 
Verdery252 and Steve Sampson.253.  
Milosz discussed this practice as early as 1951 in his famous essay titled “Ketman”, in his 
critical volume about living under socialism. He borrowed the concept of “Ketman” from 
Gobineau’s writing on Persia254, and defined it a practice of acting and dissimulation, especially 
in circles of power:  
“He who is in possession of truth must not expose his person, his relatives or his 
reputation to the blindness, the folly, the perversity of those whom it has pleased God to 
place and maintain in error.” One must, therefore, keep silent about one’s true 
convictions if possible.255  
 
In the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, argued Milosz, Ketman was widely practiced 
in “its narrowest and severest form.” Everyone participated in it, as a strategy of coping with the 
contradictions between the official propaganda and the reality of living under socialism. 
Describing an atmosphere of competition rather than complicity, he emphasized that the 
participants delighted in deceiving each other, and took advantage of situations of “accidental 
unmasking of Ketman” to take down their adversaries.256 
                                                 
250 Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Knopf, 1953).Elemér Hankiss, East European 
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254 Arthur de Gobineau, Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l’Asie Centrale (Paris: Didier, 1866). Milosz 
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255 Milosz, The captive mind, 57. 
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Gail Kligman’s ethnography of reproductive politics in Ceausescu’s Romania257 contains 
the most thorough discussion of the Romanian case:  
Duplicity became a mode of communicative behavior, consciously lying was customary 
practice. Each was a characteristic form of dedublare, which all together spun the thread 
of duplicity. “Dedublare”, Romania’s version of ketman, roughly means division in two, 
or dual or split personalities. In the context of Ceausescu’s Romania it generally referred 
to distinctive representations of the self: a public self that engaged in public displays of 
conformity in speech and behavior, and a private self that may have retreated to the 
innermost depths of mind to preserve a kernel of individual thought. 258 
 
Kligman’s discussion of duplicity, similarly to Milosz, notes the existence of competition 
and denunciations, but in addition to that she also notes the existence of complicity among those 
practicing Ketman: women, families, networks of friends, and physicians. Her take on duplicity 
neatly fits in to James Scott259’s influential analysis of what he termed “hidden scripts,” as 
responses and patterns of resistance to power and domination, that are less visible from the 
perspective of macro-level, conventional analysis. Scott goes on to argue that manifestations 
such as “lies, sabotages, laughter, disguises, folktales, ideological inversions” are indeed a form 
of legitimate resistance to structures of domination and can over time lead to destruction of these 
structures.  
Although Scott has been criticized for his “schematic dichotomy of dominant and 
subordinate,”260 throughout my interviews I consistently found that my informants referred and 
related to “power” or “the regime” as a distinctly external entity, as opposed to more complex 
structures of power and domination. Croghan261, in his observations about the Romanian 
                                                 
257 Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity. 
258 Ibid., 15. 
259 Scott, Domination and the arts of resistance. 
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education system in the 1970s, noted a “heightened consciousness” about ideological training 
and the fact that the teachers and students he interviewed were acutely aware of it as something 
external, “something that was being done to them.” Kligman suggests an interesting answer as to 
who was this “external” power:  
[..] in the former socialist states and according to popular understanding, the state, the 
party, and the secret police were virtually synonymous with respect to their referent: “the 
power”. These rhetorical devices distinguished “them” from “us”, and in part legitimated 
acts of complicity with, and duplicity against, the state. […] duplicity and complicity – 
viewed as modes of communicative behavior – were crucial to both the endurance and 
the demise of the Ceausescu regime.262  
 
Considering that the Romanian Communist Party had a membership of four million and 
was “perhaps the largest communist party, in proportional terms, in the world,”263 and its secret 
service had a massive network of informants, such a view and awareness of the power structures 
is not surprising, and it might very well explain the prevalence and preference of such “hidden 
scripts” in Romania as opposed to more organized forms of opposition. Helena Flam264’s 
discussion of Scott’s relevance to Eastern Europe casts a shadow of doubt on his contention 
about the “anger” contained in the autonomous spaces where the subordinate “venting” occurs. 
Her analysis of the opposition movements in Poland and Germany suggests that it was rather 
fear, anxiety, and caution that characterized their activities, leading to forms of protest that had 
“ambivalent, satirical and carnivalesque forms.”265 
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My research shows that ideological indoctrination of youth in 1980s Romania existed 
more as intent (Party policies) than as outcome. It was put in practice through the education 
system and youth organizations in an inept and ambivalent fashion, and further deconstructed in 
autonomous spaces of expression within family and friendship circles. By contrasting the official 
documents, textbooks, and policies with the way everyday life in the 1980s was remembered, I 
found that the “Orwellian” policies and educational objectives of the Ceausescu regime played 
out in everyday life in a much more diluted, inefficient, and self-sabotaging way than the study 
of the official documents alone would indicate.  
My interdisciplinary and mixed methods approach to studying political socialization 
allowed me too look at it not only as a discourse or in terms of policy effectiveness but as a 
dynamic process, in which social actors do not passively absorb political messages delivered by 
an authoritarian regime, but filter out, divert, deride, or even subvert them, even at a young age. 
Another important finding is that, whereas in the literature about democratic societies, schools 
are widely considered as more important than families in the political socialization of 
teenagers266, in my case-study of a totalitarian society, it was the families and peers that were 
unarguably the most important influence.  
 
                                                 
266 M. Kent Jennings and Richard G Niemi, The Political Character of Adolescence: the Influence of 
Families and Schools ([Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Spiro Kiousis, Michael McDevitt, and Xu 
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APPENDIX A. RESEARCH TOPICS IN THE CENTER FOR YOUTH PROBLEMS 
REPORTS  
Table 11. Research topics in the Center for Youth Problems Reports 
 
Year Topics 
1969 
 
Delinquency among youth 
Health  
1970 
 
Delinquency among youth 
The role of education in youth job training 
Youth problems in the foreign press  
1971 Youth organizations 
1972 
 
Youth studies  
Theory, methodology 
Youth and social movements in capitalist societies 
Political and ideological education 
Problems of working class youth  
Social integration of young girls 
Delinquency among youth 
Youth participation in higher education  
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Leisure time 
The influence of families on youth 
Career preferences of youth 
Participation in the Union of Communist Youth  
Moral education of youth 
Adolescence 
1973 
 
Theory, methodology 
Youth problems in the foreign press  
Delinquency among youth 
The moral education of youth  
1974 
 
Theory, methodology 
Youth and demographic trends in Romania 
The materialist-scientific education of youth 
1975 
 
Education  
Youth, science and technology 
1976 
 
Youth and rural modernization  
The role of youth in socialist development 
The materialist-scientific education of youth 
Theory, methodology 
Youth organizations 
1977 
– 1979 
Missing 
1980 Rural UCY organizations 
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 Attitudes toward work 
Moral and political values 
The image of the Union of Communist Youth among youth 
Life goals and ideals of youth 
Education and career preferences  
Work socialization among rural youth 
Literary preferences of deviant youth 
Socialist consciousness of youth 
Revolutionary patriotism and attachment toward socialism 
Theory, methodology 
1981 
 
Work education/socialization 
Participation in the Union of Communist Youth  
Urbanization processes among youth 
Religious beliefs among youth 
Youth participation in factory management 
Union of Communist Youth leadership working and leadership 
styles 
The work culture of youth 
Cultural values and aspirations of youth 
Working class youth culture and aspirations  
Reading habits of youth 
Theory, methodology 
1982 Professional education 
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 Research methods in mass communication 
Education 
Youth knowledge and preferences in arts 
Western youth ideals and realities 
Youth and socialist lifestyles 
1983 
 
Mass media influence on youth: newspapers, magazines, radio 
and television 
Youth attitudes toward peace 
Prison sentences for criminal youth 
Students’ knowledge of history 
Problems of political-ideological education 
Youth participation in mining sector management 
Theory, methodology 
1984 
 
The Patriotic, revolutionary education of youth 
The role of schools, families and youth organizations in youth’s 
patriotic education 
Cultural and artistic based methods of patriotic education 
The effectiveness of political-ideological education by the youth 
organizations 
Cultural values of youth 
Theory, methodology 
1985 
 
Intergenerational relations 
Youth opinions about the effectiveness of propaganda 
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Career preferences of youth 
Socialization and professional values of youth 
Youth and occupational prestige 
The dynamic of youth’s cultural preferences 
Generations and culture 
Youth’s imagining of the year 2000 
Social and professional integration of youth 
Normative and value orientations of youth 
The role of families and peers in the social integration of youth 
Theory, methodology 
1986 
 
Mystic/obscurantist activities and perfecting the scientific-
materialistic education among youth  
The social consequences of religious alienation 
Secularization in the contemporary world and the crisis of 
religion 
The role of the Union of Communist Youth in promoting 
scientific-materialist education 
Value orientations and professional performance 
College students’ professional aspirations and motivation  
1987 
 
Culture, cultural institutions and youth socialization 
Moral and civic education 
Moral values of youth 
Youth and “Culture Houses” 
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Values and aspirations among youth 
Theory, methodology 
1988 
 
Perfecting the work style of the Union of Communist Youth 
leadership 
Mystic/obscurantist activities and perfecting the scientific-
materialistic education among youth  
The ideological education of youth 
Secular ceremonies in the lives of youth 
Youth and creativity in the factory 
Social and professional integration of youth 
Young families 
1989 
 
Education and Romanian traditional values 
Cultural and political attitudes of youth 
Patriotic education of youth 
Moral socialization of teenagers 
Demographic changes in rural areas 
Cultural influences on marriage rates 
Youth and culture (literature, film, poetry, science) 
Romanian sociology in the early 20th century 
Living spaces of youth 
Religion among youth 
Workplace integration 
Career preferences of youth 
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Civic and moral education of youth 
Theory, methodology 
 132 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Almond, Mark. The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceauşescu. London: Chapmans, 1992. 
Anghelescu, Serban et. al. Mărturii Orale : Anii ’80 si Bucureştenii. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2003. 
Apor, Péter. “The Joy of Everyday Life: Microhistory and the History of Everyday Life in the 
Socialist Dictatorships.” East Central Europe 34, no. 1/2 (June 1, 2007): 185–218. 
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New ed. New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 
1966. 
Betea, Lavinia. Mentalități si Remanențe Comuniste. București: Nemira, 2005. 
Blaga, Lucian. Luntrea lui Caron: Roman. București: Humanitas, 1990. 
Blee, Kathleen. Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2002. 
Blee, Kathleen M. “Evidence, Empathy, and Ethics: Lessons from Oral Histories of the Klan.” 
The Journal of American History 80, no. 2 (1993): 596–606. 
Boia, Lucian. Mitologia Științifică a Comunismului. București: Humanitas, 1999. 
Borneman, John. Death of the Father: an Anthropology of the End of Political Puthority. New 
York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2003. 
Boym, Svetlana. Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia. Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1994. 
Braham, Randolph L. Education in Romania: a Decade of Change. [Washington: U.S. Office of 
Education, Institute of International Studies; [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1972. 
Bren, Paulina. The Greengrocer and His TV: the Culture of Communism After the 1968 Prague 
Spring. Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press, 2010. 
Brint, Steven. Schools and Societies. 2nd ed. Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. 
 133 
Browning, Christopher R. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in 
Poland. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. 
Burawoy, Michael. The Radiant Past: Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s Road to Capitalism. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Carp, Mircea. “Vocea Americii” În România: 1969-1978. Iași: Polirom, 1997. 
Cernat, Paul. Explorări in Comunismul Românesc: 3 Vol. Iaşi: Polirom, 2004. 
——— et. al. O Lume Dispărută: Patru Istorii Personale Urmate de un Dialog cu H.-R. 
Patapievici. București: Polirom, 2004. 
Cioroianu, Adrian. Pe Umerii lui Marx: o Introducere in Istoria Comunismului Românesc. 
București: Curtea Veche, 2005. 
Constantinescu, N. N. Istoria Economica a României. Bucuresti: Editura Economica, 2000. 
Cooley, Charles Horton. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken Books, 
1964. 
———. Social process. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1918. 
Croghan, Martin. Ideological Training in Communist Education: a Case Study of Romania. 
Washington: University Press of America, 1980. 
Crowley, David. Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc. Oxford; New 
York: Berg, 2002. 
Min, Choi Song “Daily NK - Harsh Punishments for Poor Mourning”, accessed on January 20, 
2012, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8668 
Deletant, Dennis, and Centrul de Studii Românești. Romania under Communist Rule. Rev. 2nd 
ed. Iași Romania,1999. 
Deletant, Dennis. Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State, 1948-
1965. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999. 
Denzin, Norman K, and Yvonna S Lincoln. The landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories 
and Issues. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1998. 
DiGiacomo, Francis Anthony. “Education Amidst Transition: the Case of Romania”. PhD diss., 
University of Maryland, College Park, 2010.  
Division, Federal Research. Romania: a Country Study. Kessinger Publishing, 2004. 
Fainsod, Merle. Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. 
 134 
Feige, Edgar L. The Underground Economies: Tax Evasion and Information Distortion. 
Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Feinstein, Joshua. The Triumph of the Ordinary: Depictions of Daily Life in the East German 
Cinema, 1949-1989. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
Fischer, Mary. Nicolae Ceauşescu: a Study in Political Leadership. Boulder: L. Rienner 
Publishers, 1989. 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “Afterword: Revisionism Revisited.” Russian Review 45, no. 4 (1986): 409–
413. 
———. Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
———. The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts 
Under Lunacharsky October 1917-1921. Cambridge: The University Press, 1970. 
Flam, Helena. “Anger in Repressive Regimes: A Footnote to Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance by James Scott.” European Journal of Social Theory 7, no. 2 (2004): 171–
188. 
Florescu, Gheorghe. Confesiunile Unui Cafegiu. București: Humanitas, 2008. 
Friedrich, Carl. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 2d ed., rev. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965. 
Gheo, Radu. Tovarășe de Drum: Experiența Feminină in Comunism. Iași: Polirom, 2008. 
Gobineau, Arthur de. Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l’Asie Centrale. Paris: Didier, 1866. 
Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. 
New York: Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1996. 
Greenfeld, Liah. “Soviet Sociology and Sociology in the Soviet Union.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 14 (1988): 99–123. 
Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Haney, Lynne. Inventing the Needy: Gender and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002. 
Hankiss, Elemér. East European Alternatives. Oxford [England]; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Hann, Chris. Postsocialism Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2002. 
 135 
Huyssen, Andreas. Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. New York: 
Routledge, 1995. 
Inkeles, Alex. Public Opinion in Soviet Russia; a Study in Mass Persuasion. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958. 
Ivan, Ruxandra, Daniel Barbu, and Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în 
România. “Transformarea Socialista”: Politici ale Regimului Comunist între Ideologie si 
Administratie. Iasi: Polirom, 2009. 
Jakobson, Roman. Essais de Linguistique Generale: les Fondations du Langage. Paris: Minuit, 
1963. 
Jela, Doina. Afacerea Meditatia Transcendentala. Humanitas, 2004. 
Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G Niemi. The Political Character of Adolescence: the Influence 
of Families and Schools. [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. 
Jinga, Luciana, and Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România. Elev În 
Comunism = Student During the Communist Regime. București: Curtea Veche, 2009. 
Johnson, Eric A. Nazi Terror: the Gestapo, Jews, and ordinary Germans. New York: Basic 
Books, 1999. 
Jowitt, Kenneth. New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992. 
———. Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development the Case of Romania, 1944-
1965. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 
———. Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: a Debate on Development in a European 
Nation. Berkeley: University of California; Institute of international studies, 1978. 
Kay, Rebecca. Gender, Equality and Difference During and After State Socialism. Basingstoke 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Keen, Mike. Sociology in Central and Eastern Europe: Transformation at the Dawn of a New 
Millenium. Westport Conn.: Praeger, 2003. 
Keen, Mike Forrest, Mucha, Janusz., ed. Eastern Europe in Transformation: The Impact on 
Sociology. Greenwood Press, 1994. 
Kennel, Herma. Jogging cu Securitatea: Rezistența Tânărului Radu Filipescu. București: Editura 
Universal Dalsi, 1998. 
Kideckel, David. “The Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in a Romanian Commune, 1945-
62.” American Ethnologist 9, no. 2 (1982): 320–340. 
 136 
King, Robert. A History of the Romanian Communist Party. Stanford Calif.: Hoover Institution 
Press Stanford University, 1980. 
Kiousis, Spiro, Michael McDevitt, and Xu Wu. “The Genesis of Civic Awareness: Agenda 
Setting in Political Socialization.” Journal of Communication 55, no. 4 (2005): 756–774. 
Kligman, Gail. Căluş: Symbolic Transformation in Romanian Ritual. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981. 
———. The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998. 
———. “The Rites of Women: Oral Poetry, Ideology, and the Socialization of Peasant Women 
in Contemporary Romania.” Journal of American Folklore 97, no. 384 (1984): 167–188. 
Koczanowicz, Leszek. “Memory of Politics and Politics of Memory. Reflections on the 
Construction of the Past in Post-Totalitarian Poland.” Studies in East European Thought 
49, no. 4 (1997): 259–270. 
Kolaja, Jiri. Glimpses of Sociology in Eastern Europe. New Delhi: Prints India, 1990. 
Komlos, John. Nutrition and Economic Development in the Eighteenth-century Habsburg 
Monarchy: an Anthropometric History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
Kott, Sandrine. “Everyday Communism: New Social History of the German Democratic 
Republic.” Contemporary European History 13, no. 2 (May 1, 2004): 233–247. 
Kovács, Éva; “What’s New in East-Central European Sociology?” Regio - Minorities, Politics, 
Society - English Edition 1 (2002). 
Kubik, Jan. “Historical Memory and the End of Communism.” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, 
no. 2 (May 9, 2007): 127–133. 
Kürti, László. Youth and the State in Hungary: Capitalism, Communism, and Class. London; 
Sterling Va.: Pluto Press, 2002. 
Larionescu, Maria. Istoria Sociologiei Românesti. Bucuresti: Ed. Univ., 2007. 
Linz, Juan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
Livezeanu, Irina. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic 
Struggle, 1918-1930. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 
Luca, Laurentiu. “Propaganda in the schools of Communist Romania”. MA Thesis, University of 
Toronto, 2005. 
Lüdtke, Alf. The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of 
Life. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
 137 
Maier, Anneli. “Philosophy in 1974: An Embarrassing Picture”, accessed January 26, 2012. 
http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/52-3-96.shtml. 
Major, Patrick. The Workers’ and Peasants’ State: Communism and Society in East Germany 
Under Ulbricht 1945-71. Manchester UK; New York: Manchester University Press; 
Palgrave, 2002. 
Marino, Adrian. Viața Unui Om Singur. Iași: Polirom, 2010. 
Massino, Jill. “Something Old, Something New: Marital Roles and Relations in State Socialist 
Romania.” Journal of Women’s History 22, no. 1 (March 6, 2010): 34–60. 
McAdam, Doug, John D McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Sructures, and Cultural Framings. 
Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Mead, George Herbert, and Arthur Edward Murphy. The Philosophy of the Present. Chicago; 
London: Open court Pub. Co., 1932. 
Mihailescu, Ioan, and Zoltan Rostas. Dialog Neterminat. Curtea Veche, 2007. 
Milosz, Czeslaw. The Captive Mind. New York: Knopf, 1953. 
Min, Choi Song “Daily NK - Harsh Punishments for Poor Mourning”, accessed on January 20, 
2012, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=8668. 
Mohan, Raj. Handbook of Contemporary Developments in World Sociology. Westport Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1975. 
Momanu, Mariana. Educaţie si Ideologie: o Analiză Pedagogică a Sistemului Totalitar 
Comunist. Iaşi: Ed. Univ.“Alexandru Ioan Cuza,” 2005. 
Müller, Herta. Regele Se-nclină si Ucide. Iași: Polirom, 2005. 
Murgescu, Bogdan. România si Europa: Acumularea Decalajelor Economice: 1500--2010. Iaşi: 
Polirom, 2010. 
Navadaru, Cosmin. “Cum a Scapat Formatia Timpuri Noi de Ancheta Fostei Securitati: Prin Pile 
- Muzica - HotNews.ro”, accessed on October 11, 2011 http://life.hotnews.ro/stiri-
muzica-10455043-cum-scapat-formatia-timpuri-noi-ancheta-fostei-securitati-prin-
pile.htm?cfat=. 
Nelson, Daniel N. Romania after Tyranny. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. 
Nora, Pierre. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996. 
Oprea, Marius, and Dennis Deletant. Banalitatea Raului: o Istorie a Securitatii în Documente 
1949-1989. Iasi: Polirom, 2002. 
 138 
Palmowski, Jan. Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the 
GDR, 1945-1990. Cambridge UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
Pandele, Andrei. Martorul-Surpriză: Fotografii Necenzurate din Comunism. Bucureşti: 
Compania, 2008. 
Park, Madison. “North Koreans Grief-stricken over Kim’s Death - CNN.com”, accessed on 
December 22, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/19/health/north-korea-mass-
grieving/index.html. 
Popper, Karl. The Poverty of Historicism Karl Popper. London; New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Radulescu, Dan Constantin. “Învăţământul Românesc 1948–1989 – Între Derivă si Recuperare 
Instituţional - Funcţională.” Calitatea Vieţii XVII, no. 3–4 (2006): 307–318. 
Raportul Comisiei Prezidenţiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, accessed on 
January 20, 2011. 
http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/RAPORT_FINAL_CPADCR.pdf. 
Reid, Susan. Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-war Eastern Europe. 
Oxford; New York: Berg, 2000. 
Rostás, Zoltán, and Andrei Pippidi. Chipurile Orasului: Istorii de Viata în Bucuresti: Secolul 
XX. Iasi: Polirom, 2002. 
Rostás, Zoltán, and Sorin Stoica. Istorie la Firul Ierbii: Documente Sociale Orale. Bucuresti: 
Tritonic, 2003. 
Sampson, Steven. National Integration through Socialist Planning. Boulder: East European 
Monographs, 1984. 
Schwartz, Barry. “Introduction: The Expanding Past.” Qualitative Sociology. 19, no. 3 (1996): 
275–282. 
Scott, James C. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990. 
Shafir, Michael. Romania: Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated 
Change. London: Pinter, 1985. 
Shalin, Dmitri. “Sociology for the Glasnost Era: Institutional and Substantive Changes in Recent 
Soviet Sociology.” Social Forces 68, no. 4 (1990): 1019–1039. 
Șiulea, Ciprian. Iluzia Anticomunismului: Lecturi Critice Ale Raportului Tismăneanu. Ediția 1. 
Chișinău: Cartier, 2008. 
Stokes, Gale. The Walls came Tumbling down: the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. 
New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
 139 
 140 
Tarkovskii, Andrei Arsen’evich, Natal’ia Bondarchuk, Donatas Banionis, Yuri Yarvet, Stanislaw 
Lem, Moskovskaia kinostudiia “Mosfil’m.”, and Criterion Collection (Firm). Solaris. 
[S.I.]: Criterion Collection, 2002. 
Thom, Françoise. Newspeak: the Language of Soviet Communism. London: Claridge, 1989. 
Tismaneanu, Vladimir. Byzantine Rites, Stalinist Follies: the Twilight of Dynastic Socialism in 
Romania. Philadelphia PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1986. 
———. Stalinism for All Seasons: a Political History of Romanian Communism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003. 
———. The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: the Poverty of Utopia. London; New 
York: Routledge, 1988. 
———. Understanding National Stalinism: a Comparative Approach to the History of 
Romanian Communism. Washington D.C.: East European Program European Institute 
The Wilson Center, 1990. 
Tucker, Robert, and American Council of Learned Societies Devoted to Humanistic Studies. 
Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation. 1st ed. New York NY: Norton, 1977. 
Vasile, Cristian. “Educaţie si Ideologie in România 1948–1953.” Revista Istorică XV, no. 5–6 
(2004): 121–140. 
———. Literatura si Artele în România Comunista: 1948 - 1953. Bucuresti: Humanitas, 2010. 
Verdery, Katherine. National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceauşescu’s Romania. Berkeley/Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1995. 
———. Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic Change. 
Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California press, 1983. 
Volovici, Leon, and Sandu Frunza. De la Iasi la Ierusalim si Inapoi: pornind de la un dialog cu 
Sandu Frunza. Bucuresti: Ideea Europeana, 2007. 
Vultur, Smaranda, and Fundația “A Treia Europă.” Lumi in Destine: Memoria Generațiilor de 
Început de Secol din Banat. București: Nemira, 2000. 
Vultur, Smaranda. Germanii din Banat prin Povestirile lor. București: Paideia, 2000. 
———. Istorie Trăită - Istorie Povestită: Deportarea in Bărăgan (1951 - 1956). Timisoara: Ed. 
Amarcord, 1997. 
———. Memoria Salvată: Evreii din Banat, Ieri si Azi. Iași: Polirom, 2002. 
 
 
